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 Mining Bodies explores the history of U.S. experimentation in the Central American and 
Caribbean region during the twentieth century. It focuses in particular on experiments conducted 
by the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS), the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB), and the 
Guatemalan government during the 1940s in Guatemala on sexually-transmitted infections 
(STIS). During these experiments, U.S. and Guatemalan doctors intentionally exposed at least 
1500 Guatemalans to STIs. The doctors did not provide available treatments nor receive 
informed consent from the people they experimented upon. This dissertation argues that these 
experiments arose from a medical research network created by U.S. and Latin American 
institutions in Guatemala during the twentieth century. They also resulted from systemic factors 
that included U.S. imperialism in the Central American and Caribbean region, a culture of 
medicine in the United States and Guatemala, health professionals’ paternalism, and racism. As 
this dissertation explores the historical factors that enabled doctors to construe Guatemalans as 
medical subjects, it also highlights the imprint that medical experimentation continues to have on 
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INTRODUCTION: DOCTORS ACROSS BORDERS 
 
 In December 2015, Marta Lidia Orellana walked across Guatemala City’s plaza central 
with her son, Luis, to demand a meeting with the country’s Vice President.1 Orellana is one of 
the survivors of experiments that the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS), the Pan American 
Sanitary Bureau (PASB), and the Guatemalan government conducted in Guatemala in the 1940s. 
In these experiments on preventative methods and treatments for sexually-transmitted infections 
(STIs), U.S. and Guatemalan doctors intentionally infected at least 1300 Guatemalans with three 
STIs—syphilis, gonorrhea, and chancroid. Since the researchers were careless in their record-
keeping, it remains unknown exactly how many Guatemalans they actually infected. The doctors 
did not obtain informed consent from the people they experimented upon, nor did they provide 
the majority of Guatemalans they infected with available treatments at the time.2 In 2010, the 
U.S. government apologized to then Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom, not to the people 
actually infected with STIs. 3  
 The legacy of these experiments remains present within the bodies and minds of 
generations of Guatemalans more than seventy years after they occurred. Many Guatemalans still 
have received neither treatment nor compensation for what happened to them. Orellana was just 
ten years old in the national orphanage when she said that doctors infected her with syphilis, an 
infectious disease caused by a spirochete that can render severe damage to the brain, heart, and 
other organs. Her children and grandchildren have also borne the cost of her encounter with the 
                                                      
1 Interview with Marta Lidia Orellana, Guatemala City, Guatemala, December 11, 2015. I have decided to use Ms. Orellana’s 
name because she agreed to have it made public during my interview with her. She has also chosen to have her name appear 
publicly in newspapers.  
2 Both the U.S. and the Guatemalan governments sponsored investigations and reports using archival documents located in their 
respective countries. See, U.S. Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, “’Ethically Impossible’: STD 
Research in Guatemala from 1946 to 1948, September 2011. Informe de la Comisión Presidencial para el Esclarecimiento de los 
Experimentos Practicados con Humanos en Guatemala, “Consentir el Daño: Experimentos Médicos de Estados Unidos en 
Guatemala, 1946-1948,” octubre de 2011.   
3 “Joint Statement by Secretaries Clinton and Sebelius on a 1946-1948-Study,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
October 1, 2010. Last retrieved July 19, 2018: https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/10/148464.htm 
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doctors. Orellana passed syphilis congenitally to at least three of her five children (two of her 
children migrated to the United States and have not been tested by doctors).4 Now in her eighties, 
Orellana’s efforts to obtain justice for what happened remains hampered by her physical 
limitations. She and Luis had repeatedly contacted the Vice President’s office to ask for a 
meeting. Since they received no answer, they decided to show up and request a meeting in 
person. The journey into the center of Guatemala City was onerous for Orellana. Luis steadied 
his mother’s arm as she walked.  
 Orellana’s struggle to walk to the Vice President’s office appeared dissonant with the 
Navidad celebrations in the plaza central on that warm December morning. Still, the buildings 
surrounding the square tell a history of Guatemalan state repression bolstered by the United 
States throughout the twentieth century. On one side of the square lies the sprawling presidential 
palace, built in the 1930s with forced labor by the pro-American dictator, Jorge Ubico. The 
Cathedral of Guatemala City, the most imposing structure in the square, has columns listing 
names of people disappeared and killed by the military during the Civil War (1960-1996), which 
became a Cold War battleground and resulted in the deaths of 200,000 people and a “scorched-
earth” offensive in the Guatemalan highlands where the indigenous population is concentrated.5 
The remains of Archbishop Juan José Gerardi, murdered in 1998 by the Guatemalan military 
after publishing, Guatemala: Never Again!, a human rights report about the atrocities committed 
during the war, also lie in the Cathedral.6 As Orellana struggles to obtain justice for what 
                                                      
4 Interview with Marta Lidia Orellana, Guatemala City, Guatemala, December 11, 2015. 
5 The 1999 truth commission report, CEH, claimed the Guatemalan government, backed by the United States, conducted 
genocide against indigenous people. It also said that 93% of the human rights violations in the country were committed by the 
Guatemalan state and paramilitary forces. Commission for Historical Clarification (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico), 
“Guatemala: Memory of Silence (Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio), February 1999. REMHI, “Guatemala Never Again!” 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1999).  
6 Francisco Goldman, The Art of Political Murder: Who Killed the Bishop? (New York: Grove Press, 2008). REMHI, 
Guatemala: Never Again!  
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happened to her during the experiments, Guatemala’s efforts to transition to democracy and 
address impunity in the country for human rights violations committed during the war has been 
hampered by the entrenched power structure in the country.7   
 The experiments form part of a long history of violence perpetrated by two states on 
women, indigenous, and marginalized Guatemalans. The irony was that the experiments were 
done in the name of medicine. Following the U.S. apology, the international press, activists, 
doctors, and academics expressed outrage. “Fueron los experimentos del diablo” (they were 
experiments of the devil), the son of one survivor of the experiments told journalists.8 An article 
in the local Guatemalan press compared the experiments to the “genocidal policies” committed 
by Nazis during World War II.9 In the United States, the media has generally focused on the 
similarities between Guatemala and a 40-year study (1932-1972) that occurred in Tuskegee, 
Alabama in which USPHS doctors observed the progression of syphilis in poor and African 
American men. The researchers intentionally deceived the men and actively kept them from 
receiving available treatments.10 The comparison between these two examples of controversial 
                                                      
7 President Jimmy Morales has refused to renew the contract with the United Nations on the International Commission against 
Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) an organization formed to fight corruption in the country that emerged during the years of 
military dictatorship. See “Guatemala: Termination of CICIG agreement is latest blow to the fight against impunity,” Amnesty 
International, January 8, 2019: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/01/guatemala-terminacion-del-acuerdo-con-cicig-
es-un-nuevo-atropello-a-la-lucha-contra-impunidad. The Guatemalan government has also recently proposed to grant amnesty for 
war crimes conducted during the civil war, despite protest from the U.S. State Department. Elizabeth Malkin, “Vote Could Free 
More than 30 Men Accused of War Crimes in Guatemala,” New York Times, March 12, 2019: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/world/americas/guatemala-military-amnesty-war-crimes.html 
8 José Elías, “Fueron los experimentos del diablo,” El País, March 26, 2011: 
https://elpais.com/diario/2011/03/26/sociedad/1301094003_850215.html. Rory Carroll, “Guatemala Victims of the U.S. Syphilis 
Study Will be Haunted by the ‘Devil’s Experiment,’” The Guardian, June 8, 2011.  
9 L. Reynolds, K. Reyes, C. Palma, “Comparen experimentos con las peores atrocidades cometidas por loz nazis,” el periódico, 2 
de octubre 2010, 3. 
10 Antonio Ordoñez y Oscar Ismatul, “Experimentos de EE.UU: Legislación facilitó pruebas en el país,” Primer Informe Sobre la 
Sífilis, Gonorrea, y Chancroide, Colegio de Médicos y Cirujanos de Guatemala, AGCA, octubre de 2010. Sushma Subramanian, 
“Worse than Tuskegee,” Slate magazine, February 26, 2017. Linda Villarosa, “The Guatemala Syphilis Experiment’s Tuskegee 
Roots,” The Root, October 2, 2010: https://www.theroot.com/the-guatemala-syphilis-experiments-tuskegee-roots-1790881109. 
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., “U.S. Apologizes for Syphilis Tests in Guatemala,” New York Times, October 1, 2010: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/health/research/02infect.html. “Catholics Condemn 1940s Experiment on Guatemalans as 
Abuse of Power,” Catholic Review, January 19, 2012. https://www.archbalt.org/catholics-condemn-1940s-experiments-on-
guatemalans-as-abuse-of-power. “U.S. Infected Guatemalans during 1940s,” NPR: All Things Considered, Ocober 1, 2010: 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130272412.  
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research is warranted. They both emerged from the same USPHS laboratory and involved many 
of the same doctors, including John C. Cutler, who directed the experiment in Guatemala. In 
1993, he gained notoriety for his defense of the Alabama study as beneficial for the African 
American community in a NOVA documentary.11 Yet, these two examples of research also have 
an important difference. In Alabama, USPHS doctors observed the natural course of the disease 
in men who already had syphilis; in Guatemala, they infected people with STIs. Historian Susan 
Reverby, who found the archival records pertaining to Guatemala during the course of her 
research on Tuskegee, has said that the pervasive myth in American society that USPHS doctors 
infected African American men with syphilis in Alabama actually occurred further south in 
Guatemala.12 
 Still, painting the experiments as “Guatemala’s Tuskegee” erases the specific histories of 
Guatemala and U.S. imperialism in the Central American and Caribbean region that enabled this 
research to occur. While the stories of “Tuskegee” continue to hold power because of the truth 
they communicate about the history of race relations and state power in the United States, the 
tale of experimentation in Guatemala has effectively disappeared from U.S. popular discourse.13 
Following a brief stir in the media, the experiments have since been forgotten or ignored by the 
vast majority of Americans, similarly to how U.S. empire continues to remain “invisible” to 
many people in the United States.14 Guatemala remains a foreign land whose history and people 
have little meaning to the majority of Americans. Recently, President Donald Trump has sought 
                                                      
11 The Deadly Deception, PBS: NOVA, 1993.  
12 Susan M. Reverby, “’Normal Exposure’ and Inoculation Syphilis: A PHS ‘Tuskegee’ Doctor in Guatemala, 1946-8,” Journal 
of Policy History Vol. 23, 1 (January 2011): 6-28. Amy Goodman, “From Tuskegee to Guatemala Via Nuremberg,” Democracy 
Now, October 6, 2010: https://www.democracynow.org/2010/10/6/from_tuskegee_to_guatemala_via_nuremberg. 
13 Susan M. Reverby, Examining Tuskegee: The Infamous Syphilis Study and Its Legacy, (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2009). 
14 Although academics have in recent years done impressive work to highlight the history of U.S. empire, the vast majority of the 
population has yet to confront the history of U.S. involvement in the world. See the recent debate on U.S. empire: Daniel 
Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire: A History of the United States that Includes Its Territories (New York: Farrar, Straus, and 
Giroux, 2019). Paul A. Kramer, “How Not to Write the History of U.S. Empire,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 42, 1 (2018): 911-931. 
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to build a border wall to keep the so-called “animals” of Central America and Mexico from 
migrating to the United States, ignoring how U.S. involvement in this region has shaped the 
circumstances causing people to flee. The language he uses to describe Central Americans 
resembles that of USPHS researchers when discussing Guatemalans during the 1940s. For many 
Americans in the past and continuing into the present day, Central Americans are racialized as 
“animals” and “illegal aliens,” or non-humans.  
 In Mining Bodies, I argue that these experiments serve as a useful lens through which to 
view the interwoven histories of the United States and Guatemala, although they also highlight 
the history of U.S. involvement in the entire Central American and Caribbean region. While 
individual doctors can be held responsible for what occurred during these experiments, I argue 
that systemic factors present in both countries played a greater role. These factors included the 
United States’ colonial relationship with Guatemala, the institutional and ethical norms of U.S. 
and Guatemalan medical and public health institutions, a masculinist culture of medical research 
that crossed national boundaries and cultures, and understandings of race in both countries. 
Beginning around the turn of the twentieth century, U.S. rising power led to the development of 
U.S. public health and medical systems that operated beyond U.S. borders in Central America, 
the Caribbean, and the Pacific.15 American colonial medicine and public health bolstered U.S. 
foreign policy goals to promote stability in foreign countries and territories, protect U.S. officers 
                                                      
15 Mariola Espinosa, Yellow Fever and the Limits of Cuban Independence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2006). Michelle Moran, Colonizing Leprosy: Imperialism and the Politics of Public Health in 
the United States (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). Laura Briggs, Reproducing Empire: Race, 
Sex, Science and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003). Steven 
Palmer, Launching Global Health: The Caribbean Odyssey of the Rockefeller Foundation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2010). Anne-Emanuelle Birn, Marriage of Convenience: Rockefeller International Health and Revolutionary Mexico 
(Rochester and London: University of Rochester Press, 2006). Alexandra Minna Stern, “The Public Health Service in the Panama 
Canal: A Forgotten Chapter of U.S. Public Health,” Public Health Reports, Vol. 120, 6 (Nov.-Dec. 2005): 675-9. Eileen Findlay, 
Imposing Decency: The Politics of Sexuality and Race in Puerto Rico, 1870-1920 (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2000).  
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and soldiers stationed on bases abroad, ensure the flow of trade, and “civilize” people located in 
these regions. As part of this infrastructure, doctors at U.S. government agencies and private 
institutions conducted research on tropical medicine or afflictions that threatened the security of 
the United States and the liberal world order.16 
 Guatemala formed a key piece of this medical research network that emerged during the 
twentieth century. U.S. private and public institutions, including the United Fruit Company, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Office of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (OIIAA), the Pan 
American Sanitary Bureau (PASB)/USPHS, and later the World Health Organization (WHO), 
formed a medical research network in Guatemala that built upon the country’s long history of 
repression and impunity. Through the infrastructure that these institutions developed, U.S. 
doctors formed ties with Guatemalan medical professionals who sought to uplift their careers and 
their nation within the bounds of economic dependency to the United States. Yet, Guatemalan 
doctors also demonstrated agency in their efforts to bring U.S. knowledge and technological 
resources to their country. In the experiments on STIs, U.S. and Guatemalan doctors bonded over 
a secret. Together they created a research space hidden from the laws and ethics of both 
countries. Although they had different reasons for participating in this research, they forged 
connections based upon their paternalism, sense of professional accomplishment, and the 
legacies of American and Spanish colonialisms.  
     U.S. and Guatemalan doctors by no means forged their diplomatic alliance on equal 
ground. I use the term alliance rather than partnership to highlight the inequalities underscoring 
their relationships. Many of the U.S. doctors who approved and participated in these experiments 
                                                      
16 Espinosa, Epidemic Invasions, 56-63. Michelle T. Moran, Colonizing Leprosy, 56-7, 108-111, 118-123. Stern, “The Public 
Health Service in the Panama Canal.” Susan E. Lederer, “’Porto Richochet’: Joking about Germs, Cancer, and Race 
Experimentation in the 1930s,” American Literary History 14, no. 4 (2002): 22-46. Palmer, Launching Global Health, 1 
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had gained renown globally for their discovery in World War II that penicillin cured syphilis. 17 
They benefited from the fact that the United States entered the height of its power following 
World War II and began channeling more money into research. Although as government doctors 
they lacked financial power in the United States, they remained important members of the 
American meritocracy and became leaders in the USPHS, World Health Organization and in 
U.S. universities. In contrast, Guatemalan doctors contended with authoritarian rule and political 
turmoil that impeded their ability to develop an effective medical and public health system and 
participate in research.18 They had little opportunity to assume political and intellectual 
leadership roles to which they believed they were entitled given their knowledge of the 
biological aspects of life.  
 Although many Guatemalan doctors decried U.S. imperialismo (imperialism), they still 
forged ties with U.S. institutions and professionals who operated in their country because they 
offered opportunities to gain access to medical knowledge, technology, and connections to 
recognized researchers in an international medical community. Scholars of the history of 
medicine in Latin American have highlighted that countries such as Mexico, Argentina, and 
Brazil led innovation in public health and medicine and developed policies specific to their 
geographies and nations. These countries did not just seek to emulate developments in the United 
States and Europe.19 In contrast, Guatemala was a small and poor country on the periphery of 
                                                      
17 Allan Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease Since 1880 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987): 17-2. Harry Marks, The Progress of Experiment: Science and Therapeutic Reform in the United States, 1900-1990 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 108-113. 
18 Steven Palmer, From Popular Medicine to Medical Populism: Doctors, Healers, and Public Power in Costa Rica, 1800-1940 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003): 52. David Carey, Jr., Engendering Mayan History: Kaqchikel Women as 
Agents and Conduits of the Past, 1875-1970 (New York: Routledge, 2006): 44.  
19 Gabriela Soto Laveaga, Jungle Laboratories: Mexican Peasants, National Projects, and the Making of the Pill (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2009): 66. Espinosa, Epidemic Invasions, 56-63. Nancy Leys Stepan, “The Hour of Eugenics: 
Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991): 3-4. Julyan G. Peard, Race, 
Place, and Medicine: The Idea of the Tropics in Nineteenth Century Brazilian Medicine (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 1999): 3. 
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U.S. empire that did not have the resources to effectively participate in a global medical research 
network emerging during this time period, even though Guatemalan doctors also never simply 
followed the policies and innovations of the United States. Moreover, despite that other Central 
American countries such as Costa Rica developed robust medical and public health systems 
made possible by their incorporation of popular medical beliefs into biomedicine, political 
instability and repression also hampered Guatemalan doctors’ efforts to assume the positions of 
power that they desired and to shape imperial medical policies according to their own terms.20    
 As American imperial networks operating in Central America and the Caribbean enabled 
ties between U.S. and Guatemalan doctors, these doctors also bonded across borders through 
their paternalism. Although the doctors’ paternalism was shaped by the specific histories of their 
countries, they still forged connections through their masculine identities and sense of 
professional accomplishment that led them to view themselves as above ethics and laws. U.S. 
and Guatemalan doctors shared convictions that they should determine the treatments for their 
patients and methodologies for research without interference from other government officials, 
lawyers, or activist groups. Historian Susan Lederer has highlighted that U.S. doctors never had 
complete freedom to do whatever they pleased in medical research, despite lacking clear 
guidelines and enforcement policies governing research prior to the end of World War II.21 Still, 
although anti-vivisectionists and social reformers challenged medical doctors’ authority, in 
general the medical community continued to hold through much of the twentieth century that the 
“best men” should make decisions about the biological aspects of life.22 This view was shared by 
                                                      
20 Steven Palmer, From Popular Medicine to Medical Populism, 3-7. 
21 Lederer, Subjected to Science, xv. 
22 David J. Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical Decision Making, 
(New York: Basic Books, 1992): 1, 5. Harry Marks, The Progress of Experiments, 12. 
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Guatemalan doctors, even though they did not receive the respect they believed they deserved 
from political leadership in Guatemala. 
 Although scholars have highlighted the central role of paternalism in forming the 
identities of U.S. foreign policy actors including diplomats and soldiers, they have given less 
attention to doctors in shaping America’s presence in the world.23 An exception is historian 
Warwick Anderson who has shown how the masculine and white racial identities of U.S. Army 
doctors were hardened by colonialism and informed their treatment of Filipinos during the U.S. 
occupation at the beginning of the twentieth century.24 Doctors’ perceptions of themselves were 
also shaped by U.S. popular culture. By the 1920s, novelists, filmmakers, and journalists 
celebrated the medical heroism of doctors who traveled to foreign lands to conquer disease. 
USPHS officers charged with protecting U.S. borders were portrayed as valorous war heroes. 
Novels such as Paul de Kruif’s Microbe Hunters (1926) and Sinclair Lewis’ novel Arrowsmith 
(1925) further glorified doctors. In particular, these novelists celebrated U.S. Army doctor 
Walter Reed and the U.S. soldiers who participated in his experiments on yellow fever in Cuba 
during the U.S. occupation at the beginning of the twentieth century.25 In contrast, Lewis 
denigrated the role of the Spanish immigrants who participated in Reed’s experiments, 
describing them as “hardly more intelligent than animals,” a view that reflected USPHS doctors’ 
perceptions of the Guatemalans upon whom they experimented.26 Novelists also elided the role 
of Cuban doctor Carlos Finlay in discovering that the mosquito was the cause of yellow fever.27 
                                                      
23 Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy, (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2001). Mary Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940, 
(Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How 
Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).  
24 Anderson, Colonial Pathologies, 6-7.  
25 Paul de Kruif, Microbe Hunters (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1926). Sinclair Lewis, Arrowsmith (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1925). 
26 Quoted in Lederer, Subjected to Science, 132.  
27 In truth, both Finlay and Reed can take credit for this discovery. Finlay identified the mosquito that was the vector of the 
disease, but Reed conducted experiments showing that the mosquito transmitted the disease. Moreover, it was Jesse Lazear, a 
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Among Cuban nationalists and Latin American medical professionals, the omission of Finlay’s 
discovery became a cause célebre to denounce U.S. intellectual and medical imperialism. 
Although U.S. and Guatemalan doctors shared a sense of paternalism, U.S. doctors still harbored 
superior attitudes towards Latin American doctors.  
 Despite competition with U.S. doctors, Guatemalan medical professionals saw 
themselves as contenders in the international medical sphere. In the tradition of Latin American 
doctors who have taken a decidedly active role in public life, Guatemalan doctors also viewed 
themselves as rightful leaders of their countries.28 Their gender, class, and race privilege further 
influenced their identities.29 As Guatemalan Historian Arturo Taracena Arriola has observed, the 
Guatemalan nation has been imagined as Ladino, an identity defined in opposition to indigenous 
identity.30 Guatemalan doctors who participated in these experiments were Ladinos. Many 
Guatemalan doctors had ties to the “oligarchy,” a term that still applies to the country and refers 
to the entrenched power of the agricultural and business elite and its ties to the military and 
political leaders.31 Doctors often had opportunities to study at elite universities in the United 
States and in Europe. Sharp inequality defined Guatemalan society, the development of 
Guatemalan medicine, and the doctors’ perceptions of women, marginalized and indigenous 
Guatemalans. 
 U.S. and Guatemalan doctors’ shared paternalism further was shaped by the influence of 
eugenics on their public health and medical work. The term eugenics was coined in the late 
nineteenth century by Francis Galton, Charles Darwin’s cousin. Eugenicists believed they could 
                                                      
member of the U.S. commission to study yellow fever, who initiated the experiments with mosquitos. See Espinosa, Epidemic 
Invasions, 56-7.  
28 Marcos Cueto and Steven Palmer, Medicine and Public Health in Latin America: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015): 65. 
29 Ibid, 61. 
30 Arturo Taracena Arriola, Etnicidad, estado y nación en Guatemala, 1808-1944 Vol. 1 (Antigua: CIRMA, 2002): 24. 
31 Ibid, 109-111. Marta Elena Casaús Arzú, Guatemala: Linaje y Racismo, (Guatemala: F & G Editores, 2010): 115-116, 169. 
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draw upon fields of human knowledge in order to promote “better breeding” and perfect human 
society according to their ideals of race, gender, sexuality, class. In both the United States and 
Guatemala, two countries with strong racial divides, venereal disease engaged anxieties about 
racial crossings and the reproduction of populations that would become burdens to society, since 
it could cause disabilities in the offspring of women who had the disease. Although by World 
War II Nazi Germany had rendered scientific racism out of fashion in the United States, the 
practice of eugenics continued to inform U.S. family planning, population control efforts, and 
sex research.32 Many USPHS/PASB leaders had been trained in eugenics and these ideas 
continued to influence the organization’s research in Alabama and Guatemala.33 The eugenics 
movement also remained strong in Latin America continuing through the 1940s.34  Both U.S. and 
Guatemalan doctors saw themselves as entitled to assert control over women’s reproduction and 
the bodies of poor and indigenous Guatemalans for the wellbeing of their nations.  
 Although scholars have presented Latin American eugenics as developed in opposition to 
a “hardline” U.S. and European eugenics, the experiments in Guatemala show that the 
distinctions between the two were not as definitive as has been assumed by scholars and 
practitioners. Historian Nancy Leys Stepan’s seminal work, The Hour of Eugenics, argued that 
Latin American eugenicists, challenging the racism of the United States and Europe and 
informed by the Catholicism in their countries, adopted a preventative approach to eugenics in 
which they sought to cleanse the environment of “racial poisons” such as venereal disease, 
                                                      
32 Alexandra Minna Stern, Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America (Berkeley and Los 
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alcohol, and tuberculosis.35 She contended that Latin Americans have avoided interventionist 
policies that U.S. and European eugenicists have used to control reproduction including 
sterilization. Yet, recently Latin American historians have shown that interventionist eugenic 
policies such as sterilization were much more widespread than had been previously assumed.36 
Likewise, the experiments represent an interventionist approach on the part of both U.S. and 
Guatemalan physicians. In their effort to gain knowledge about venereal disease, doctors harmed 
the reproductive health of Guatemalans for generations. Through their research, they sought to 
gain better control over the spread of disease in the populations who were the subjects of their 
public health work.       
 As paternalism bonded U.S. and Guatemalan doctors across national divides, USPHS 
doctors’ ethical understandings were still informed by the border they envisioned between the 
United States and Latin America. USPHS doctors believed that they could follow a different set 
of ethical parameters in Guatemala than they followed in the United States. As members of a 
medical force trained to protect U.S. national borders and with a history of inspecting Latin 
American immigrants on the U.S.-Mexico border who they presumed were immoral and rife 
with disease, USPHS doctors imagined Guatemala as a land where they could escape the 
criticism of social reformers and laws in the United States.37 During the STI experiments, 
USPHS Surgeon General Thomas Parran was reported by another USPHS officer to have said 
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that these experiments could never have been conducted in the United States.38 In the same letter, 
the USPHS officer, who had visited Cutler in Guatemala and observed his research, claimed that 
he was “looking over the fence” with envy at the freedoms that he believed U.S. medical 
researchers enjoyed in Guatemala.39  
 Yet, the border that USPHS officers envisioned between the United States and Latin 
America was not as distinctive as they had supposed. Concerns about sexuality and morality also 
remained strong in Guatemala. Knowing that the experiments would be controversial in the 
United States and in Guatemala, doctors from both countries forged an alliance to keep them a 
secret. The experiments in Guatemala became lore among USPHS officers, but Cutler and his 
team never published an article about it.40 In contrast, USPHS officers published numerous 
articles about their study in Alabama in leading medical journals, although they did not mention 
the deceptive tactics they used to convince the men to cooperate with them.41 In Guatemala, 
doctors also did not publish an article about the intentional-exposure experiments. As in the 
United States, the experiments became known within Guatemalan medical circles, but the 
majority of the population remained in the dark about what had happened until the public 
revelation in 2010. 
 USPHS officials’ perceptions of the ethical differences in these two examples of research 
were further informed by their understandings of race and STIs. In Alabama, doctors justified 
their work as a “study in nature.”42 They claimed that they were not interfering in the men’s 
lives, a contention informed by their racialized understandings that dated to the slavery about the 
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“naturalness” of black male’s excessive sexuality and beliefs that the men would have been 
unable to access healthcare resources. Yet, nothing about their perceptions of these men nor the 
study was natural. USPHS officers actively kept the men from obtaining treatment. USPHS 
doctors also believed that syphilis was not infectious during the latent stages. In fact, syphilis can 
remain contagious in the latent stages and continues to have severe effects on the heart, brains, 
and other organs.43 The doctors further limited the study just to men in part to limit the spread of 
syphilis congenitally through women to their offspring. USPHS doctors did not take these 
precautions in Guatemala. In the Central American region, the doctors also believed it was 
“natural” to not provide medical treatment to the people they infected with syphilis. The doctors 
violated what they understood to be their duties as public health officers to contain syphilis at its 
early stages when it was most infectious.44  
 Indeed, the fact that doctors intentionally infected Guatemalans with a disease transmitted 
sexuality strongly influenced the decision to keep these experiments hidden. Although the United 
States had no formal guidelines governing medical research before World War II, doctors 
demonstrated particular caution in their studies during World II in which they used an inoculant 
to infect men with gonorrhea.45 Many in the United States continued to view STIs as divine 
punishment and remained wary of research on these infections. These perceptions made doctors 
more inclined to keep their research from the American public. Similar concerns about research 
on sexuality and reproduction led researchers to conduct clinical trials on the birth control pill in 
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Puerto Rico in the 1950s.46 As the American public has remained wary of research on sexuality 
and reproduction, U.S. scientists have conducted their work in colonial sites in order to avoid 
criticism and laws.  
 Doctors also kept the experiments secret because they used sex workers to transmit the 
disease to soldiers and prisoners. Sex work was illegal in the United States, even though military 
commanders tolerated and even encouraged soldiers to visit brothels in foreign countries. 
Surgeon General Parran had led the charge during World War II to force the military to repress 
sex work surrounding military bases.47 In 1941, Parran and fellow USPHS officer Raymond 
Vonderlehr published Plain Words About Venereal Disease, in which they lambasted the 
military for its toleration of prostitution.48 Given the illegality of sex work in the United States 
and the USPHS role in suppressing it, the doctors believed it imperative to hide their research. 
Guatemala had a legalized system of sex work in which women had to register with the state and 
report for regular vaginal inspections. USPHS doctors believed that this system offered an 
opportunity to study “natural exposure,” or to gain a better understanding of the transmission of 
the disease. In a tropical country like Guatemala that had legalized sex work, doctors also viewed 
their work as a “study in nature.” Despite that the USPHS had criticized military policies of 
tolerating sex work during the war, doctors like many other U.S. officials have adhered to 
different legal and moral standards in the domestic sphere as opposed to in colonized locations. 
 As U.S. doctors envisioned Central America as a land apart from the concerns hampering 
their research in the United States, Guatemalan doctors’ distance from the poor and indigenous 
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groups they experimented upon also informed their ethical understandings. When news broke 
about the experiments in 2010, the Guatemalan media highlighted the controversy surrounding 
the fact that this research occurred during Guatemala’s Revolution (1944-1954), a period with 
considerable symbolic weight among Guatemala’s left. Known as “Ten Years of Spring,” the 
Revolution was a period of democratization in a country otherwise marked by authoritarian rule. 
Soon after the revelation of the experiments, a newspaper article quoted Alfonso Bauer Paiz, an 
administrator during this period who commented that he was not surprised the gringos would 
accuse the revolutionary leader, President Juan José Arévalo, of having approved these 
experiments now that he had passed away.49 To some, the experiments and the public revelation 
represented another attempt by the United States to meddle in Guatemalan affairs and historical 
memory. 
 The Revolution did indeed mark a watershed in Guatemalan history. The government 
passed a labor law and implemented a social security system. Although Arévalo was more 
moderate in his reforms, President Jacobo Arbenz Gúzman demonstrated a commitment to 
indigenous and labor demands and passed agrarian reform that included confiscating land from 
the United Fruit Company (a measure that some historians have argued was instrumental in 
convincing the CIA to back a coup against the administration in 1954 that unceremoniously 
ended the Revolution).50 The historical literature on the Revolution has primarily focused on 
diplomatic relations between U.S. and Guatemalan political actors, the United Fruit Company, 
and agrarian reform.51  
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 Yet, the Revolutoin was certainly not “Ten Years of Spring” for all people in the country. 
The experiments provide a different perspective on U.S. and Guatemalan relations during this 
ten-year period by showing that the Guatemalan government continued to seek foreign aid and 
technical expertise from the United States, especially during the Arévalo period, despite claims 
to national sovereignty.52 Moreover, a few studies have highlighted the violence towards women, 
indigenous, and marginalized Guatemalans that occurred during this period and the social 
instability that it spurred in the countryside.53  
 By examining the medical arena, we further see the repression that continued during the 
revolutionary period. Doctors did not view their policies as repressive; they sought to implement 
a “regeneración” (regeneration) of the people following years of dictatorial rule. They aimed to 
heal what they viewed as Guatemala’s “broken body,” or divisions between the Ladino and 
indigenous populations and to address issues of poverty and disease in the country that they 
believed hampered national development.54 Although scholars have often presented the 
ladino/indigenous divide as based upon cultural differences, Guatemalan Anthropologist Marta 
Casaus Arzú highlighted in her groundbreaking study that understandings of “blood purity” 
informed elite ladino/a perceptions of their identities.55 As Casaus Arzú and Taracena Arriola 
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have shown, Ladino nationalism has primarily promoted segregationist policies with indigenous 
peoples in order to protect the economic and political power of elites.56   
 In contrast, the Revolution was a period focused on nation-building and assimilation of 
indigenous people into Ladino values and nationalism, even though segregationist policies 
continued during this period. Therefore, it is not surprising that concerns about sexuality and 
reproduction became central in doctors’ efforts to build a unified population and a new 
Guatemala.57 Venereal disease control and the regulation of sex work became a key focus of 
doctors and political leaders touting “regeneración.” Discourse surrounding venereal disease and 
sex work became a path for doctors to teach Guatemalans their views of morality and 
reproductive health in order to promote the wellbeing of future generations and Ladinoize the 
population. Their policies were directed not only a indigenous peoples but also poor ladino/as 
who they also viewed as prone to criminality, alcohol, and sex work. Through this discourse, 
social reformers sought to build men capable of contributing to economic development and 
family welfare, and women able to nurture and rear their children. Although scholarly literature 
on Guatemala has often focused on divisions between indigenous and ladino/a identities, my 
dissertation also shows the centrality of class to the national project. The experiments arose from 
this climate of reform and heightened efforts to change Guatemalans’ bodies and minds.  
 Viewing the Revolution through the lens of medicine also reveal continuities between 
this period and the state-sanctioned violence that have occurred in other moments of Guatemalan 
history. In her oral history interview and in newspaper articles, Marta Lidia Orellana has 
described her encounter with doctors as sexual assault.58 Her recollection of the experiments 
                                                      
56 Taracena Arriola Etnicidad, estado y nación, 35. 
57 Nelson, A Finger in the Wound, 228. 
58 Interview with Marta Lidia Orellana, Guatemala City, Guatemala, December 11, 2015.  
 19 
provides a powerful interpretation of the bodily harm that Guatemalans experienced in the 
experiments. Moreover, writing on the experiments, Bioethicist Charlene Galarneau has also 
pointed out that forcing sex workers, prisoners, and soldiers to have sexual intercourse without 
their consent constitutes rape.59 The experiments fit into a long history of state-sanctioned sexual 
and gender-based violence in Guatemala. Historian Greg Grandin has noted the “intimate” nature 
of violence in Guatemala forged within plantation cultures underpinned by rape and sex.60 
Ladinos have presumed sexual access to indigenous women throughout the country’s history. 
During the 36-year war, the Guatemalan military used rape as a weapon of war against not only 
indigenous women but also Ladinas who joined the guerilla movement or did not conform to 
gender norms.61 In the postwar era, gender violence and femicides have increased.62 Most 
recently, women have begun to flee Central America in response to gang and gender-based 
violence.63 Yet, women have found no escape from violence through migrating to the United 
States where they have been subjected to sexual assault by coyotes and U.S. border patrol 
authorities.64 The experiments not only highlight the state-sanctioned sexual violence that 
occurred against women during the revolutionary period, they also show that men should further 
be considered as victims within this scholarship on sexual and gender-based violence in 
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Guatemala. Ladino elites have presumed access to poor and indigenous Guatemalan men who 
they use to perform the sexual and bodily labor necessary for economic growth or national 
development. 
 Despite both U.S. and Guatemalan doctors’ presumption about their use of Guatemalan 
men and women’s bodies for experimentation, they did not encounter the docile subjects that 
they had expected. Many Guatemalans fought back in the experiments. Parents of school 
children wielded machetes at U.S. and Guatemalan researchers, sex workers refused to 
participate in the experiments, and prisoners protested having their blood drawn. Nevertheless, 
Guatemalans were also subjected to extreme power imbalances in their encounter with doctors 
who had the backing of two states, including one at the height of its global power. The limited 
archival documents and oral histories of the people subjected to experimentation speaks to their 
powerlessness within the context of experimentation.  
 In my efforts to highlight Guatemalan voices, I have drawn upon archival sources in the 
United States and Guatemala. They include letters written to government authorities and doctors, 
hospital patient records, theses of medical and social work students, newspapers, medical and 
anthropological field notes, journal articles and novels. Still, Guatemalan voices often remain 
mediated through anthropologists, doctors, and court officials. Although no historical documents 
exist of Guatemalans directly voicing their protests against the experiments, I have tried to read 
documents “against the grain” in an effort to highlight their experiences.65     
 Since the revelation of the experiments, a few people have also come forward publicly as 
survivors of the experiments. The reasons that people may continue to remain silent are 
multifold. Since the doctors never obtained consent nor informed Guatemalans about their 
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research, many people likely do not know that they were part of the experiments. Moreover, 
Guatemalans may fear repercussions for coming forward. After Orellana appeared in a news 
article about the experiments, she was extorted by her neighbors who believed that she had 
received money from a foreign organization.66 The Guatemalan government continues to be 
riddled with corruption and to condone violence towards people in the country. Many 
Guatemalans prefer to remain unknown to authorities. Although recent lawsuits include 
survivors and the relatives of survivors, they have not come forward publicly about their 
experiences.67 In an effort to protect Guatemalans who were subjected to experimentation from 
further harm and from having their medical information exposed publicly, I have given them 
pseudonyms. I have made an exception for oral histories where my interviewees chose to make 
their name public. 
 Orellana remains one of the only survivors who continues to openly to seek justice for 
what happened more than seventy years ago. On that warm December morning as she reached 
the Vice President’s Office, she climbed up a long set of stairs with the help of her son. Yet, only 
the Vice President’s secretary could meet with them that day. She told Orellana and her son to 
return the following week. Traveling again to the plaza central will pose a huge challenge 
Orellana. Yet, as long as the U.S. and Guatemalan governments ignore the people who continue 
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CHAPTER 1: BUILDING AN AMERICAN RESEARCH NETWORK 
 
 In 1913, Neil MacPhail, “the Scottish doctor,” arrived in Quiriguá, on Guatemala’s 
southeastern border with Honduras, where he would direct the United Fruit Company’s hospital 
for the next forty years. The hospital was also located in proximity to Puerto Barrios, 
Guatemala’s Atlantic coastline port that el bananero (the banana grower) had controlled from the 
beginning of the twentieth century when it established operations in the country. MacPhail’s 
hospital would become a nexus connecting prominent scientists and medical doctors primarily 
from the United States and Latin America. Travelers also entered Guatemala through Puerto 
Barrios and made their first stop to tour the Mayan ceremonial site near MacPhail’s hospital. In 
1947, when British writer Aldous Huxley visited Quigiruá, he described MacPhail as the 
“universal godfather” of the country.68    
 MacPhail’s influence in Guatemala arose with expanding U.S. power in the Central 
American and Caribbean region during the early twentieth century.69 As powerful corporations 
such as United Fruit (known as “el pulpo” or the octopus by Guatemalans for the hold it had 
over the country’s economic and political affairs) established enclave communities in Caribbean 
countries to harvest “green gold,” they built hospitals to safeguard the health of their managers 
and laboring class.70 MacPhail and other medical professionals further conducted research on 
tropical diseases that endangered the Company’s crops and workers. Since United Fruit held 
close connections to both Guatemalan and U.S. government and private institutions, the 
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Company helped to forge ties that led to the establishment of an American medical research 
network in Guatemala.     
 United Fruit was not the only organization that connected U.S. researchers and medical 
professionals to Guatemala. The medical research network established in the country during the 
first half of the twentieth century also emerged through the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
International Health Division (IHD).71 Established in 1913 through the philanthropy of oil 
tycoon John D. Rockefeller, the IHD developed operations in 80 different countries.72 It helped 
establish U.S. imperial networks around the world. U.S. empire has often operated through 
“informal” networks such as philanthropic organizations and corporations rather than 
establishing colonial offices in foreign countries. Although other philanthropic organizations 
such as the Carnegie Foundation sent researchers to the Guatemala as well, United Fruit and the 
IHD were particularly powerful in the medical sector and had close ties with governmental 
organizations such as U.S. Public Health Service and the U.S. Army Medical Corps.  
 These organizations also helped to forge connections with Guatemalan medical 
professionals in public health and military institutions. The ties that U.S. and Guatemalan 
researchers established in the country brought opportunities for work and study in the United 
States. As in other Latin American countries, the Rockefeller Foundation funded Guatemalan 
medical professionals to pursue postgraduate work in the United States, namely at Johns Hopkins 
University, where the philanthropic organization had invested significantly in the development of 
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medical education and research. Although many Guatemalan doctors opposed the imperialism of 
U.S. institutions and resisted the authoritarianism of their government, they still sought 
opportunities through these organizations to grow their careers and to develop the Guatemalan 
national medical and public health infrastructure. 
 In establishing these networks, U.S. and Guatemalan doctors built a culture of medicine 
in Guatemala. This culture developed both from Guatemala’s history of medicine and the United 
States’ emerging role in the twentieth century as a leader in medical research. Guatemalan 
medical and public institutions evolved within the context of colonialism and a repressive state 
system that had a history of compelling women, indigenous, and marginalized Guatemalans to 
cooperate with government health policies and labor regimes. The United States’ historical roots 
in empire further influenced the emergence t of its public health and medical institutions. As U.S. 
doctors envisioned their country as a world leader, they developed paternalistic attitudes that led 
them to see themselves as uniquely positioned to mold fit and healthy bodies around the world.73 
Trained in institutions such as Johns Hopkins University, doctors learned their trades through 
experimentation and studies on marginalized peoples in the United States and sites of empire in 
Central America, the Caribbean, and in the Pacific. As Guatemalan doctors increasingly came to 
study in these institutions, they brought aspects of the U.S. culture of medicine back to their 
country and helped cement ties with U.S. researchers and institutions.  
  Together, U.S. and Guatemalan doctors helped each other to achieve their ambitions to 
further their status in an international medical research community and to build Guatemala’s 
medical infrastructure. The story of how U.S. and medical researchers created a medical research 
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network begins with rising U.S. imperialism in Central America during the early twentieth 
century.  
 
American Empire and Public Health  
 U.S. imperialism in Central America and the Caribbean during the early twentieth 
century facilitated the establishment of a U.S. medical infrastructure and research in Guatemala. 
Following the “closing of the frontier” and the U.S. annexation of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the 
Philippines, and Guam in the Spanish-American War, the U.S. government looked southward 
towards Central America.74 In 1903, when the U.S. government began constructing the Panama 
Canal, symbolizing for many in the United States the country’s rising world power and superior 
scientific and public health institutions, the United States’ relationship with the isthmus 
fundamentally changed.75 In the next 30 years, the U.S. government invaded the region more 
than 30 times.76 In seeking to protect its investment in the region, the United States aimed to 
ensure the stability of countries in Central America through squelching revolutionary movements 
and implementing “dollar diplomacy” that enabled U.S. banks to gain greater control over 
countries’ finances.77 Although couched as “soft power,” U.S. policies developed by 
governmental and private institutions were backed by the Marine Corps that the government 
readily employed when faced with a challenge to its hegemony in the region.  
 U.S. power in Central America enabled private institutions to gain considerable influence 
in the region. Although many within the State Department remained wary of United Fruit’s 
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power, the U.S. government also depended upon the Company.78 In Latin America, the U.S. 
government has a history of leaning on corporations operating in the region for information and 
consultation on foreign policy. The U.S. government helped to maintain the fruit company’s 
power by backing it in negotiations with the Guatemalan government.79 Even in comparison with 
other Central American and Caribbean countries, U.S. institutions’ such as the United Fruit 
Company operated with nearly unchecked power in Guatemala for the first half of the twentieth 
century. One Company official wrote that United Fruit began its first operations in Guatemala 
because, “a good portion of the country contained prime banana land and because at the time we 
entered Central America, Guatemala’s government was the region’s weakest, most corrupt, and 
most pliable.”80  
 La Frutera also gained power in Guatemala due to the pro-American dictatorships that 
ran Guatemala during the beginning of the twentieth century and the aspirations of the 
agricultural elite. The Liberal elites who took control of the government at the end of the 
nineteenth century believed that democracy would arise only after economic growth. They 
sought to attract foreign capital and investment in the country.81 As part of efforts to spur 
industrial development, the Guatemalan government embarked upon building a railroad system 
that would enable the export of coffee and other agricultural goods to foreign markets. In the 
1890s, these efforts stalled in response to an economic crisis. United Fruit eventually took over 
construction efforts at the beginning of the twentieth century. In return for the construction of the 
railroad, the Company entered into a 90-year contract with the Guatemalan government during 
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which officials could not tax the banana company nor regulate its internal affairs.82 Due to that 
agreement, the Guatemalan government also had little leeway to oversee medical research that 
occurred in the UFCO hospitals and plantations. Building the railroad further granted the 
organization control over coffee plantation owners who relied upon these transportation 
networks to export their products to the international market. In addition, UFCO came to operate 
two major ports on the Pacific and the Atlantic and the telegraph company. As the banana 
company established control over much of the country’s infrastructure, it effectively operated as 
a colonial power in Guatemala. 
 The Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Division (IHD) also established an 
office and implemented its programs in Guatemala. The IHD’s first program focused on studying 
and treating hookworm in the Caribbean and Central American region. Labeled the “germ of 
laziness,” the Rockefeller Foundation had launched a program to eradicate hookworm in the 
southern United States before extending its operations to “America’s backyard.” The 
organization focused on hookworm not just as a means to eradicate the disease but also to spur 
the development of public health infrastructures in countries around the world.83 In doing so, the 
Rockefeller Foundation sought to promote stability in countries and promote U.S. culture. 
Historian Steven Palmer has said that the IHD viewed the Caribbean and Central American and 
Caribbean region as a “geopolitical laboratory” where it could quietly experiment with 
treatments and campaigns to control hookworm before applying its policies to the rest of the 
world.84  
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 The Guatemalan dictator at the time, Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920), welcomed the 
Rockefeller Foundation and its programs. In a rebuff to local medical doctors, Estrada Cabrera 
made Alvin Struse, the Rockefeller representative in Guatemala, head of the Consejo Superior, 
the country’s main office overseeing the medical and public health system.85 As the dictator 
favored the investment of foreign organizations, he also held foreign medical doctors to be 
superior to the health professionals in his own country. Yet, although Estrada Cabrera was a 
“warm friend of the United States,” the country had a limited public health and medical 
infrastructure upon which Rockefeller Foundation officers could build their programs.86 The 
government also did little to cooperate with IHD officials and many doctors in the capital 
remained hostile to what they viewed as the imperialistic intentions of the philanthropic 
organization.87 The inability of IHD to work with government institutions distinguished 
Guatemala from the other Caribbean and Central American countries. 
 In the absence of an infrastructure upon which to build its programs, the IHD worked 
with the agricultural elite who opened their plantations to its hookworm programs. To help 
facilitate their programs, the Rockefeller Foundation hired Guatemalan medical students who 
came from elite families.88 IHD field workers functioned seamlessly within the structure of the 
Guatemalan plantation system. One IHD worker lauded the Guatemalan agricultural elites who 
he met during the course of his work: “I must state that the people of Guatemala impress me as 
being the cream of Central America. The unfortunate mixture of negro blood so common in 
Spanish countries is almost nil.”89 He did not mention in his regards the Guatemalans who he 
experimented upon and treated for hookworm disease.  
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 The U.S. government and institutions did confront challenges to their power in 
Guatemala from the German community. German settlers owned a large number of the 
Guatemalan coffee fincas (plantations) particularly in the region of Alta Verapaz in the Central 
Highlands of the country where the indigenous population is concentrated.90 Coffee brought 
them considerable access to money and power. By the end of the nineteenth century, Guatemala 
was the world’s fourth largest producer of coffee.91 Still, United Fruit’s control of the railroad 
gave them leeway over the German coffee planters. Moreover, during World War I when 
Guatemalan coffee lost access to European markets, Estrada Cabrera joined the Allies and 
participated in the surveillance of the German population.92 The proximity of the United States 
and the force that it held over the economy granted it greater control over its Central American 
neighbors than the German community was able to exert. 
 U.S. institutions facilitated the rise of an American public health and medical 
infrastructure in Guatemala. Many of the medical officers who worked for United Fruit 
Company and the Rockefeller Foundation had first served in the USPHS or in the military. 
UFCO and IHD also had advisers in the U.S. Public Health Service, including Joseph H. White 
who helped the IHD to facilitate agreements with Central American governments when it 
established its operations.93 These private organizations provided a base in Central America upon 
which the U.S. government could capitalize upon should it want to intervene in the country’s 
affairs. In 1918, during an outbreak of yellow fever in the country that threatened U.S. soldiers 
stationed in the region, Rockefeller commissioned White to control the yellow fever epidemic in 
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Guatemala.94 As a representative for the IHD, White became an international actor and avoided 
the label of a colonial officer in the region.   
 These medical and public health institutions also facilitated the growth of an American 
medical research network. At first, the medical departments of La Frutera and the IHD worked 
closely together on public health campaigns. Even after United Fruit sought to gain control over 
its own plantations and labor force it enabled U.S. researchers to gain access to its plantations 
and laborers for medical research.95 The presence of these organizations in Guatemala allowed 
for U.S. government medical and public health employees, as well as university researchers, to 
easily access the country for both public health campaigns and research. These organizations 
brought opportunities for Guatemalan doctors to gain opportunities to develop their professional 
careers as researchers and health professionals. 
 
A Medical System Built Through Repression 
 U.S. public health and medical institutions built upon a culture of medicine that had 
developed in Guatemala in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Guatemalan public health and 
medical institutions emerged within a state system and plantation economies that depended upon 
compulsion. Since Guatemalan biomedical institutions were weak and had little legitimacy 
among indigenous and poor populations, public health and medical officers often resorted to 
violence when forcing populations to cooperate with programs.    
 The public health and medical system in Guatemala had not always just been based upon 
coercion. In the colonial era, the Guatemalan medical community and the University of San 
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Carlos’ medical school earned international repute. Guatemala had a recognized medical school 
that attracted students from throughout Central America. Guatemalan physicians became known 
as elite practitioners and innovators in their fields.96 In the Spanish Royal Vaccination 
Expedition (1803-1806) for smallpox, Guatemalan doctor José Flores incorporated indigenous 
views to assuage their patients’ fears and garner their cooperation. Historian Martha Few says 
that Guatemalan doctors were driven by humanitarian influences towards the Guatemalan 
indigenous population.97 Yet, Spanish colonial medicine was implemented in other instances 
through force and targeted indigenous practices for idolatry and sorcery. Indígenas often hid 
their children, fled or actively resisted medical practitioners.98   
 Following independence from Spain that brought heightened political and social unrest in 
the country, the prestige of the medical school and system declined. Although doctors throughout 
Central America continued to pursue degrees in Guatemala, increasingly they went to Europe 
and the United States to study.99 Guatemala further did not have an adequate number of doctors 
to build a sustainable biomedical program. In fact, only 20 licensed medical professionals 
practiced in the entire Central American region during the twentieth century.100 The majority of 
these doctors lived in the capital and had little contact with Mayan groups. In this dearth of 
medical and public health resources, traditional medicine flourished. In fact, many indigenous 
and poor Guatemalans preferred to visit curanderos, midwives, and healers.  
 Doctors and government officials viewed these healers as threats to their influence and 
national development. They sought to force Guatemalans to cooperate with public health 
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programs. In 1837, when a worldwide cholera epidemic was ravaging Central America, political 
elites and doctors blamed Mayan cultural practices and foods including chilies, homebrews, and 
spices as the causes of the disease.101 Oral histories conducted in the present day reveal that the 
violent nature of public health campaigns still imprint the historical memories of indigenous 
Guatemalans.102 During the cholera epidemic, local priests spread rumors that the chemicals the 
government put in the water were intended to poison communities.103 This story precipitated a 
widespread revolt that led to the overthrow of the government. Rafael Carrera, a conservative 
mestizo who implemented protectionist measures for indigenous populations, took power as 
president for the majority of the next twenty years (1844-1848, 1851-1986).  
 Yet, the state’s protection of indigenous populations was short-lived. In 1871, coffee 
planters led by Justo Rufino Barrios overtook the country in a Liberal Revolution. The leaders of 
this movement were mestizos; they attacked the power of the Creole oligarchy and solidified 
Ladino rule. In spite of their rhetoric of equal rights, political elites set about constructing a 
police state aimed at bolstering the agricultural-export business. They stripped Mayans of their 
land. The government instituted forced labor laws to ensure that planters had access to sufficient 
manpower. It also restrained the power of the Catholic church and confiscated its property. As 
the state lacked popular legitimacy, it adopted increasingly brutal tactics to maintain control of 
the country.104 
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 The new Liberal elite believed public health and education would bring progress and 
order to the country. Intellectuals and professionals aspired to solve the so-called “Indian 
problem” and to “cure” Mayans of their perceived backwardness105 Presented by elites in a 
paternalistic manner, these efforts focused on ridding indigenous people of their cultural 
practices. Mayans have closely tied medicine and healing to their spiritual beliefs, which they 
have interwoven with Spanish culture and the Catholic Church. They view the body as a holistic 
entity and as interconnected with the natural world.106 Mayans healers have sought to foster 
balance within individuals and communities. Liberal elites held their practices to be harmful to 
national development and sought to foster the assimilation of indigenous people into the norms 
of biomedicine.   
 Although the Liberal government saw public health and medicine as necessary for 
building a “civilized” country, the development of this infrastructure remained limited. The 
medical school at the national university did once again begin to train future medical 
professionals in the country. The faculty renewed its program of study after it had fallen into 
disarray from political turmoil in the nineteenth century. Yet, the medical school did not return to 
the flourishing intellectual center that it had been in the colonial period.107 The country remained 
constrained by financial resources. Moreover, politicians were more committed to forcing 
indigenous and poor Guatemalans to labor on coffee plantations than they were with improving 
their health. Public health in the countryside was mainly confined to fincas, where agricultural 
elites invested limited time and money in laborers’ health except when it benefited their profits. 
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The government often issued ill-timed responses to epidemics. The reach of the state was limited 
and could not force populations throughout the country to cooperate with its programs. 
  In the beginning of the twentieth century, the government did embark upon efforts to 
build a more robust public health and medical system, but its development still remained 
hampered by the country’s authoritarian government. In 1898, Dictator Manuel Estrada Cabrera 
assumed power and ruled Guatemala for the next twenty years as his personal fiefdom. In his 
novel, El Señor Presidente, the famed Guatemalan novelist, Miguel Angel Asturias, 
immortalized Estrada Cabrera. Asturias described the dictator’s mobilization of the military, 
police, and a network of informants to maintain strict control over the country and his power.108 
Corruption, limited financial resources, and an entrenched social hierarchy influenced the 
country’s medical culture. Asturias wrote that the doctors practiced surgery on the “Indians” in 
the hospital; they refined their “hands” for people deemed to be more important members of 
society.109 The practice of medicine laid bare stark inequalities in the country.  
 Fancying himself a benevolent ruler, Estrada Cabrera spearheaded efforts to create a 
permanent public health department. In 1906, Guatemalan government established the Primer 
Consejo Superior de Salubridad Pública (Supreme Council of Public Salubrity) with a mission 
to oversee and respond to public health concerns throughout the country. The Supreme Council 
named medical commissions to address epidemics of yellow fever, typhus, smallpox, and 
malaria. They coordinated these campaigns with the Jefe Político, the local governors of each of 
Guatemala’s twenty-two departments and the town boards who were also responsible for 
ensuring labor drafts on coffee plantations.110 In 1925, the government replaced the Supreme 
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Council with the Dirección General de Salubridad (General Direction of Healthfulness), and 
then changed its name in 1932 to the Dirección General de Sanidad Pública (General Direction 
of Public Sanitation).   
 Still, the government failed to provide the necessary funding to support the public health 
department; its reach remained limited and focused on containing epidemics and eliminating 
parasites.111 As only 200 physicians existed in the entire country in the early twentieth century, 
the vast majority of them were located in Guatemala City. According to a Rockefeller 
Foundation officer, most of the Guatemalan territory did not have a “single medical man.”112 Dr. 
Alberto Padilla, the head of the Consejo Superior during the majority of the dictatorship, did not 
even receive a salary.113 A Rockefeller Foundation representative working in the country at the 
time said that Padilla served solely for “patriotic” purposes and due to his aspirations to affect 
the “sanitation betterment” of his country.114 Other Guatemalan medical doctors also assumed 
government posts as service to the country but received no compensation.  
 In the capital, public health worked in tandem with the policing and surveillance of 
marginalized groups. The Guatemalan government passed prostitution laws that were among the 
most repressive in the world.115 Although Guatemala lagged behind the United States and the 
majority of other Latin American countries in medicine and science, the government strictly 
enforced venereal disease laws. A Rockefeller Foundation officer commenting upon the dearth 
of public health resources in the country reported that, “a complete set of regulations governing 
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prostitution is in force, and its provisions are being actively carried out.”116 In the early twentieth 
century, the government implemented venereal disease policies primarily to protect elite men 
who frequented brothels and their families.      
 Like other Latin American countries influenced by the French medical system, 
Guatemala had adopted a regulation system at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1881, 
Guatemalan laws began to confine sex work to bordels (brothels), which were run by matronas, 
or women managers.117 Sex workers had to register with the state and submit to weekly vaginal 
inspections that were performed by male medical doctors. The law dictated that all women who 
had demonstrated “bad conduct” needed to register with the brothels.118 While these laws 
particularly made poor women who had little access to privacy susceptible to charges, they also 
required women of all classes to carefully guard their honor. Guatemalan prostitution laws 
mirrored the system of debt-labor on agricultural plantations. Women registered as sex workers 
had to carry a libreto (pay book) in which the matrona recorded any of their existing debts for 
medical care, laundry, makeup, or for any money advanced by the madam.119 Other agricultural-
export societies that relied upon forced labor, such as Mexico during Porfirio Díaz’s regime, also 
compelled women to perform “debt labor” in bordels.120 In spite of these laws, a number of 
women still avoided registering with the state and refused to work in brothels. Although the state 
tried to enforce strict policies, its power remained limited and often thwarted by the women who 
refused to comply with the laws.    
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 The state not only punished women for sex work but also for reproductive crimes. In 
Guatemala, as in other parts of the world, crimes were gendered and maintained the patriarchal 
order. Historian David Carey found that indigenous women had relatively more freedom in the 
criminal justice system than Ladinas who the state viewed as a greater threat to Ladino male 
power.121 Doctors remained wary of women who lost their babies and even accused them of 
clandestine prostitution. Merely accusing a woman of abortion was enough to ruin her 
reputation.122 In a prominent national newspaper, a writer wrote that prostitution resulted from 
the same “instinctual drive” in women that led them to also commit infanticide or obtain 
abortions.123” In 1899, one medical student wrote that syphilis was the most common cause of an 
abortion or a stillbirth; therefore he judged women as immoral rather than focusing on the 
medical problems that could have affected their loss.124 Poor women were most susceptible to 
these accusations because they lacked access to healthcare and had limited means to care for 
their children. Doctors also often blamed women for miscarriages or stillbirths, holding that their 
nutritional or hygienic habits during pregnancy as responsible for causing the fetus harm, rather 
than considering conditions of poverty. Moreover, state officials and doctors often blamed 
mental illness in the Guatemalan population on women; they claimed that the high rates of 
people in the mental institution resulted in large part from “hereditary syphilis,” creating people 
who were “incapaces de vivir” (incapable of living).    
 The repressive nature of Guatemalan public health and medicine further influenced 
policies at the mental institution which served effectively as an extension of the prison system. In 
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the Asilo de Alienados, the majority of inmates could not pay for medical services, nor did they 
have families to support them in their homes. They had worked as day laborers, farmers, 
weavers, construction workers, seamstresses, laundresses, and cooks.125 Estrada Cabrera used the 
institution to punish his enemies and have them diagnosed as “degenerate.” Yet, as one of the 
only institutions of its kind in the region, people from around Central America visited the Asilo. 
Despite the limited infrastructure for public health and medicine, Guatemalan doctors continued 
to have a strong reputation for medicine in the Central American region.126 Still, the Asilo had 
financial constraints and shortages in staffing and supplies. Following the 1917-1918 earthquake 
that destroyed much of Guatemala City, the psychiatric institution kept inmates in temporary 
shacks with poor ventilation until the 1930s.127   
 As the government used public health as a means for policing poor Guatemalans in urban 
areas, rural indigenous communities continued to meet medical commissions sent to the 
countryside with fierce protest. Indígenas ignored and actively resisted government efforts to 
vaccinate them for typhus or smallpox. The coffee plantations worked with the government to 
impose social control, enforcing vaccination campaigns among laborers. Mayans feared hospitals 
as places of death and only brought their loved ones there for treatment as a last resort. Yet, 
historian David Carey has also shown that indígenas at times welcomed public health 
interventions in their communities. Government officials furthermore at times showed sensitivity 
and openness towards indigenous cultural practices. A Guatemala hospital financially supported 
by the Rockefeller Foundation incorporated aspects of indigenous culture; it used Mayan 
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blankets and brass knobs on beds to make their patients more comfortable.128 In 1927, Maya 
communities collaborated to drain Lake Quinizilapa, a breeding ground for mosquitos that 
spread malaria.129 It is indeed too simplistic too presume that biomedicine and traditional 
medicine were diametrically opposed to each other in Guatemala. Yet, medical professionals in 
countries such as Costa Rica and Ecuador arguably made greater concessions to incorporate 
popular medicine than they did in Guatemala.130   
 During the Ubico dictatorship (1931-1944), the government worked to improve public 
health services and bring biomedicine to the countryside. Often referred to as a “Liberal 
dictator,” Ubico used public health efforts to project his desired image as a protector of the 
people. These efforts further formed part of his agenda to centralize the government and 
undercut the authority of agricultural elites. A populist leader, Ubico was known for driving his 
motorcycle around the countryside so he could personally attend to people’s concerns. Although 
the global financial crisis had a considerable effect on Guatemala, the government still aimed to 
better coordinate and reorganize the hospital system throughout the countryside and stepped up 
efforts to fight epidemic disease rural areas.131 Guatemala further held the Primer Congreso 
Sanitario de Centroamérica y Panama (The First Sanitary Congress of Central America and 
Panama).132 It sought to cast itself once again as a leader of public health in the region.  
 Yet, many of the efforts to instill public health continued to be done so in a coercive 
manner, reflecting the terror that punctuated daily life under the caudillo. In 1935, the 
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Guatemalan government launched its most intensive campaign yet to round up sex workers.133 
This campaign extended to the military, where officials employed punishing tactics to ensure that 
soldiers also did not hide their infections.134 Not just women but men also felt the effects of this 
campaign. Under Jorge Ubico’s dictatorship, the government passed new laws that claimed to 
“humanize” prostitution laws, but in reality just gave police greater control over the women. In 
1938, the government implemented the Reglamento.135 This law diminished the power of the 
matronas and the state-regulated brothel system, allowing women to work in their private 
residences. Although women no longer had to contend with “debt labor,” the laws augmented the 
power of the male police force over their personal lives.   
 In the countryside and the capital, Ubico’s government tried to impose biomedicine 
through criminalizing traditional healers. The national police pursued a campaign against 
midwifery, charlatans, and brujería (medical charlantry and witchcraft).136 Fueling support for 
the campaign, the newsletter of the national police published sensationalized accounts of brujos 
and detailed accounts of their arrests; one article described how police had found wooden idols, 
fragments of women’s hair, and a mysterious carafe with an amber colored liquid.137 Other 
articles in police and sanitation periodicals railed against indígenas for their idolatry, deriding 
them for trusting “mystics” more than medical doctors.138 In competition with traditional healers, 
the majority of medical doctors supported the police and their efforts to control traditional 
medicine. In his medical thesis, one student who later worked for the government cited the 
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“rudimentary” and “ridiculous” social rituals of the Mayan population and their lack of trust in 
biomedicine as the reasons that they became susceptible to disease and thereby threatened 
national health.139     
 Despite state efforts to bring biomedicine to rural areas, Guatemalan laws remained 
weakly enforced or nonexistent in much of the country. Hospitals were overcrowded in both the 
capital and in the countryside. Many areas of the country still lacked a hospital or a single 
medical doctor.140 Public health and medical infrastructure was insufficient in Guatemala City as 
well. The director of the venereal disease hospital, which just treated women, said it had a 
woefully insufficient capacity to accommodate the hundreds of its patients who needed services 
each year.141 Infant mortality also remained high during the dictatorship.142 In the capital, people 
lived in shacks with poor sanitary conditions in informal settlements known as “El Gallito,” 
“Llano de Paloma,” and “La Palmita.” The homes were poorly constructed and not regulated by 
the government. A sanitation professional blamed the people who built these homes for 
destroying the “harmony” of “urban health.”143 Occasionally the police would destroy these 
homes. In Guatemala, the public that government officials sought to protect in public health 
campaigns did not include poor and indigenous Guatemalans.  
 
Guatemalan Political Doctors  
 Although the development of Guatemalan public health and medical systems remained 
limited, Guatemalan doctors still developed a robust discourse on social and medical policy. In 
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the tradition of doctors in Latin America who have adopted public role in their countries, 
Guatemalan doctors believed that they were uniquely positioned to guide the body politic on a 
path of national development. Yet, in their efforts to build their power, doctors drew upon 
eugenic discourse that painted women, indigenous, and poor Guatemalans as threats to the 
nation. In an attempt to build their power, doctors contributed to Guatemala’s repressive medical 
culture.     
 Guatemalan doctors did not represent a monolithic group. They had varied backgrounds 
and viewpoints. Some had close ties with the authoritarian government, while others more 
forcefully denounced Guatemalan dictatorships and U.S. imperialism. Yet, their professions led 
them to align with Liberals who believed that the development of biomedicine was imperative 
for the nation’s future. They also had similar views of race and ethnicity as many of the 
country’s agricultural elite and political leaders. Doctors viewed indigenous and marginalized 
Guatemalans as harming efforts to progress economically and politically. Furthermore, the 
majority of doctors upheld normative gender roles and traditional family structures which they 
believed were instrumental for building healthy nations and preventing the spread of disease. 
Social hierarchies informed the identities and practices of doctors.   
 Guatemalan doctors had aspirations to rebuild the country’s role as a leader of medicine 
in Central America. They wanted to renew the country’s distinguished colonial tradition. Some 
doctors did gain international renown during the early twentieth century. For instance, Dr. 
Rodolfo Robles earned fame in medical circles around the world for his discovery of 
onchocerciasis (also known as river blindness), a disease caused by a parasitic worm that can 
cause blindness, in Central America. Still, the authoritarian dictatorships limited the medical 
community’s ability to flourish. During the dictatorships of Estrada Cabera and later under Ubico 
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(1931-1944), the police and the military held more power than intellectuals. The dictators relied 
upon police and military networks to maintain their control over the country. The national 
police’s main publication indicates the disrespect frequently shown to medical doctors. In one 
article, the writer blamed doctors for leading lives of luxury in the capital while some rural areas 
did not have any medical professionals. It railed against doctors for driving fancy automobiles, 
drinking daily cocktails, and earning cushy government salaries.144 Rather than pointing out the 
limited government resources in rural areas, members of the police blamed doctors for failing to 
fulfill their service to the nation. 
 In spite of the insults doctors endured from government authorities, they still maintained 
aspirations to build a robust medical infrastructure. During the late nineteenth century, 
biomedicine underwent professionalization and increased in prestige in countries around the 
world.145 The development of bacteriology brought new methods for preventing and treating 
disease. Latin American countries followed these developments.146 Many Guatemalan doctors 
had developed their expertise abroad in universities in Europe and North America, like other 
doctors in Latin America. Foreign influences in public health also came from German settlers on 
agricultural estates who established coffee plantations.147 German doctors aligned with the 
hacienda elite provided the finqueros (plantation owners) with expertise on preventing and 
treating diseases in the plantation zones.   
 Guatemalan doctors also closely followed developments in medicine among their 
neighbors in Latin America. In the beginning of the twentieth century, many Latin American 
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physicians ascribed to Auguste Comte’s theory of positivism that described society as 
functioning akin to an organism. Doctors, particularly ones associated with the government, 
viewed their role as diagnosing and healing the body politic.148 Compared to other countries, 
Latin American medical professionals more often assumed the role as state functionaries.149 In 
Costa Rica between 1920-1948, doctors made up almost forty percent of the members of 
congress.150 In Honduras and Nicaragua between 1883 and 1965, four presidents were doctors. 
Fewer physicians in the United States directly participated in politics due to the push for 
privatized medical services.151 Still, a number of U.S. doctors also had vested interests and used 
their work to influence politics.  
 Although Guatemala looked to other Latin American countries for guidance on medicine 
and public health, they were increasingly aware of their limited ability to keep pace with them. 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, many Latin American physicians in Brazil, Mexico, 
and Cuba were at the vanguard of medical research and had established medical, public health, 
and research institutions in their countries.152  The lack of medical infrastructure in Guatemala 
frustrated the country’s globe-trotting medical personnel attuned to innovations around the 
world. Moreover, despite the influence of positivism on Guatemala, not all doctors ascribed to 
these views. Indeed, many physicians were Catholics and concerned about what they viewed as 
the radical materialism of positivism.153  
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 In 1920, after Estrada Cabrera was overthrown, the broader intellectual community in 
Guatemala began to more openly advocate for social reform. The relative democratic opening in 
the country inspired a flourishing of discourse among intellectuals who wrote about their hopes 
for the country’s future. They established the Sociedad de Geografía e Historia de Guatemala, 
an organization that sought to build a concept of national identity.154 Yet, in their writings these 
Ladino intellectuals often blamed indígenas for the problem of national formation. Doctors, 
lawyers, and other writers of the so-called “Generación 20” (Generation 20) published 
prolifically on the “Indian problem.”  
 These intellectuals included famed Guatemalan novelist Miguel ´Angel Asturias.155 In his 
1924 thesis on the “Indian problem” that he wrote at the national university, Asturias drew from 
eugenic theory in recommending that the government prohibit early marriages and unions 
between people with disease. He also proposed policies to improve nutrition, reduce hours of 
work, promote education, hygiene, racial mixing, and European immigration. Some Guatemalan 
eugenicists promoted immigration as a means for erasing the indigenous “blood” in the 
country.156 These writers deemed Mayan cultural practices as key impediments to the nation and 
promoted policies aimed at whitening indígenas.  
 Eugenic influences in Guatemala followed trends in other Latin American countries. By 
the 1920s, eugenics influenced countries throughout the United States, Europe, and Latin 
America. Latin Americans overall rejected the biological determinism of North American and 
European eugenicists. Instead, they focused on preventative methods and cleansing the 
environment of “racial poisons,” including venereal disease, alcohol, and tuberculosis. A 
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Guatemalan delegate attended the international conference on eugenics in New York (1921) and 
later the first Pan American eugenics conference in Havana (1927). Yet, unlike Latin American 
countries including Mexico, Brazil, and El Salvador, and Nicaragua that celebrated mestizaje, 
Guatemalan Ladino reformers in general favored segregation over integration with the 
indigenous majority.157 Even though many promoted racial mixing, their goal was to limit the 
influence of indigenous culture in the country. In this way, their views were closer to those of 
eugenicists within the United States who also pushed for segregationist policies between white 
and non-white populations in their country.  
 Doctors’ expertise on the biological aspects of life distinguished them among 
intellectuals in the Generation 20s. The doctors sought to rebuild the intellectual medical culture 
centered around the medical school at the national university. During the country’s dictatorship, 
the university did not have autonomy. The Rockefeller Foundation also reported that the 
university did not have a budget to support a regular staff at the medical school, only half of the 
time did professors show up to their classes, and the school did not have sufficient laboratories 
for students to conduct research.158 Since it was voluntary service, professors had limited time to 
invest in students. In 1917-1918, an earthquake destroyed the medical school and almost all of its 
archives. Later in 1921, some “interesados” (self-interested people) burned the medical 
archives.159 Political turmoil in the country hampered efforts to develop a strong academic center 
at the medical school. Still, doctors were prolific in their articles on topics relating to sexuality, 
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reproduction, infant mortality, alcoholism, and mental hygiene. Doctors viewed these issues as 
key to building a new nation, and saw themselves as the rightful vanguards to implement these 
measures.  
 Despite this period of democratic opening in the 1920s, the Guatemalan government 
remained hampered by corruption, authoritarianism, and political turmoil. Their vision for the 
country was frustrated by many of the same challenges they had experienced during the 
dictatorship. The eugenics program in Guatemala suffered in comparison to countries including 
Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil. Dr. Federico Mora, the director of the psychiatric institution, 
struggled to build the eugenic program he desired. After studying abroad with Sigmund Freud, 
he returned to Guatemala and sought to build the status of the psychiatric institution. For many 
years, he advocated for the foundation of a mental hygiene league, which would coordinate and 
promote eugenic programs in the country. Between the world wars, Latin American countries 
including Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina established mental hygiene leagues.160 In Guatemala, no 
such league would exist until the 1940s. 
 Still, Mora remained a staunch proponent of eugenics. He wrote books that classified 
indigenous Guatemalans as mentally ill and sought to implement policies that “cured” these 
populations of their afflictions.161 Mora contended that alcoholism, regarded widely in 
Guatemala as an indigenous affliction, was an acute cause of “mental degeneracy” and 
“psychosis.” In a later work, Mora wrote that alcoholism, malnutrition, and the harm that 
indigenous groups had suffered since the Spanish conquest had made them unable to adapt to the 
conditions of modern and civilized life.162 Mora was influenced by the field of mental hygiene, 
                                                      
160 Stepan, “The Hour of Eugenics,” 50-51, 57. 
161 Carlos Federico Mora, Manual de Medicina Forense (Guatemala, C.A., 1931) 
162 Carlos Federico Mora, Higiene Psiquica: Eugenesia (Guatemala, C.A., 1947): 57. 
 48 
which he presented as a progressive approach to crime and insanity. Italian criminologist Cesare 
Lombroso’s theories of hereditarianism, which proposed that certain individuals and groups had 
a natural propensity towards crime, influenced this field.163 He was also a leader in the 
government. Mora served as ambassador to Germany and the rector of the national university. 
Despite his role as a Latin American political doctor, he did not have the power to establish a 
thriving intellectual medical culture  
 Still, doctors continued to publish articles and promoted eugenic policies. During the 
1920s and 1930s, doctors became preoccupied with preventing infant mortality in the country. 
Like other Latin American eugenicists around this time period, Guatemalan doctors adopted 
interest in puericulture. Founded by French obstetrician Adolphe Pinard, puericulture called for 
the scientific cultivation of the child to protect the “biological resources” of the nation.164 Pinard 
developed this field at the beginning of the twentieth century in response to concerns over the 
low fertility rates in France. In Guatemala, physicians believed that puericulture could reduce 
infant mortality rates, which they reported as exceedingly high, even though they lacked accurate 
statistics on the number of child deaths per year particularly in rural areas. In addition to a focus 
on children, puericulture called for closely monitoring women’s health during the prenatal and 
natal periods. Doctors stressed the role of syphilis, malnutrition, poverty, poor hygiene, 
alcoholism, ignorance, and disease in causing infant mortality.165 In 1926, one doctor and 
prominent indigenista wrote that the government should criminalize people who knowingly 
spread an infectious disease to others by refusing vaccinations.166 Since Mayans often feared 
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vaccination, he implicitly called for penalizing if they did not cooperate with biomedical 
programs.     
 The government followed doctors’ recommendation to increase awareness about infant 
mortality and child health. In 1923, the country established el “Día del Niño,” (the day of the 
child) to educate the public about puericulture. In an effort to protect children from immoral 
influences, the state also passed laws against establishing brothels, cantinas, or liquor stores 
within proximity to schools. Yet again, medical doctors and journalists lamented that the 
government did not do more to prevent infant mortality. Dr. Luis Gaitán, the chair of hygiene at 
the national university who later became the Minister of Health, said that “disgracefully” 
Guatemala did not have the economic resources to implement eugenic policies and advance 
scientifically.167 A prominent local newspaper lambasted the Guatemalan government over its 
failure to address infant mortality, saying that the country could only reduce child deaths if state 
officials would take these problems seriously.168   
 Guatemalan doctors also continued to advocate for repressive venereal disease laws. 
During the 1920s, Guatemalan activists began to advocate on behalf of sex workers. In one 
newspaper, writers penned passionate critiques decrying the inhumane treatment of women in 
the state’s prostitution laws. They defended the women who they said were cast as “slaves” and 
“víctimas” (victims) of men. They added that these laws violated Christian values. One writer 
queried, “Is it dignified for a highly civilized society to abandon the most wretched members of 
society to this misery?”169 Some journalists denounced the practice of regular pelvic 
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examinations, calling for the construction of dispensaries next to the general hospital, which 
would have treated infection with venereal disease as a health concern rather than a crime.        
 Yet, many doctors defended these policies which they held protected Guatemalan society. 
Venereal disease policies were central to eugenic programs at this time in Latin America, the 
United States, and Europe. Syphilis could cause physical and mental handicaps that medical 
professionals and government employees feared would harm the labor force and place a social 
burden on government services. In fact, medical doctors such as Dr. Alberto Padilla advocated 
for heightened enforcement of venereal disease policies. He wanted more surveillance of 
women’s lives, in order to help quell disorder and protect the wellbeing of neighborhoods. 
Moreover, Padilla challenged calls for making prostitution illegal. He insisted that the 
Guatemalan government was doing a better job addressing the problems surrounding prostitution 
than the United States, where the government had made the practice illegal.170 As a medical 
doctor charged with overseeing public health, Padilla was concerned with how Guatemala’s 
public health laws reflected the dignity of the country and his own office. He did not show 
concern for the women.  
 Although Padilla advocated to maintain government policies, other medical doctors 
during this time period used the democratic opening and the interest in eugenics to challenge the 
fact that Guatemalan venereal disease policies did not extend to the United Fruit Company 
plantations. During the 1920s, the anti-imperialist sentiments in the Central American region 
were also strong among some sectors.171 Guatemalan doctors argued that the introduction of 
Afro-Caribbean laborers by the United Fruit Company would spread venereal disease to 
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Guatemalans.172 These views were influenced by racialized assumptions that people of African 
descent were more prone to venereal disease. In 1926, a medical student who later worked for 
the Ministry of Health, stated that the fruit company’s contraction of black male laborers had 
brought about a “repugnant” propagation of these diseases.173 Although La Frutera’s medical 
staff frequently treated venereal disease in the hospital, in general the organization downplayed 
the prevalence of these infections in surrounding communities, likely so as to mitigate 
controversy over its labor choices.174 The Guatemalan government had also avoided pushing the 
banana company to implement stricter policies. Instead, the military adopted punitive measures 
towards women living in these areas. The military forced women accused of “bad conduct” to 
grind corn for local garrisons.175    
 The medical community also sought to extend public health programs to indigenous 
communities as part of an effort to facilitate the uplift of the country. Two distinguished doctors 
at the medical school called upon the government to lead a hygiene campaign among campesinos 
and the proletariat.176 They warned that “degeneration” among these groups threatened to spread 
disease, physical and mental deformities to the Guatemalan “race.” One local newspaper blamed 
Mayans’ “absolute” lack of hygiene and ignorance as the cause of a recent smallpox outbreak.177 
The article said that indígenas resisted vaccination, believing “santa viruela” (saint smallpox) to 
be of divine origin.178 Yet, the writer did not just place the responsibility on Mayans. He also 
criticized the state for its failure to demonstrate “solidarity” with the Guatemalan people. The 
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writer also placed the onus on “barbarian” plantation owners who used indigenous labor as a 
“source of inexhaustible wealth.”179 This article reflected the views of many left-leaning 
intellectuals during this time period who blamed the Liberal Revolution and planter elite for 
Guatemala’s backwardness. Despite a push for attention in rural areas, the public health 
infrastructure in this region remained weak. Medical authorities reported that municipal leaders 
did not cooperate with the Consejo de Salubridad, unless a locality was struck by an outbreak of 
disease.180 Doctors also remarked on the enormous challenge they had combatting the ignorance 
of people in rural areas.181 Doctors continued to paint rural areas as riven with vice, disease, and 
filth. 182    
 As doctors advocated for strengthening the public health and medical systems, they also 
engaged in a vibrant conversation among themselves on the need to increase medicine’s stature 
in the country, as part of their efforts to increase their own stature. This discourse reflected their 
paternalism and efforts to improve the profession as a whole during this time period. No formal 
guidelines regulated medicine. In 1927 a medical student debated doctors’ “moral” obligation to 
protect patient confidentiality as opposed to his duty to safeguard society.183 The doctor believed 
that in general society should allow medical professionals to use their conscience when deciding 
to report a disease or a crime. He denounced the penal code that criminalized doctors for failing 
reporting disease or a crime to authorities, suggesting that by virtue of their profession and 
expertise on disease that they should be free to best decide the wellbeing of their patients and 
society. In the case of syphilis, the medical student said that doctors should forgo patient privacy 
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to consider the health of society at large.184 Because of the severity of the disease, the doctor did 
not believe that his colleagues should be immune from state intervention.185 Doctors were willing 
to make exceptions to their standard ethical practice to limit the spread of STIs within the 
national body.  
 Despite efforts to develop the medical field, one doctor wrote about the limited power of 
the medical profession in the country. In 1937, in the main publication of the public health 
department, a doctor decried that in rural areas many doctors worked on fincas where their 
influence was limited by the power of patrons.186 Although most indigenous Guatemalans 
avoided medical doctors, on the fincas estate owners required their laborers to report to the 
resident physician. Yet in general, he added that the finca owners and doctors who worked on the 
estates did little to preserve laborers’ heath. There was high infant mortality on the fincas and 
children who cut sugar cane suffered from poor health conditions. By advocating for inspections 
of the fincas, the doctor sought to augment the role of urban doctors connected to the 
government in gaining control over the health of local populations.  
 In the 1930s, the medical community was increasingly stifled during the dictatorship of 
Jorge Ubico. Many intellectuals, lawyers, and doctors went into exile. Some of the doctors fled 
from state repression. The national university did not have autonomy from the government, and 
was thus handicapped as an intellectual center. Doctors went abroad to study. Others worked in 
private practice or for the government, creating an underground subversive force in the country. 
In an oral history, Dr. José Barnoya recalled the frequent parties at his house in the capital. 
Novelist Miguel Angel Asturias was a close member of the family, and Barnoya said that many 
                                                      
184 Ibid, 23, 52.  
185 Ibid, 69. 
186 Dr. Jorge Fuentes Novella, “Reorganización del Cuerpo Médico,” Boletín Sanitario de Guatemala No. 46, Año IX (enero-
diciembre 1938): 457. 
 54 
prominent intellectuals and feminists also were frequent visitors.187 These communities 
continued to quietly criticize the dictatorship and dream of reform. 
 
American Laboratories in Guatemala  
 As Guatemalan doctors struggled to find the support to develop professionally and gain 
political influence in their countries, some began to form alliances with U.S. institutions working 
in the country. Doctors who formed connections with the Rockefeller Foundation and United 
Fruit grew more closely connected to an international medical network, built their careers in 
public health and medicine, and brought resources to their country. They shared similar views 
with U.S. researchers of the indigenous and marginalized Guatemalans who became the focus of 
the IHD and La Frutera’s research and public health campaigns. As many Guatemalan doctors 
viewed these populations as impediments to national development, they had less concern within 
protecting them as subjects of experimentation. U.S. institutions built upon the climate of 
medicine in the country in establishing their medical research community.      
 The Rockefeller Foundation capitalized upon the coercive plantation economies to gain 
access to indigenous bodies for experimentation. In Guatemala, the IHD public health and 
medical research programs operated within the “private sovereignty” of coffee plantations.188 
They took advantage of the fact that the indígenas were “bought and sold by large landowners 
like so many animals.”189 Still, the IHD officers’ alliance with plantation owners could also harm 
their research. They encountered trouble gaining trust from laborers. On the Guatemalan fincas, 
the IHD did surveys on diseases, collected and examined stool samples, constructed privies, and 
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gave public lectures.190 The IHD director in Guatemala reported that the “Indian is “so 
suspicious of treatment” that they have to be “forced to take it” by the plantation managers.191  
 Despite resistance from laborers, the Rockefeller Foundation with the support of 
Guatemalan medical professionals did numerous experiments. The IHD did experiments on 
upwards of ten thousand people in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica on the use and dosage 
of the oil of Chenopodium to treat hookworm, a medication that destroyed and expelled 
hookworm from the gut.192 These experiments were dangerous. Too high a dose of the medicine 
had proved toxic. In some cases, the medicine had been fatal.193 In their experiments, the IHD 
documented 200 deaths from the oil of chenopodium, although the number was likely higher. On 
fincas located on the Pacific Coast of Guatemala, the Department of Uncinariasis which served 
as the local Guatemalan office for the IHD hookworm program, did an experiment with mozos, 
or agricultural laborers, to determine the appropriate dosage that they should use.194 They took 
enormous risks with Guatemalans’ lives in order to perfect their methods.  
 Still, Rockefeller officers reported no fatalities in Guatemala. While IHD officers may 
have had more success using this treatment, the limited statistics could have also resulted from a 
lack of concern about the people who they experimented upon or an inability to track them. IHD 
employees may also have wanted to hide the deaths from authorities.195 In Costa Rica, the death 
of a Hispanic mestizo child from the treatment of oil of chenopodium led to the arrest, 
incarceration, and trial of the technical assistants who had treated him. IHD officers did not take 
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responsibility for these fatalities, but rather blamed the victims for their poor health.196 In fact, 
the Rockefeller Foundation reported “favorable” to “excellent” results, suggesting a blatant 
disregard of their responsibility for the fatalities that did occur.197 Costa Rica, with its more 
developed public health infrastructure, had more ability than Guatemala to monitor the work of 
the philanthropic organization.  
 IHD officers did try to teach laborers about the treatment, although it is not clear that they 
explained the potential risks associated with it. They made house visits to talk to people about 
their concerns and distributed written information, (which seemed primarily for officials and 
elites since the majority of poor and indigenous Guatemalans could not read).198 Yet, the 
fieldworkers’ ability to lecture on hookworm and treatment was also limited by the fact that 
indigenous laborers spoke a number of different languages. In the lectures, IHD officers tried to 
accommodate varied languages by using illustrated explanations of their program. Many of the 
laborers attended the lectures, interested in finding ways to lessen their problems with hookworm 
and disease.199 They were not opposed to treatment if they trusted the doctors and understood 
their methods. In fact, as the laborers began to witness the treatment expel the parasites, they 
grew more cooperative with the program. Fieldworkers reported that laborers became “willing 
and anxious to receive it (treatment).”200 Still, if they had known that too high a dose could be 
fatal, the laborers likely would not have been so eager to receive the treatment, or they would 
have been extremely concerned about the dosage.    
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 Fieldworkers also experimented with a highly dangerous treatment called thymol. This 
medication was known to be harmful if not taken correctly or combined with alcohol. It also had 
unpleasant side effects such as nausea, dizziness, and vomiting.201 The use of this drug was 
particularly dangerous in Guatemala given that the IHB had little ability to know the 
whereabouts of laborers who frequently migrated to different plantations.202 On coffee 
plantations, alcohol formed part of the economy.203 Labor contractors plied indigenous workers 
with alcohol. After men awoke from drinking binges, labor contractors presented them with a bill 
and forced them to work until they paid it off. No evidence indicates that the plantation managers 
limited the distribution of alcohol when the experiments began. Moreover, field workers could 
not count on the indigenous laborers to take their medication or cooperate with the program, 
especially because many were suspicious of the treatment methods.204 These factors apparently 
did not deter IHB fieldworkers from experimenting with the medication.    
  Continuing through the 1920s, IHB conducted and funded campaigns and studies on 
intestinal parasites, hygiene and sanitation, yellow fever, malaria, and hookworm.205 Yet, the 
Rockefeller Foundation remained wary of working in countries that could not offer financial 
support nor the infrastructure with which they needed to carry out public health campaigns. It 
eventually began to focus more on larger countries such as Mexico and Brazil that had more 
established public health and research infrastructures. By the 1930s, the organization scaled back 
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its programs in Guatemala, although it continued to fund Guatemalan medical doctors who 
sought educational opportunities in the United States.  
 As the Rockefeller Foundation drew back its activities in Guatemala, the United Fruit 
Company’s medical division maintained a strong presence in the country. Working on a United 
Fruit Company plantation was an attractive option to both U.S. and Guatemalan researchers. As 
one Company representative commented, “many problems in tropical medicine still remained 
unsolved, and not a few of them are encountered in the world of the United Fruit Company’s 
plantations.”206 Dr. Richard P. Strong, professor of tropical medicine at Harvard University, 
capitalized on the “opportunities” for research at UFCO plantations.207 He used La Frutera’s 
laborers to study onchocerciasis and compared his findings in Guatemala to his study of the 
disease in Africa. A representative from the Guatemalan public health department assisted 
Strong in the study.208 Through connections with United Fruit, the public health official 
developed a relationship with a leading researcher in tropical medicine at the time.  
 Strong likely would have done little to push for increased oversight of experimentation 
on vulnerable people in Guatemala. Before coming to the isthmus, he faced criminal charges for 
studies he did in the Philippines during which he inoculated prisoners with a vaccine 
contaminated with the bubonic plague.209 Although several of the prisoners died, the charges 
were dropped. In the United States, there was little concern for the rights of people in colonized 
locations. Researching disease on a United Fruit Company plantation safe from government 
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intervention and people who might take issue with his methods, Strong had fewer reasons to 
suspect that he would encounter critiques for his work.  
 Dr. John Rock also spent time working with MacPhail in Guatemala. A young researcher 
in Guatemala, Rock went on to become instrumental in the development of “the pill,” the first 
oral contraceptive for women. In Guatemala, Rock witnessed how outposts of American empire 
could function as sites of experimentation. Later, he would conduct his research on the birth 
control pill in Puerto Rico. In the 1950s, Rock and fellow researcher George Pincus tested the 
first oral contraceptive pill on women in a mental institution in Massachusetts. Since the 
distribution of birth control was illegal in Massachusetts, Rock and Pincus performed clinical 
trials for the pill in Puerto Rico where no laws prohibited the distribution of birth control because 
of concerns about overpopulation on the island. Birth control crusader Margaret Sanger, and 
heiress named Katherine McCormick, provided the financial backing for the clinical trials as 
they sought to grant women greater control over reproduction. McCormick’s description of the 
women who participated in the trials as a “cage of ovulating females” suggests the attitudes that 
the American researchers and philanthropists held of the women they experimented upon.210 In 
Guatemala, U.S. and Guatemalan researchers also frequently used animalistic imagery to 
describe the people they experimented upon.  
 Although Rock had a reputation as an ethical researcher, his decision to participate in this 
trial was informed by his paternalism towards “Third World” countries.211 Concerns about 
overpopulation particularly in poor countries such as Puerto Rico convinced Rock of the 
importance of these studies. Scientists and medical doctors who participated in the global 
population control movement often demonstrated paternalistic attitudes towards the 
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predominantly non-white and poor women whose bodies the scientists sought to better control in 
order to prevent reproduction.212 Rock had developed these attitudes towards Central American 
and Caribbean countries partly in Guatemala. In the late 1940s, a few years before his work in 
Puerto Rico, Rock wrote a letter in commemoration of MacPhail after his death. He wrote “there 
has not been one other man who had such a stabilizing influence on all classes of people in 
Guatemala.”213 He appeared to believe that Guatemalans of all classes needed guidance from the 
United Fruit Company’s doctor. A similar attitude justified his research in Puerto Rico.      
 Yet, some Guatemalan doctors shared Rock’s view that MacPhail and the United Fruit 
Company’s medical division brought important benefits to the country. Local authorities 
collaborated with United Fruit on sanitation campaigns. MacPhail attended conferences with 
Guatemalan medical professionals and provided them with information on the latest efforts to 
control and treat malaria.214 Dr. Luis Gaitán, who became Minister of Public Health and had 
strong ties with el bananero, praised United Fruit for improving health and sanitation standards 
in the Montagua Valley where the Company’s plantations were located. Before UFCO arrived in 
the country, Gaitán wrote that the Montagua Valley was a “deadly” land where people died daily 
in overwhelming numbers from malaria. He said that due to MacPhail’s efforts malaria had a 
fairly benign effect on the area.215 Through connections to United Fruit, Guatemala doctors also 
gained opportunities to work with elite members of the international medical establishment. La 
Frutera formed connections with researchers in tropical medicine at Harvard, Tulane, the U.S. 
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Public Health Service, and the military.216 Guatemalan medical students wrote their theses 
working at La Frutera’s hospital. MacPhail provided links between Guatemala and intellectuals 
and researchers from around the world. 
 The power United Fruit exercised in Guatemala influenced medical doctors’ views of 
themselves. United Fruit Company officials imagined themselves as “modern conquerors.”217 
They identified their work as part of the white man’s mission to civilize the tropical world, 
denigrating the work of Latin American doctors before them. La Frutera built its main 
Caribbean port, Puerto Barrios, by draining a swamp and filling it in with the Company buildings 
and a railway. One medical professional boasted that before this project Puerto Barrios was 
“notorious” among La Frutera’s steamship crews as having the most unsanitary port.218 By 
taming the region of tropical diseases, the Company aimed to construct a habitable location for 
its managerial class that came primarily from North America and Europe. It also built golf 
courses, tennis courts, swimming pools, and baseball grounds to keep their white personnel 
content in a tropical and foreign land.219  
 Although Guatemalan doctors such as Gaitán praised the improvements United Fruit 
made to the Montagua Valley, the living conditions and medical care that the Company provided 
its laborers were poor. While the Company gave screens to the “better class” of employees to 
keep out mosquitos that spread malaria, banana officials told the laborers to sleep with mosquito 
nets.220 When laborers fell ill with malaria, the Company blamed the workers. United Fruit hired 
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the majority of its workers from the West Indies, believing that African-descendant populations 
would be less likely to contract malaria.221 One officer complained about the difficulty of 
controlling the spread of malaria due to the “mentality and lack of education of most of our 
laborers.”222 In Guatemala, a far higher number of patients suffered from malaria than in other 
countries.223 The poor public health infrastructure in the country likely made more Guatemalan 
laborers susceptible to disease. Moreover, high rates of illiteracy, particularly in Guatemala, 
rendered it difficult for sanitation workers to communicate information about hygiene and 
sanitation.224 Fancying themselves conquerors, Company doctors failed to win the cooperation of 
the workers who distrusted their intentions.   
 Like the IHD, the Company conducted a number of medical experiments on its laborers 
with no oversight from the Guatemalan government. Banana laborers served as “material” in 
investigations on the Company plantations.225 In his hospital, Macphail did research on the most 
effective dosage, preparation, and administration of the antimalarial drug quinine.226 No longer 
recommended as an anti-malaria treatment by the World Health Organization, quinine can cause 
life-threatening conditions including kidney failure, blood and cardiovascular conditions, as well 
as side effects that include nausea, headaches, vertigo, and sweating. Nevertheless, quinine was 
commonly used at the time to treat and prevent malaria. MacPhail acknowledged that his patients 
became “tired” of the taste of liquid quinine.227 He did not mention that they may have also been 
suffering side effects from the drug. 
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 The Scottish doctor also did other experiments on malaria treatments and the United Fruit 
Company used pesticides detrimental to worker health. In 1926, a German company gave United 
Fruit an anti-malarial drug called Plasmochin to conduct clinical trials in its hospitals. Following 
treatment with quinine, Company doctors found that the parasite causing malaria was still 
present in blood samples of patients. MacPhail experimented with patients at his hospital on the 
dosage of Plasmochin that should be administered.228 He took blood samples daily and also gave 
some patients a combination of Plasmochin and quinine. He found that too high a dosage of 
Plasmochin was toxic and caused in a “small amount” of patients’ pain in the abdomen, cyanosis 
of the lips and nails, and nausea.229 Due to these symptoms, he recommended that a smaller 
dosage of plasmochin be used among health workers in the field. La Frutera also used Paris 
Green, a highly toxic insecticide used to eradicate mosquito larvae.230 When the Company was 
not able to drain water in proximity to their plantations, they instead used Paris Green to control 
malaria.231  
 Although MacPhail received little pushback in Guatemala, he contended with critique in 
international medical circles. He did studies comparing the efficacy of giving quinine orally as 
opposed to conducting an intramuscular, intravenous, or subcutaneous injections of the drug 
through a soluble solution.232 Despite finding that the intramuscular method could cause 
necrosis, or tissue damage in patients, MacPhail used it in patients with potentially fatal cases of 
malaria. In 1924, at the United Fruit Company’s International Conference on Health Problems in 
Tropical America in Kingston, Jamaica, a medical professional in attendance rebuked 
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MacPhail’s method.233 He said that MacPhail should try injecting himself with the intramuscular 
injection method rather than trying it first on his patients. Prior self-experimentation was 
standard ethical practice for medical professionals at the time. MacPhail defended his study. He 
also said that this doctor did not have enough experience combatting malaria in tropical areas to 
understand the necessity of using intramuscular injections in acute cases.234 MacPhail suggested 
that he believed in a different ethical standard in tropical areas; the challenges of controlling 
tropical disease justified experimental risks.   
 Guatemalan medical professionals did not just seek alliances with U.S. organizations, but 
also formed connections with Latin American medical professionals and institutions. In 1935, the 
Brazilian hygiene league invited Guatemala to attend the First Inter-American Conference on 
Mental Hygiene in Rio de Janeiro and to “intensify the intellectual exchange” between the two 
countries.235 A Guatemalan delegate accepted the invitation and visited the Oswaldo Cruz 
Institute. He also went to the hospitals, insane asylums, prisons, and sanitation organizations.236 
Doctors wanted to develop a mental hygiene league similar to the one that had existed in Brazil 
for almost two decades and whose membership included many of the most prominent medical 
scientists. Yet again, this vision did not materialize. Doctors had more opportunities to advance 
in their careers and to gain access to resources locally from U.S. organizations that had 
established their own medical departments in the country. The expansion of U.S. imperial 
networks in the country enabled Guatemalan doctors to more easily gain access to international 
medical networks. 
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An Emerging U.S. Medical Research Culture 
 Through connections to U.S. institutions operating in Central America and the Caribbean, 
Guatemalan doctors gained opportunities to pursue postgraduate education in the United States. 
By studying at universities such as Johns Hopkins, Guatemalan doctors also became exposed to 
the culture of U.S. medical research developing in the first half of the twentieth century. They in 
turn helped to strengthen the development of an American medical research network in 
Guatemala. 
 Guatemalan medical professionals sought opportunities to study public health and 
medicine in the United States through the IHD which funded Latin American doctors pursuing 
postgraduate education in the United States, even after the organization scaled back its public 
health efforts in the country. The vast majority of doctors went to the Johns Hopkins School of 
Hygiene and Public Health. Established in 1916 with a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Hopkins had the first and one of the most preeminent public health academic program in the 
United States. Guatemalan doctors with close connections to the U.S. private institutions and 
government officials gained these opportunities. In 1921, Dr. Luis Gaitán, who later became the 
Minister of Health, received a fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation to study public health 
at Hopkins.237 The rapport he had built with the IHD, United Fruit, the USPHS, and U.S. military 
during a 1918 yellow fever outbreak in the country helped to ensure his place at the university. 
His relationship with military doctors, including U.S. Army Surgeon General William Gorgas, 
known for his work on yellow fever and malaria control in Florida, Havana, and the Panama 
Canal, placed him in good stead to win the fellowship. MacPhail also recommended Gaitan. 
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These individuals and institutions served as gateways for Guatemalan doctors seeking 
opportunities to develop their careers and the Guatemalan medical and public health systems. 
 At Hopkins, Guatemalan doctors were also exposed to an emerging culture of U.S. 
medical research. By the end of the nineteenth century, Johns Hopkins University’s School of 
Medicine adopted the new model of medical education focused on laboratory instruction. This 
model had expanded with the discovery of germ theory. In his survey on medical education, 
Abraham Flexner, known for his reform of medical education in the United States to focus on 
laboratory instruction and clinical experience, held Hopkins to be the ideal and determined that 
the other medical schools were lacking in their instruction.238 The Rockefeller Foundation also 
heralded the rise of laboratory medicine. In 1904, the Rockefeller Institute of Medical Research 
opened its laboratories and was devoted completely to medical research.239 By connecting to 
these institutions, Guatemalan doctors became aligned with leading doctors and institutions 
promoting medical research in the United States.  
 Johns Hopkins researchers have a history of experimenting on vulnerable people. Many 
medical and public health students trained in Johns Hopkins Hospital which primarily served the 
poor and African American population surrounding the university. Built in 1899, Hopkins was 
established as a charity hospital serving the local community. The African American population 
believed the university built the hospital in their neighborhood so that medical researchers could 
conduct experiments on their poor and black patients. The folklorist Gladys-Marie Fry traced the 
African American oral tradition about “night doctors” who allegedly kidnapped African 
Americans for experimentation and dissection between the 1880s and World War I, when more 
blacks were migrating north to cities like Baltimore and the Hopkins’ hospital established its 
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operations.240 These fears gained greater credence with the discovery that in 1951 Hopkins 
doctors had taken cancer cells from an African American woman named Henrietta Lacks before 
she died without her consent. These cells became known as the immortal HeLa cells that have 
been sold for the study of cancer, influenza, sexually-transmitted infections (STIs), Parkinson’s, 
and other diseases.241  
 Some Guatemalan doctors came to Hopkins specifically to study venereal disease control 
and research. Between the 1920s and 1940s, Johns Hopkins grew into an epicenter of research on 
venereal disease. The Rockefeller Institute also devoted considerable resources to the study of 
syphilis and funded programs at Hopkins.242 The U.S. government also began focusing on 
venereal disease control during World War I. Venereal disease posed a serious problem to U.S. 
Army that lost almost seven million days of active duty due to these diseases.243 Following the 
war in the 1920s, the U.S. government significantly curtailed funding for venereal disease, but 
groups including the U.S. Public Health Service, the Rockefeller Foundation, and Hopkins 
continued to view these infectious as a priority.  
One of the preeminent syphilis researchers in the world, Dr. Joseph E. Moore, worked as 
a professor at the university. Also trained at Hopkins, Moore became focused on venereal disease 
during World War I. For close to twenty years Moore headed a famed syphilis clinic that served 
primarily indigent African Americans living in the surrounding Baltimore area.244 The clinic was 
known as Hopkin’s “Department L,” which stood for “lues venerea.” Moore allegedly hated the 
name, but it was meant to protect patients from the embarrassment of visiting the syphilis clinic. 
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He conducted many of his studies on syphilis with the patients who visited his clinic.245 Through 
his work at the clinic and research, he became convinced that “syphilis in the negro is in many 
respects almost a different disease from syphilis in the white.”246 He also has become known as 
what Historian Susan M. Reverby has called the “godfather” of the syphilis study in Tuskegee, 
Alabama. Through observing and collecting longitudinal data on African American men in 
Alabama, the USPHS sought to explore Moore’s preposition that race had a direct effect on the 
manifestations of syphilis.     
 In 1939, Guatemalan Dr. Enrique Padilla would become the first Latin American medical 
professional to take a postgraduate course at Hopkins on syphilis control and research. The 
course would be the first of its kind and focused on venereal disease control and research in East 
Baltimore, a predominantly African American area of the city. Padilla had taken the professional 
routes in Guatemala that granted him access to opportunities to pursue postgraduate education in 
the United States. After obtaining his medical degree from the national university, he had worked 
as a military surgeon before becoming a medical doctor with the United Fruit Company on its 
Tiquisate plantation located near the Pacific Coast.247 His references for the course at Hopkins 
included MacPhail and Gaitan, who had maintained close ties with the Rockefeller Foundation 
since his return from Hopkins in the 1920s. As more Guatemalan doctors became linked to this 
medical network with the United States, they recommended their mentees for further study 
abroad so that they could develop the Guatemalan medical and public health system. 
 The fact that Padilla was the only Latin American officer to take this course shows the 
close links between Guatemala and the United States. It also highlights the Guatemalan 
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government’s commitment to addressing problems of venereal disease control, despite the 
limitations of other aspects of its public health infrastructure. The vast majority of other students 
in the course were USPHS officers, highlighting the close links between the national health 
organization and Hopkins. One student came from Hawaii, then a territory of the United 
States.248 U.S. colonial links in other parts of the world also facilitated medical professionals 
travel to the United States for study. Other students comprised of state public health service 
officers from New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Florida, California, and West Virginia. 
Padilla later brought the knowledge he gained about venereal disease control back to the 
Guatemalan government which was increasing efforts during the Ubico dictatorship to lower 
rates of venereal disease.  
 Dr. Thomas Turner, another leading syphilis researcher at Johns Hopkins University who 
later approved the experiments in Guatemala, led the postgraduate course. Turner’s memoir, Part 
of Medicine, Part of Me: Musings of a Johns Hopkins Dean, illuminates how the U.S. culture of 
medical research, race, and colonial medicine led to his formation as a medical doctor and as a 
professor of venereal disease.249 Often described as a “Maryland Gentleman of the old school,” 
Turner was born in the southern part of the state near what had once been tobacco plantations.250 
After earning his medical degree at the University of Maryland, he received a postdoctoral 
fellowship at Johns Hopkins. There, he met Alan Mason Chesney and Moore who served as his 
primary mentors. Chesney and Moore trained the next generation of preeminent venereal disease 
researchers and gave them a strong foundation of clinical research.251 Both Turner and another 
researcher in the group, Dr. Harry Eagle, would go onto form part of the syphilis study section 
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that reviewed and recommended that the UPSHS conduct experiments on venereal disease in 
Guatemala during the 1940s. Turner described the camaraderie and sense of mission that the 
syphilis study group shared, saying that they “all worked hard and occasionally played hard.”252 
Chesney, who had begun his career at the Rockefeller Institute Hospital in New York City soon 
after it opened was an ardent supporter of “unrestricted” clinical research.253 He also strongly 
opposed the anti-vivisectionist movement. During his time at Hopkins, Chesney led an effort that 
allowed medical schools the right to use animals from the city pound for experiments. Turner 
became inculcated into the norms of medical research at the time which held experimentation as 
moral and pertinent for the survival of humankind.   
 Turner’s professional identity was also forged by expanding U.S. power around the 
world. Outposts of American empire in the Caribbean, Central America, and South Pacific 
served as key training grounds for young researchers like Turner. He traveled to Haiti where 
Hopkins was conducting a study of tropical diseases including yaws, an infectious disease that 
affects the skin, bones, and joints and is caused by the same spirochete as syphilis. Turner 
arrived in Haiti during the U.S. occupation of the country (1915-1934) which was marred by the 
U.S. Marine Corps racism and violence towards Haitians.254 In 1931, the IHD began to fund the 
yaws research and Turner stayed on to lead the effort.255 The links between Johns Hopkins and 
the Rockefeller Foundation made Turner an easy choice for the leadership role.256 Turner then 
went on to lead yaws research in Jamaica for the IHD. In his memoir, he described the 
experience in Jamaica as challenging and emotional. He recalled one young girl who arrived at 
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his clinic on a donkey in a straw saddle bag. “Her legs and buttocks were the sites of deep ulcers, 
her joints distorted by healed scars, her body emaciated, and her mind untutored but bright,” 
Turner wrote.257 Across boundaries of nation and racial understandings, Turner showed some 
empathy for his patients. 
 Yet, away from the clinic, Turner and his fellow researchers remained detached from the 
local Jamaican population. He came to affiliate with other Rockefeller Foundation officers 
including Hugh Smith, a virologist, who had also received his medical degree at Johns Hopkins 
University. In his autobiography, Life’s a Pleasant Institution: The Peregrinations of a 
Rockefeller Doctor, Smith described how he, “Tommy Turner” and a doctor with the United 
Fruit Company would go to the United Fruit Company’s Myrtle Bank Hotel pool to swim and 
drink punch on the weekends.258 The doctors would socialize with American and British tourists 
who arrived weekly on cruise ships. Rockefeller researchers lived in the screened homes of the 
United Fruit Company, setting them apart from the predominantly Afro-Caribbean laborers who 
lived in unscreened homes segregated from the white managerial staff. Smith also describes the 
researchers attending tennis parties at private homes, leisurely afternoons playing golf, or 
attending horse races. These activities provided distance for the researchers from the poverty and 
illness on the island. 
 When Turner returned from the Caribbean and resumed his post at Hopkins, he 
established the postgraduate course on syphilis that Dr. Padilla attended. Understandings of race 
informed the class structure and adhered to dominant understandings of venereal disease in the 
medical community at the time. Turner shared with Moore the view that syphilis was a different 
disease in African American as opposed to European descendant populations. Drawing upon data 
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collected at Moore’s syphilis clinic, Turner concluded that racial and sexual differences existed 
in the disease.259 The postgraduate course included instruction on syphilis control and research in 
the Eastern Health District of Baltimore which had predominantly African American community 
and Turner believed formed a “representative urban community.”260 The research in the Eastern 
Health District were funded by Rockefeller’s IHD, and focused on epidemiology and laboratory 
work on immunology and the storage of blood plasma. Students in the postgraduate course 
researched the prevalence of syphilis in African American as opposed to white populations. 
Their findings showed that the African American population had higher rates of syphilis, 
confirming stereotypes at this time that they were a “syphilis-soaked” race. Yet, the researchers 
collected many more samples of African Americans than they did of white populations, a fact 
that they noted in their reports as influencing their results.261  
 The Eastern Health District was just one place where Johns Hopkins had established field 
sites to study the epidemiology of syphilis. Hopkins researchers also had established field sites in 
the Chapel Hill-Durham, North Carolina region and in San Joaquin County, California. 
Researchers sought to study and compare the extent of syphilis in different populations that 
included a metropolitan area, Baltimore, the rural south, North Carolina, and the far West in San 
Joaquin County that had a large migratory population. During the Greater Depression, “Okies,” 
or poor whites from the Midwest and southwest, made known by John Steinbeck’s The Grapes 
of Wrath, migrated to San Joaquin County. Filipino and Mexican-American populations also 
lived in the region.262 In San Joaquin, researchers investigated the role of sex work as a source of 
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the spread of infections. The focus on prostitution in this area as opposed to others suggests 
assumptions about sexual license in migratory poor white, Latin American, and Filipino 
populations.  
 In the early 1940s, Turner aimed to expand Johns Hopkins’ field sites internationally. He 
wrote a proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation calling upon the organization to provide funds 
for the establishment of a venereal disease laboratory abroad. He said that at present no 
laboratories existed internationally on research concerning syphilis, and he suggested that the 
IHD establish a field site in “representative regions of the world as opportunity presents and 
qualified personnel becomes available.”263 Turner said that such field sites could be established 
in Latin America, the “Romance language areas” of Western Europe, Russia, India, or China. 
Several years before the Pan American Sanitary Bureau/U.S. Public Health Service built a 
venereal disease research laboratory in Guatemala, Turner and the Rockefeller Foundation had 
ambitions to develop a field site in Latin America. 
 The Guatemalan doctors who received funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and 
trained at Hopkins provided future contacts for U.S. doctors seeking to expand their work in the 
Latin American region. As Chapter Two will demonstrate, doctors such as Padilla continued to 
collaborate with U.S. researchers who came to the country through organizations such as the 
Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB).264 Trained in 
the United States, these Guatemalan doctors linked U.S. and Guatemalan medicine and public 
health and enabled the growth of an American research network in the country.    
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 Guatemalan doctors drew upon their experiences with the Rockefeller Foundation and 
their education in the United States to advocate for the Guatemalan government to improve 
public health and medical programs in the country. Dr. Gaitán, who after returning from Johns 
Hopkins became chair of hygiene at the national university, wrote admiringly of public hygiene 
in the United States that he had observed as a student, describing it as at the “vanguard” of 
countries when it came to health.265 He proposed that Guatemala should mimic the U.S. public 
health program. Following their training in elite U.S. public health institutions, Guatemalan 
doctors brought aspects of the culture of U.S. medicine back to their country.   
 
Conclusion  
 U.S. rising imperial power in the Central American and Caribbean region enabled the 
growth of an American medical research network in Guatemala. This network emerged through 
U.S. institutions such as the United Fruit Company and the Rockefeller Foundation. Yet, local 
circumstances in Guatemala also led to the growth of this medical research network. 
Guatemala’s authoritarian leaders and the agricultural elite, seeking to attract foreign investment 
in the country, welcomed U.S. institutions in the country and facilitated their work. Doctors also 
aimed to rekindle Guatemala’s distinguished tradition in medicine and establish their roles as 
leaders of the body politic. They further formed ties with these U.S. organizations; they gained 
opportunities to work with these institutions and to study in the United States at elite universities 
of public health and medicine.  
 Through the network that U.S. and Guatemalan medical professionals developed at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, they began to create a culture of medical research in the 
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country. This American-medical research network built upon the history of repression in public 
health and medical institutions in Guatemala. Yet, it was also influenced by American imperial 
medicine and by a growing focus on research in the United States at institutions such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation and Johns Hopkins University. The culture of medicine in Guatemala 
facilitated the medical violence that researchers conducted on women, indigenous, and 
marginalized Guatemalans.       
 As the next chapter will demonstrate, Guatemala’s role as a central site for medical 
research became solidified during World War II. As the U.S. international health infrastructure in 
the Latin American region expanded, Guatemala became a key piece of the medical research 



























CHAPTER 2: BORDERING PAN AMERICAN HEALTH 
 
 When the United States entered World War II, it embarked upon a militarization 
campaign in the Latin America to protect the region from invasion. As part of these efforts, the 
U.S. government invested in the development of a health and sanitation infrastructure in Latin 
American countries. The State Department created the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIIAA) 
to develop multilateral programs with Latin American countries on health, sanitation, and 
agriculture. The U.S. government also funneled money into the Pan American Sanitary Bureau 
(PASB), which essentially served as an arm of the USPHS for the first half of the twentieth 
century before becoming an office of the WHO in the Americas in the late 1940s.266 Through 
these organizations, the U.S. government intended to “win hearts and minds” in Latin America, 
build the infrastructure necessary for defense, and protect U.S. soldiers stationed in the region 
from the spread of disease. Latin American health and sanitation professionals in general 
enthusiastically participated in, encouraged, and supported many of these programs.267    
 Yet, Latin American professionals’ participation did not mean that the United States built 
this infrastructure in complete solidarity with its southern neighbors, nor did it emerge from the 
grassroots concerns of people subjected to these programs. To U.S. health professionals, the land 
south of Mexico remained polluted with vice, immorality, exotic peoples and disease.268 Latin 
American officials also at times differed from U.S. health professionals in how they approached 
the containment of health and disease. They rejected U.S. views of Latin American racial 
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inferiority that informed many U.S. public health and medical programs.269 U.S. and Latin 
American health and sanitation professionals did, however, share views of the people who were 
the subjects of health campaigns. Both U.S. and Latin American health professionals believed 
that women, non-white, and marginalized groups needed to be reformed to ensure hemispheric 
defense and national development.  
 The boundaries envisioned and created by health professionals and the people they 
researched facilitated the creation of a medical research hub in Guatemala. U.S. professionals’ 
views of Central American countries as immoral also informed their beliefs that they would 
serve as effective sites of research. In Guatemala, health professionals facilitated U.S.-funded 
research on vulnerable peoples. During World War II and continuing into the postwar era 
Guatemala became a center of experimentation in which scientists and doctors sought to research 
diseases that threatened hemispheric security and soldier health.270 In fact, during this period, 
Guatemala became one of the first and arguably the most important field sites for the PASB.271 It 
was second in size only to the Bureau’s headquarters in Washington, DC. The IIAA and the U.S. 
military also conducted research in the country. That Guatemala became a center for 
experimentation is significant given the small size of the country and its relatively limited 
influence in Latin American medicine.272   
 Guatemala’s history as a close friend of the United States was also an important reason 
why the country became an attractive site for research. The country’s geographical location as 
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the weaker and smaller neighbor of Mexico, and its ambitions to lead Central America, has 
historically made the country a willing partner of the United States.273 Throughout his time in 
power (1931-1944), Dictator Ubico “placed himself in the shadow of Uncle Sam” as a strategy 
for mitigating Mexico’s influence in the country and gaining international power.274 At the 
beginning of World War II, Ubico “declared emphatically…fully cognizant of how little material 
aid Guatemala could offer, (that) she was with the United States in any needed capacity all the 
way.”275 In 1942, Ubico and Roosevelt established an agreement that permitted the stationing of 
U.S. troops in the country.276 The Guatemalan government helped the United States track down 
German residents in the country, confiscate their property, and place them in exile. Guatemala’s 
pro-American stance also led the country to become a site of experimentation on diseases that 
threatened national security and U.S. soldier health in tropical locations.  
 U.S. institutions built upon and greatly expanded the medical research infrastructure 
already established in Guatemala by the Rockefeller Foundation and the United Fruit Company. 
Guatemalan doctors who had received fellowships from the Rockefeller Foundation and studied 
at Johns Hopkins University became key point persons for U.S. institutions, health professionals, 
and researchers. The energy for research and money that U.S. institutions had from the United 
States during World War II served as the catalyst that rendered the country a “Third World 
Model” for experimentation continuing into the Cold War.   
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Building Pan American Health  
 The international health infrastructure that emerged during World War II built upon 
earlier efforts to forge Pan American health. Attempts to develop public health across the 
Americas have often been led by the United States and riven by divisions, competitions, and 
inequalities. Yet, Latin American health professionals also actively participated in establishing 
Pan American health initiatives. Regional cooperation helped Latin Americans move towards 
their goals of constructing public health and medical infrastructures in their countries. Concerns 
about the threats posed by marginalized members of Latin American society have bounded U.S. 
and Latin American health professionals across borders.  
 In 1902, during the first Pan American sanitary convention, the American republics 
established the International Sanitary Bureau (ISB) at the urging of the United States. The oldest 
international health organization, it emerged several years before the creation of two other 
influential international health organizations: the Paris Office International d’Hyiéne and the 
Health Organization of the League of Nations. Operating on a shoestring budget, the 
organization established the foundations of an Inter-American medical and public health 
infrastructure. The ISB was later renamed the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) and then 
the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), when it became the regional office of the World 
Health Organization. This chapter will use the term PASB, since the organization was called that 
for the majority of the first half of the twentieth century.  
 For its first half of the twentieth century, U.S. interests dominated the PASB. The USPHS 
(known in its early years as the Marine Hospital Service) ran the PASB for the first fifty years. 
At the organization’s foundation, U.S. Surgeon General Walt Wyman addressed the 11 countries 
represented and declared, “health, cleanliness, intellect, and morals might well be the motto of 
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this conference.”277 U.S. Surgeon Generals served as the Directors of the PASB until 1947, when 
a Rockefeller man, Fred Soper, assumed the helm of the organization. USPHS and PASB shared 
the same office, budget, and personnel. USPHS officers, on assignment with PASB, assumed 
positions as international actors, no longer subject to the laws of the United States. They 
conducted studies and public health campaigns that aided U.S. goals to bulwark regional defense, 
while also pursuing their own research agendas. The PASB helped to mask the imperial nature of 
U.S. public health work in the region.  
 The PASB at first had little influence in Latin America. In the early years, PASB had few 
financial resources nor the ability to implement programs.278 It focused on collecting and 
circulating information about disease to member countries and organized sanitation conferences. 
Many Latin Americans remained wary of PASB’s mission to cultivate regional solidarity. Cuban 
intellectual José Marti suspected that Pan Americanism served as a disguise for U.S. 
imperialism. Others such as literary critics Rubén Dario and José Enrique, remained skeptical of 
Pan Americanism as a concept: they charged that the materialistic proclivities of Anglo 
Americans could never be reconciled with a more spiritual Latin American culture.279  
 Still, both U.S. and Latin American delegates attended PASB conferences where they had 
lively debates about port sanitation, quarantine, and the control of disease.280 By the 1920s, the 
Bureau stepped up its operations and gained more power to operate in Latin American countries. 
In 1924, at the Pan American Sanitary Conference in Havana, Cuba, the Bureau further 
established itself as an international health organization by creating the Pan American Sanitary 
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Code, which was ratified by all the American republics and continues to remain in place in the 
current day.281  
 The Pan American Sanitary Code provided the Bureau with considerable power to 
operate in Latin America. It established PASB as the central coordinating agency to collect and 
distribute information on disease and sanitation in the Americas. As an international health 
organization, the Bureau could also sidestep diplomatic channels and engage directly with health 
and sanitation authorities on efforts to control and prevent disease.282 USPHS officers and health 
authorities in Latin American countries had significant leeway to direct disease control measures 
and studies with little oversight from governmental regulatory bodies. The Bureau could further 
place national health service employees on contract as representatives while still keeping their 
jobs. For the first half of the twentieth century, this measure mainly helped the USPHS. From the 
beginning, the Code made research central to the organization. The Bureau had the ability to hire 
experts to do epidemiological studies and other investigations.283 Nevertheless, countries had to 
request technical assistance; PASB could not impose projects on countries without local support.   
 For the first half of the twentieth century, the PASB served the USPHS’s primary goals to 
protect U.S. national borders and citizens. In 1798, USPHS had begun as a network of hospitals 
for merchant seaman. By the 1900s, USPHS conducted research, controlled infectious diseases, 
and implemented quarantines. The U.S. annexation of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines 
during the Spanish-American War (1898) and the building of the Panama Canal Zone (1904-
1914) raised new concerns about managing health and sanitation of populations in the newly 
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acquired territories and ensuring that diseases would not spread to the mainland.284 During the 
construction of the Panama Canal, the USPHS managed quarantine operations, manned hospitals 
and laboratories in the Panama Canal Zone, and sought to eradicate rats and mosquito larvae.285 
Historian Alexandra Stern has observed that the USPHS made the Canal Zone “a working 
laboratory where U.S. officials had an enormous amount of power to study disease and enforce 
strategies of containment and eradication.”286 The USPHS acted as an “occupying force” in the 
Panama Canal Zone, operating outside the organization’s purview as a national organization.287    
 As the United States expanded its international health programs in the region in an effort 
to protect the United States from the spread of communicable diseases, the USPHS also sought 
to limit the influx of Latin American immigrants. Between the 1890s to the 1920s, USPHS 
officers determined which immigrants posed “biological threats” to the nation.288 They devised 
tests to detect “feebleminded” immigrants who they suspected would fail to contribute to the 
industrial labor force.289 One officer wrote that these tests were critical in preventing the United 
States from becoming another Mexico.290 At the time, the Mexican Revolution was underway, 
sparking popular uprisings throughout the country. On the U.S.-Mexico border, USPHS officers 
conducted particularly onerous examinations of immigrants.291 In El Paso, USPHS officers, 
fearing an outbreak of typhus, forced Mexicans seeking to enter the United States to strip naked 
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and bathe.292 They were more lenient with foreign physicians who continued to migrate in 
significant numbers to fill hospital shortages, contributing to the “brain drain” that occurred in 
other countries.293 By 1924 when the U.S. imposed stricter quotas for immigration, the federal 
government moved medical inspection of immigrants abroad to U.S. consulates, where USPHS 
staff and immigration officials still inspected immigrants for physical and mental disabilities and 
defects.294   
  U.S. immigration policies towards Latin Americans and hardline approach to eugenics 
hampered efforts to forge Pan American collaboration in health and sanitation. In 1927, at the 
First Pan American Conference on Eugenics and Homiculture in Havana, Charles Davenport, a 
leader of the U.S. eugenics movement, and a Cuban eugenicist named Domingo y Ramos, 
proposed that the Latin American delegates adopt a Code of Eugenics. It called for classifying 
people according to their genetic fitness, sterilizing the mentally ill and criminals and prohibiting 
migration from American countries that did not meet eugenic standards.295 Many delegates at the 
conference, including the Mexican representative, Rafael Santamarina, protested the Code. He 
expressed concern that U.S. eugenicists had subjected Mexican American children in the United 
States to mental tests, claiming to prove their inferior intelligence.296 Latin American delegates 
had good reason to suspect that the Code would be used against their countries. Moreover, the 
Catholic influence in Latin America deterred member states from supporting the proposal for 
sterilization. Given these concerns, Latin American delegates refused to adopt the Code.297   
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 At other Pan American conferences, Latin Americans also challenged U.S. eugenic 
policies. They argued that countries adopt their approach to the control of reproduction. During 
the early Pan American Congresses, Latin American delegates pushed the PASB to address 
maternal and child health care.298 Influenced by French puericulture, or homiculture in the 
Cuban-coined version, Latin Americans were also influenced by eugenics and believed that 
maternal and child health was critical to nation-building.299 Their concern for women was 
secondary in these programs. Until the 1940s, PASB ignored Latin Americans’ requests. The 
Bureau preferred to focus on technical solutions to contain the spread of disease, avoiding 
responsibility for the development of national infrastructure, let alone the funding of maternal 
health clinics and child care services. Even in the United States, healthcare providers struggled to 
secure state funding for maternal and child healthcare, despite the increasing numbers of women 
who went to hospitals for childbirth by the 1920s and 1930s.300 Historian Anne-Emanuelle Birn 
says that U.S. concerns about the rising influence of socialism shaped PASB’s decision to stay 
out of socially-oriented policies, which were more common in the French models.301 PASB 
Director and USPHS Surgeon General Hugh Cumming (1920-1947), like many of his 
contemporaries, was distrustful of social medicine. He did not want state-run medicine to curb 
efforts to build private or voluntary initiatives.302  
 Yet, Cumming was also a eugenicist. He sought to use his platform as USPHS Surgeon 
General to build government support for the American eugenics movement.303 The so-called 
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“cavalier of Virginia,” (according to Cuban eugenicist Domingo Ramos), Cumming was a 
member of the American Eugenics Society and served on its advisory council. He was also a 
delegate for the second Pan American Conference on Eugenics in 1934.304 Seeking to protect the 
so-called American racial stock, he initiated a study on the relationship between insanity and 
immigration in the United States.305 In his articles, Cumming stressed the importance of 
hereditary factors and eugenics in preventative medicine.306 As PASB director, he appeared more 
interested in containing the spread of disease to protect the U.S. white population than supporting 
Latin American approaches to “better breeding.” 
 Despite receiving no support from the PASB, Latin American eugenicists expanded the 
Pan American network. Latin American feminists, doctors, and lawyers organized eight Pan 
American Child Congresses between 1916 and 1942.307 The conferences were not just for Latin 
Americans. The U.S. Children’s Bureau also participated in several conferences, urging Latin 
American countries to move away from state-sponsored welfare programs and to instead use a 
mix of public and private solutions.308 The primary focus of the conferences was the 
development of a welfare state to address maternal and child health.309 The commitment of Latin 
American feminists, medical doctors, and lawyers to state puericulture demonstrates the 
continued influence of French medicine in Latin America, and Latin American social reformers’ 
rejection of aspects of U.S. healthcare policies.    
 Although U.S. and Latin American eugenicists disagreed about maternal and infant care, 
neither of their approaches emerged from the interests of women who were the targets of these 
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programs. For instance, in Puerto Rico, nationalists and the Catholic Church sharply criticized 
U.S. family planning programs on the island and accused them of being part of a genocidal 
plot.310 New Deal policies and later Clarence Gamble provided funding for birthing clinics and 
milk stations. In the clinics, health workers sterilized women without their consent and used 
them in clinical trials to test birth control, with officials giving women foam powders, 
contraceptive jellies, and condoms to test their effectiveness.311 The outcry over U.S. family 
planning programs coincided with the 1930 discovery that a Rockefeller Foundation researcher 
named Cornelius P. Rhoades wrote a private letter to a colleague in which he claimed to have 
tried to “exterminate” Puerto Ricans by giving them cancer.312 Despite efforts to control 
women’s reproduction through the family planning programs, many Puerto Rican women wanted 
access to reproductive control. In their debates, Puerto Rican nationalists did not represent the 
views of many of the women. Instead, nationalists used the women as symbols of the U.S. 
violation of its national sovereignty.  
 Despite sparring with Latin American health professionals, PASB stepped up efforts to 
work on disease control in South America. In the 1920s, PASB began to send USPHS officer Dr. 
John D. Long as their lone representative to visit Latin American countries and form 
relationships with their health departments.313 Long’s ability to travel to different Latin 
American countries through the PASB allowed USPHS a greater role in the control of diseases in 
Latin America. One of the Bureau’s key efforts in the interwar years was the eradication of the 
plague in South America. Long, who had been at the forefront of USPHS efforts to contain the 
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plague in California and the Philippines, was well equipped to lead these initiatives.314 He 
focused primarily on Peru and Ecuador. Since 1903, when the plague first invaded Peru, the 
country had suffered outbreaks every year. Peruvian officials contended with widespread protest 
in their efforts to control the disease.315 Crowds threw stones at the “death wagon,” which carried 
away infected people for treatment.316 Family members hid their relatives, fled the lazarettos, and 
staged minor revolts when health officials tried to disinfect and burn their homes.317  
 In 1930, the PASB signed an agreement with the Peruvian and Ecuadorian health 
authorities to begin a plague eradication campaign and strengthen regional commitment to 
fighting infectious disease. The Bureau (and hence USPHS) largely funded the effort.318 Long 
and PASB epidemiologist C.R. Eskey arrived in the country. They launched a National Anti-
Plague Service, trained health workers in Lima, and sent them around the country to trap rats and 
flees.319 The campaign was successful in drastically lowering plague rates. They also led 
research on disease control and epidemiological studies.320 Long and a Peruvian officer proposed 
that the plague had originated from infected fleas in jute bags carried by Indian shipping 
vessels.321 They had found that the people who had handled the jute bags stricken with the 
plague, and discovered dead fleas in the jute bags. Around the turn of the twentieth century, 
India had been devastated during a worldwide plague outbreak, concerning public health 
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authorities around the world.322 These concerns likely formed health workers’ presumptions 
about the plague’s spread. Yet, further studies suggested that no one person, rat, or flea was the 
sole source of the disease.323  
 U.S. and Peruvian official’s prejudices shaped their epidemiological and disease control 
work. Peruvian health officials painted newly arrived Chinese immigrants as vectors of the 
disease, as had USPHS officers in California during the plague outbreak at the turn of twentieth 
century.324 They also charged that indigenous groups’ poor sanitation and cultural practices led 
to the spread of the plague. Public health workers, mainly from Peru and Ecuador, scrutinized the 
cultural habits of indigenous groups in epidemiological studies. In Ecuador, health workers said 
that indigenous funeral practices, in which mourners stayed together for several at wakes, 
facilitated the spread of the plague.325 Health authorities began requiring rapid burials where they 
disinfected and wrapped dead bodies in blankets, and then buried them two feet below the 
ground. These burials led to sharp protest from indigenous groups.326 Peruvian authorities also 
claimed that the ponchos and blankets of indigenous people were “infested” with fleas.327 Yet, 
they did not find high rates of plague in highland communities where many indigenous people 
lived.328 As in Guatemala, health authorities had presumed that indigenous people’s cultural 
practices rendered them disease vectors, despite lacking clear evidence of this fact. 
 Although PASB had limited personnel to send to Latin American countries during these 
campaigns, the organization gained regional influence through its main publication. Beginning in 
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the 1920s, the PASB published and distributed the Boletín de la Oficina Sanitaria Internacional 
for free to 30 countries.329 The publication disseminated information on the latest technical 
developments to improve sanitation and contain the spread of disease. The publication also 
helped to build the Bureau’s reputation in Latin America.  
 By the 1930s the United States stepped up efforts to build good will in the region through 
the Good Neighbor program. The Mexican Revolution and resistance in Nicaragua during the 
1920s had forced U.S. officials and members of the public to acknowledge that “gun boat 
diplomacy” did little to further the protection of U.S. economic and political interests. The 
United States moved to secure its economic interests in the region from European competitors by 
strengthening its political, economic, and cultural ties with Latin America.330 Although no longer 
seeking to strong arm Latin Americans into compliance with U.S. foreign policy and corporate 
interests, this use of “soft power” was still rooted in efforts to expand U.S. power. Nevertheless, 
many Latin American countries demonstrated enthusiastic support for Roosevelt’s new foreign 
policy approach towards their countries and welcomed programs that they believed would 
strengthen their economies and prevent disease. 
 As part of efforts to develop neighborly initiatives, the PASB helped Chile develop health 
legislation and in Central America supported the construction of the Pan American Highway by 
carrying out sanitation campaigns in nearby communities. Still PASB’s influence remained 
limited in the years leading up to the war. Fred Soper, who worked for the Rockefeller 
Foundation before later becoming PASB director, interacted with PASB officers on efforts to 
control yellow fever while in Brazil. He criticized the Bureau as “inadequate” and “dependent 
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almost entirely on UPSHS for technical personnel.”331 Despite a successful campaign to contain 
the plague, PASB did not yet have the support from the U.S. government to play a significant 
role in the development of Latin American medicine and public health.  
 As mentioned in Chapter One, the primary work of the United States in international 
health until the 1940s was conducted by the Rockefeller Foundation’s IHD. Focusing on the 
control of yellow fever, malaria, and hookworm in countries throughout Latin America, 
Rockefeller eventually began to pursue relationships only with countries that could economically 
sustain public health efforts.332 Brazil became its most established program, although Rockefeller 
also gave considerable attention to Mexico.333 In Brazil, Rockefeller Foundation officers worked 
on the development of a vaccine for fellow fever. Hugh Smith, a Rockefeller Foundation officer, 
found that the “benevolent dictatorship” of Getulio Vargas during the 1930s was “most helpful” 
in supporting yellow fever control.334 The first vaccinations were carried out on coffee 
plantations in Minas Gerais, a southeastern state in Brazil. Smith went first to the largest 
fazendas, or plantations to establish rapport with the fazandeiros (estate owners). The fazendeiro 
would inquire as to how many people the researchers wanted then issue orders to his lieutenants 
for that number to appear at the specified hour on the following day. As demonstrated in 
Guatemala, Latin American countries with authoritarian governments and entrenched social 
inequality served as useful field sites for U.S. public health and medical officers.  
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World War II and International Health 
 During World War II and continuing into the postwar era, the U.S. government began to 
funnel money into international health in Latin America.335 As part of these efforts, the United 
States vastly expanded its financing of PASB. In 1942, the U.S. government also established the 
Office of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) under the U.S. State Department, “to 
further the general welfare and to strengthen friendship and understanding of the peoples of the 
American Republics.”336 The IIAA expanded the goals of the Good Neighbor Program to spur 
collaboration between U.S. and Latin American professionals and sought to implement public 
health programs that had already proven effective in the United States.337  
 Headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, grandson of the oil magnate John D. Rockefeller, the 
IIAA set up its health and sanitation programs in the model of Rockefeller Foundation. During 
World War II and in the postwar era, the Rockefeller Foundation increasingly adopted a “retired 
empire’s role.”338 As the U.S. government took on a greater role in funding international health, 
the Rockefeller Foundation began to scale back its efforts but remained a consultant to the new 
government institutions. In the 1940s, the Rockefeller Foundation increasingly focused on 
agriculture and malnutrition, which IHD and other U.S. scientists and officials believed held 
back development in the region.339 As will be discussed later in this chapter, these efforts 
developed in Mexico and later in Central America. 
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 Together the IIAA and PASB built upon previous efforts of U.S. private organizations 
and expanded efforts to establish a medical network that supported hemispheric defense. The 
IIAA provided fellowships for Latin Americans to study at U.S. universities and created greater 
links between U.S. and Latin American medical professionals. This investment in resources and 
the war generated greater solidarity between U.S. and Latin American doctors. By 1951, the 
IIAA had provided fellowships for 39 Guatemalan doctors, nurses, and engineers to study in the 
United States.340 They included Dr. Juan Funes, a key participant in the USPHS venereal disease 
experiments that occurred later in the 1940s. The IIAA also conducted several studies on 
diseases in countries throughout Latin America.341 The IIAA received far more funds from the 
U.S. government than the PASB.342 Still, the two organizations collaborated in efforts. IIAA 
funded several projects at the Bureau. The two organizations held joint conferences on sanitary 
engineering and nurses’ training. They also collaborated in conducting studies and 
experiments.343  
  Guatemala was among the eighteen Latin American countries that received aid from the 
U.S. State Department during the war.344 The IIAA established a Servicio (Service) or a division 
in Guatemala City. The Servicio employed and paid the salaries of physicians, engineers, nurses, 
and technicians, many of whom were Guatemalan.345 It had close contacts with doctors who had 
                                                      
340 “The Work of the Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Salud Pública and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in 
Guatemala, September 12, 1951. IIAA Health and Sanitation Division/Subject Files Relating to Guatemala, 1950-1961, Box. 1. 
NARA College Park, Maryland.  
341 Institute of Inter-American Affairs: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4—State Department Organization and Personnel of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, First Session on H.R. 4163, June 20 and 27, 
1947 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), 13-14. 
342 Ibid, 313. 
343 Report of the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau to the Member Governments of the Pan American Sanitary 
Organization, 29-30, The Fred L. Soper Papers, NLM. 
344 Institute of Inter-American Affairs: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4—State Department Organization and Personnel of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1. 
345 The Work of the Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Salud Pública and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in 
Guatemala, September 12, 1951. IIAA Health and Sanitation Division/Subject Files Relating to Guatemala, 1950-1961, Box. 1. 
NARA College Park, Maryland.  
 93 
previously received fellowships from the Rockefeller Foundation and trained at Johns Hopkins. 
They included Dr. Enrique Padilla who had taken the venereal disease control and research 
course at Hopkins and began working for the Servicio on a part time basis.346 He provided 
training to other doctors and interns at the Guatemalan health department on how to conduct dark 
field examinations for syphilis.347  
 The IIAA sought to develop the health infrastructure in Guatemala in order to further 
stability and readiness for war. The IIAA signed an agreement with Dictator Jorge Ubico to 
partially fund and construct the new Roosevelt Hospital, which was to be located in the capital. It 
would become the largest public hospital in the country. The Servicio also assisted with the 
development of Guatemala’s public health infrastructure by building health clinics in poor 
neighborhoods in Guatemala City and in rural areas and through developing water and sewage 
systems. It further had a program to train midwives so as to reduce the rates of maternal and 
infant mortality, implemented campaigns to control malaria and typhus, treated patients for 
venereal disease at health clinics, improved sanitation in Guatemala’s major ports in San José 
and Puerto Barrios, and worked with the PASB on research initiatives.  
 The PASB also focused on preparing the region for war by establishing field sites in three 
key locations: one in El Paso on the U.S.-Mexico border, one in Lima, Peru that gave the 
institution a foothold in South America, and one in Guatemala City, Guatemala that established 
PASB presence in the Central American and Caribbean region. The afflictions that the PASB 
focused on in these sites suggest how certain populations and regions of the Americas became 
associated with specific diseases. In the Lima office, the Bureau continued to combat the plague. 
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PASB officers conducted epidemiology and research and continued to develop their methods for 
controlling the disease.348 The Lima Office also built a focus on sanitary engineering, which 
included the trapping of rats and fleas that spread the plague.  
 In the El Paso office, the Bureau focused on containing the spread of infectious disease 
across the U.S.-Mexico border. One of PASB officers’ main efforts focused on mitigating the 
spread of venereal disease.349 PASB/USPHS officials still saw the land south of Mexico as 
ridden with venereal disease. U.S. officials’ views of Latin Americans as having looser morals 
and incompetent governments who lacked control of their populations informed these ideas. 
Many people in the United States feared that U.S. troops in Latin American ports would become 
infected with syphilis or gonorrhea within mere days of being stationed there.350 During World 
War I, General John J. Pershing, who later became the commander-in-chief of the American 
Expeditionary Forces in Europe, had instituted a regulated system of prostitution in Mexico for 
his troops in an effort to quell the spread of venereal disease.351 Although sex work was illegal in 
the United States, in foreign and border locations the U.S. military has often tolerated and 
regulated prostitution. Military commanders have privately believed that their soldiers needed 
access to brothels in order to contain their sexual assault of women and also thought that 
suppressing prostitution in foreign populations was unrealistic. They further held that local 
authorities in Latin America were incapable of controlling venereal diseases.  
 During World War II, PASB/USPHS officer Joseph Spoto, launched the Campaña 
Antivenérea Internacional (International Anti-Venereal Disease Campaign). Through the Bureau 
office, U.S. and Mexican governments coordinated new efforts to lower rates of venereal 
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disease. The U.S. government did not want venereal disease to spread across the border, and 
Mexican officials had also been centrally concerned about the spread of venereal disease since 
the Mexican Revolution.352 Spoto also carried out physical examinations of Braceros, or 
Mexican farmworkers contracted to work in the United States during the war.353 USPHS officers 
scrutinized Braceros bodies in medical inspections. They searched the men for lice that could 
spread typhus and for signs of venereal disease. They used x-rays to check the Braceros for 
tuberculosis, deloused them with DDT to prevent the spread of typhus and malaria, and 
disinfected their clothes while they were forced to shower.354 USPHS officers made sure the men 
would be good workers; they screened the men to ensure that they were young, well built, 
cooperative, and immune from radical politics.355 For USPHS officers, the presence of disease 
served as indications of the men’s characters. They presumed that men who had venereal disease 
were weak and immoral, and those who had typhus to be unhygienic and lazy.     
 Under the newly developed Border Public Health Program, the USPHS exported its 
public health programs to Mexico, although by the 1940s, both the United States and Mexico 
legally suppressed prostitution.356 Sister cities implemented the same public health programs and 
exchanged epidemiological information 357 In El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, officials led intensive 
campaigns to arrest sex workers. Mexican government officials welcomed the assistance of U.S. 
health workers. The PASB also provided fellowships to train Mexican public health workers 
with the USPHS on venereal disease control, installed dispensaries, and distributed educational 
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information on venereal disease control in Spanish.358 The PASB’s El Paso field office enabled 
the USPHS to gain more direct influence on public health activities across national boundaries. 
 U.S. military and health professionals’ concerns about the spread of venereal disease 
extended to Panama, Guatemala, Mexico, and Cuba where U.S. troops were stationed during the 
war. In each location, U.S. Military Surgeons remained concerned that troops were particularly 
susceptible to venereal disease in Latin American countries. During World War II, a military 
surgeon located in the Panama Canal Zone complained that Central American governments 
tolerated prostitution and saw it as a “lucrative business.” In these “tropical areas of the world,” 
the surgeon said that soldiers contended with strange and foreign customs that fundamentally 
challenged Anglo-Saxon and Puritan values.359 The military surgeon implicitly associated the 
predominantly Catholic religious values and Latin backgrounds with what he viewed as 
immorality. He added that the economic conditions near military bases made sex work an 
attractive business in Panama; local populations viewed American soldiers as a “gold mine.”360 
Since Panama tolerated prostitution and had a registration system, there were a number of 
brothels that soldiers could visit and, according to the military surgeon, there were “legions of 
clandestines, in hotels and parks.”361 The presence of U.S. soldiers also brought new cantinas 
that “sprang up with fungus-like rapidity around outlying camps and bases.”362 Military surgeons 
viewed the soldiers as victims of local populations and circumstances, and did not acknowledge 
that their demand for sex workers led to the rise in business.  
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 The military’s medical department tried to lower rates of venereal disease among the 
troops. It embarked upon an education campaign for soldiers, provided prophylactic kits, and at 
the recommendation of USPHS used contact investigation to try to track down people who were 
the sources of the spread of disease.363 The local Panamanian venereal disease hospital 
cooperated with efforts and treated the women for their infections. Yet, U.S. military surgeons 
complained that commanders failed to do more to address the problem. They claimed that nearly 
all sex workers in Panama were infected with venereal disease. Nevertheless, the U.S. military 
contributed to the problem. Although U.S. federal law required the repression of prostitution near 
military bases, in practice military commanders both tolerated and encouraged troops to visit 
brothels. In fact, the U.S. military has implemented some forms of regulatory measures in Cuba, 
Haiti, Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, the Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, the Philippines, France, 
Arizona, Texas, Florida, and Guatemala.364 In the postwar era, the U.S. even handed out 
pamphlets to soldiers with information about brothels located throughout the Panama Canal and 
Central American region.365 Military commanders often encouraged soldiers to visit brothels to 
deter the sexual assault of local women. Many commanders also privately assumed a connection 
between virility and soldierly prowess.     
 In Guatemala, the U.S. military also implemented methods to control venereal disease. 
The military command in Guatemala was under the umbrella of the Panama Canal Department 
and followed similar guidelines in seeking to limit the spread of infectious disease. The military 
with the cooperation of local authorities began inspections of cantinas, restaurants, dance 
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halls.366 In Guatemala, the military managed to convince the government to expand Guatemala’s 
regulation system. Ubico’s desire to please the U.S. government and military officials granted 
them more leeway to implement programs. At the urging of the U.S. Army, Ubico passed laws 
requiring that not just women accused of “bad conduct” but also waitresses, barmaids, and 
women who worked in dance halls regularly report for gynecological inspections.367 This law 
implied presumptions about the morality of the working class women who most often labored in 
these establishments.  
 The Guatemalan population vociferously protested the implementation of this law 
because it subjected more women to gynecological scrutiny by male medical professionals. 368 
During this time, many in Guatemalan society continued to see vaginal inspections as a form of 
punishment for women who had committed sexual transgressions.369 Women who submitted to 
these inspections often experienced shame and embarrassment. These laws show the burdens that 
women had to endure in order to protect the health of U.S. white male soldiers. As the United 
States sought to develop health and sanitation programs with its southern neighbors during the 
war, many of these programs adversely affected women and marginalized populations in Latin 
American societies. These programs were not aimed not only at promoting health; they also 
sought to increase the surveillance and control of people deemed as threats to hemispheric 
defense. 
 In a newspaper article, a Guatemalan doctor named Epaminondas Quintana, who had 
received an IIAA fellowship to study health education at the University of California, Berkeley 
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challenged the notion that local women and governments victimized U.S. white soldiers 
stationed in their countries. Quintana’s time in the United States did not translate into support for 
U.S. soldiers who he viewed as harming his compatriots. He ironically commented that the 
“splendidness of the men in uniform” had brought about surge of venereal disease in the 
country.370 Sex workers from across the Central American region had flocked to the areas 
surrounding where U.S. soldiers were stationed in Guatemala City and in San José near the 
Pacific coastline. While before Guatemalan doctors had estimated that 8 to 10 percent of the 
population had venereal disease, now Quintana said that this number had reached far higher 
numbers especially among the youth.  
 The U.S. Army established dispensaries that instituted rapid treatment methods like those 
in the United States during the war but they were mainly to serve the needs of U.S. soldiers. The 
IIAA sought to address the problem of venereal disease in the country by establishing health 
clinics in Guatemala City and in rural areas. Drawing from his studies in the United States, 
Quintana also participated in a propaganda campaign to raise awareness about venereal disease 
and the need for treatment. In 1945, the IIAA provided penicillin to treat patients for venereal 
disease, but this medicine still remained in short supply at this time.371 Yet, given the rise in 
venereal disease, these new health clinics were not sufficient to meet Guatemalans’ health needs.  
 
A Key Experimental Site  
 Imagining Latin America as a land of immorality and weak government regulations, U.S. 
health professionals and researchers also saw it as a place where the ethics and laws that impeded 
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their research in the United States did not apply. Beginning in World War II, the Guatemala 
office became the most active PASB research site. Ubico’s efforts to accommodate the U.S. 
military and institutions operating in the country provided a welcome environment for research 
on vulnerable populations. Furthermore, Guatemalan doctors, many of whom had received 
fellowships to study at U.S. universities from the Rockefeller Foundation or the IIAA, helped to 
facilitate and participate in research studies. A PASB officer who wrote about the research in 
Guatemala on typhus, onchocerciasis, venereal disease, malaria, and malnutrition stated that 
these projects “may be considered more as investigative or research in nature than as definite 
public health programs.”372 The article described the research underway in Guatemala as “far 
reaching,” suggesting that it was not developed to help just Guatemala but rather were deemed 
applicable to other countries and regions of the world.373 USPHS funded several of these studies 
on malaria, onchocerciasis, venereal disease, and on malnutrition.374    
 The rise of research on human subjects and animals in Guatemala followed trends in the 
United States. Before World War II, the federal government had provided little financial support 
for scientific research. In 1941, responding to the needs of the war effort and competition with 
countries including Japan and Germany, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt established the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). It had a Committee on Medical 
Research (CMR) that oversaw experiments on human and animal subjects. The U.S. 
government’s centralization and increased funding for research led to an expansion of 
collaborative studies between government and private researchers in academia and industry in 
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areas that benefitted the U.S. military and national security.375 These cooperative studies, in 
which scientists at universities directed physicians on the use of drugs and treatments, also 
allowed for a vast rise in the number of so-called “patients” used in studies.376  
 As the U.S. government centralized research and funding during the war, it also 
drastically expanded the power of the USPHS to direct medical research. In 1944, in response to 
the advocacy of Surgeon General Thomas Parran, Congress gave the UPSHS the right to make 
grants to universities, hospitals, laboratories, and individual researchers, providing the 
framework for what would become the postwar National Institute of Health (NIH) extramural 
program.377 Following the war, the NIH took over the OSRD grants program. Due to the creation 
of this grants program, the NIH became the foremost biomedical research institution in the 
United States. By the late 1960s, the NIH gave annual appropriations of more than one billion.378  
 During World War II, USPHS researchers and the military conducted a number of studies 
on human subjects. U.S. researchers used populations of “convenience” who included soldiers, 
mental health patients, and children in orphanages in medical research.379 The people with the 
least amount of power to fight back against powerful U.S. institutions and researchers were most 
often rendered the subjects of experimentation. The USPHS used U.S. sailors in a study on 
penicillin and streptomycin to treat tuberculosis.380 The streptomycin studies show what USPHS 
researchers deemed acceptable ethical practice during World war II. UPSHS gave one group of 
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patients the drug streptomycin to treat tuberculosis, while withholding treatment from members 
of a control group, despite recognition in a previous study at the Veterans Administration that 
this protocol would be controversial.381 USPHS officers tried to avoid controversy by not telling 
people in the control group that they were part of the study. Many other experiments were 
conducted during World War II and continuing into the Cold War. The U.S. military subjected 
unknowing soldiers to mustard gas and nuclear radiation.382 Manhattan Project doctors injected 
hospital patients, pregnant women, and disabled children with plutonium. On the Marshall 
Islands, people were subjected to radiation from the U.S. military’s testing of atomic bombs.383  
 This may seem egregious, but U.S. scientists had a long history of experimenting on 
vulnerable people. In the nineteenth century, J. Marion Sims, the so-called “father of 
gynecology,” developed the speculum through experiments he conducted on enslaved women.384 
In 1916, University of Michigan Researcher Udo Wile published a study describing his “dental 
drill” experiments on patients at a mental institution. He sought to prove the effect of syphilis on 
the brain through this drilling.385 Before World War II, U.S. researchers had few formal 
guidelines governing their use of human subjects in medical research. In 1916, the American 
Medical Association had almost amended its code of ethics to require that researchers obtain 
informed consent from human subjects, but received pushback from leading scientists in the 
field.386 Only in 1946 following World War II would the AMA include informed consent in its 
code.  
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 Nevertheless, Historian Susan Lederer has shown that U.S. researchers have never 
operated in an ethical vacuum. They always understood what the medical field deemed best 
practices. Before conducting human experimentation, researchers were expected to do prior 
animal studies and self-experimentation.387 Following World War II, the passage of the 1947 
Nuremberg Code gave U.S. researchers little pause. As Bioethicist Jay Katz has observed, U.S. 
doctors perceived the Nuremberg Code as a “code for barbarians” because it was developed in 
response to Nazi atrocities.388 Still, scientists continued to debate what constituted ethical 
practices. During the Atomic Energy Commission’s Human Radiation Experiments, scientists 
considered risks to the individual, even though they ultimately decided that national security 
concerns outweighed those risks.389 Although mid-century researchers often questioned the 
ethical implications of their research, they appeared less concerned with guarding the wellbeing 
of marginalized members of society, including African Americans, prisoners, soldiers, and 
mental health patients. National interests took precedence over the wellbeing of individuals, 
especially ones viewed as being of lesser importance to the nation. 
 PASB Director Hugh Cumming had a history of approving non-consensual experimental 
studies on vulnerable populations. In the 1920s, soon after becoming Surgeon General, 
Cumming placed a leprosy hospital in Carville, Louisiana under the USPHS, which became an 
established site of research.390 Later during his tenure as Surgeon General and while 
simultaneously serving as the Bureau’s Director, Cumming approved the USPHS syphilis study 
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in Tuskegee, Alabama. This study highlights factors that led U.S. government researchers to 
choose sites and populations upon which to study. Macon County, where the study was 
conducted, offered an ideal site for the study, according to researchers. The county was more 
than 80 percent black and poor. The Tuskegee Institute, which USPHS officers deemed to be the 
“best” of historically black educational institutions, assisted with the study.391  
 Scholars, activists, and journalists have heavily debated the intentions of the black health 
professionals who participated in the study. These African American health professionals have 
been mispresented as ignorant of the study or “race traitors” who sought their own professional 
advancement at the expense of poor African American populations.392 In particular, popular 
discourse has focused on Nurse Eunice Rivers, who was responsible for following up with the 
men in the study. In the 1997 HBO rendition of Miss Evers’ Boys, a film focusing on Nurse 
Rivers, the filmmakers portrayed her deception of the men in a sexualized manner.393 As shown 
with U.S researchers’ perceptions of Guatemala, some have viewed sexuality as indicative of 
loose morals in the realm of research. Yet, African American health professionals, who were also 
a different class than the men in Macon County, were committed to scientific improvement and 
research and appeared to see their participation in the study as potentially benefitting the African 
American population and building the reputation of the Tuskegee Institute. They made these 
decisions according to the limited resources offered to them as African American health 
professionals given stark racial inequality in the United States.394  
 Guatemalan physicians who collaborated with U.S. researchers on experiments had 
similar intentions to uplift their nation. They were interested in the research and directly 
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participated in it. Many of these physicians worked under the Ubico government and later 
continued to serve in government positions during the revolutionary period. Yet, many of the 
doctors were also key players in Ubico’s overthrow. In fact, doctors who directly participated in 
the Revolution, including Minster of Health Julio Bianchi, were instrumental in facilitating 
experiments by foreign researchers, as will be discussed further below. Their aspirations for the 
nation, and their desire to advance medicine and technology in their country, influenced their 
decisions.  
 Guatemalan doctors’ interest in uplift was apparent in their support of the PASB 
Bureau’s efforts to control and study onchocerciasis, a non-fatal skin and eye disease and a major 
cause of blindness in the country. Onchocerciasis develops from a parasitic filarial worm 
transmitted by black flies. It had been common on coffee plantations and was construed as an 
indigenous disease.395 Known as “Robles disease,” it had been discovered in 1915 by a 
Guatemalan doctor named Rofolfo Robles Valderde had discovered the disease in the Americas 
and observed the parasitology and its transmission through black flies. Robles’ discovery has 
been a source of longstanding pride to the Guatemalan medical community.396  
 PASB health officials and military doctors grew concerned about onchocerciasis, a skin 
and eye disease transmitted by a parasitic worm and carried by black flies, during the 
construction of the Pan American Highway. One of the PASB’s main efforts during the war was 
supporting efforts to construct the Pan American Highway that connected the United States to 
Panama and helped to improve readiness for a possible invasion. The highway ran through 
communities that before had little contact with the outside world. Yet, its development also 
opened new problems for health officers trying to contain the spread of disease in the region. 
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Tourists could now travel more frequently along the highway. In The Voice, a newsletter of the 
English-Speaking Protestant Church in Guatemala City, one young American woman told how 
she and her husband drove their five-horsepower DW motorcycles over the Pan American 
Highway on their return home to the United States for Christmas.397 She said they stopped in an 
indigenous village with a “welcome reserved for the Pied Piper of Hamlin,” from the children 
who chased them as they rode through the village on their bikes.  
 Regardless of how much fun this was for American tourists, U.S. government officials 
and Latin American health officials feared that heightened contact with communities along the 
highway would spread diseases across international borders, ultimately rendering the region 
more vulnerable.398 To contain the spread of disease, the PASB spearheaded surveys of 
populations in the areas with the assistance of local public health departments, and sought to 
directly improve the sanitation of towns and villages along the route. The U.S. government did 
not try to implement any limitations on the roving gringos. Like U.S. soldiers, health officials 
presumed these tourists were vulnerable to infections but not the carriers of disease. They were 
not subjected to health surveys and inspections.   
 Health professionals were particularly worried about the spread of onchocerciasis. In 
1947, the USPHS commissioned an entomologist named Herbert Dalmat to lead a new research 
program on onchocerciasis in coordination with the PASB field site in Guatemala. The 
Laboratory of Tropical Diseases of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) funded the 
investigations.399 Colleagues and friends described Dalmat, known as “Herb,” as an 
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“enthusiastic” researcher and “champion of the underprivileged people of the third world.”400 
Guatemalan and U.S. scientists assisted him in his investigations. Dalmat originally began 
studying tropical diseases in the U.S. Army Sanitary Corps during the war and then in Natal, 
Brazil where he tried to control mosquitos known to spread malaria.401 In Guatemala, he and his 
colleague Colvin Gibson had a field office in Yepocapa, located in the department of 
Chimaltenango in the central highlands where the disease was endemic.402 The town contained 
approximately 2200 inhabitants, the majority of whom were indigenous.  
 Betty Adams, a Guatemalan of German descent and the wife of Anthropologist Richard 
Adams, recalled being “bothered” by experiments that the scientists conducted at the Yepocapa 
field office.403 A young woman in her early twenties at the time, Adams worked as a secretary 
for Dalmat and Colvin Gibson. Although just an assistant who did not know the details of the 
research, Adams described seeing the researchers use male “volunteers” who she said were 
already infected with onchocerciasis and were indigenous laborers. She said the researchers 
treated the men like animals, placing them in cages for several hours where flies infected with 
onchocerciasis would bite them. For compensation, the men received a daily wage for an 
agricultural laborer, hardly enough money upon which to survive. Since the onchocerciasis had 
already severely harmed the men’s vision, they had limited opportunities to earn a living aside 
from serving subjects in experiments. The researchers may have been able to convince the men 
who had special needs to participate in their study due to the promises of compensation. Yet, 
since many of the laborers would likely not have spoken Spanish or English, it is likely that the 
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researchers did not completely explain their studies to the men. Therefore, the researchers 
probably did not obtain informed consent from the men to participate in their research.   
 The scientists’ papers corroborate Adams’ observation. Although Dalmat and Gibson 
made no mention of placing men in cages, likely because they knew that this would have been 
controversial, they did describe an experiment in which black flies fed upon human volunteers 
who had onchocerciasis.404 The experiment was to determine whether the humans could induce a 
“normal infection” in various species of black flies.405 In this case, humans were viewed as the 
vectors and not the insects. Following the experiment, the scientists dissected the flies. Although 
Dalmat and Gibson gave little explanation as to why they used cages, they likely made it easier 
to contain and specify which black flies had been feeding upon the “volunteers.” Equipped with 
this information, the scientists planned to conduct epidemiological control focusing on 
containing black flies most prone to infection. Yet, health professionals did not manage to 
eradicate onchocerciasis until decades later. Overall the studies brought little benefit to the 
country and to the people who participated in this research.406    
 PASB onchocerciasis researchers also had connections to U.S. military researchers 
conducting studies in Guatemala and Panama. Sites of medical research have often arisen in 
countries where U.S. soldiers have been stationed at military bases. Researchers from Gorgas 
Memorial Hospital, the U.S. Army hospital in Panama City, collected “clinical material” relating 
to onchocerciasis from PASB researchers. That material included blind eyes from autopsies of 
the Guatemalans used in the onchocerciasis studies.407 The researchers failed to mention whether 
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they gained consent to collect this “material” from Guatemalan bodies. The researchers sent the 
“material” to a laboratory in Washington, DC for further research.408 In the syphilis study in 
Tuskegee, Alabama, USPHS researchers had to gain consent from family members for autopsies 
because of state laws. To ensure access to the autopsies, USPHS researchers provided money for 
the families to bury the men.409 Lederer has said that the researchers viewed the men as 
“cadavers” rather than humans.410 As researchers used coercive tactics in Alabama, chances are 
they did not ask Guatemalans or their family members, given the lack of consent they obtained in 
other studies.  
 U.S. Army researchers capitalized upon the networks that had been established 
previously in Guatemala for research. They had close contact with Guatemalan researchers who 
had previously received fellowships and collaborated with the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
IIAA. Those researchers included Dr. Julio Herrera and Dr. Enrique Padilla who both had 
knowledge of and collaborated on the onchocerciasis research.411 U.S. military researchers from 
Gorgas Hospital conducted further studies in Guatemala with the help of the United Fruit 
Company. One researcher conducted a study on tropical ulcers. He secured “clinical material” to 
study tropical ulcers from the United Fruit Hospital located in Tiquisate near the Pacific Coast.412 
The researchers also collected ticks and other insects to try to induce the ulcers in animal studies.  
 This medical research network in Guatemala also proved useful in PASB and IIAA 
efforts to contain typhus and conduct studies on the use of DDT in the prevention of disease. 
Typhus had long been a problem in Guatemala and became a focus in both PASB and IIAA 
                                                      
408 Ibid. 
409 Reverby, Examining Tuskegee, 53. 
410 Susan Lederer, “Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study: Nurse Rivers, Silence, and the Meaning of Treatment,” in 
Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, ed. Susan M. Reverby (Chapel Hill and London: University of North 




health and sanitation efforts in the country. In 1944, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover visited 
Guatemala and reported that typhus was endemic in the Guatemalan highlands where the 
indigenous population was concentrated. “The straw mats, straw roofs, and direct floors of the 
Indian huts make excellent breeding places for lice which carry this disease,” Hoover wrote. 
Reflecting the racism U.S. and Guatemalan researchers commonly showed towards Mayans, 
Hoover blamed the spread of disease on indigenous cultural and domestic practices rather than 
on their poverty.413 In 1944, Dr. Herrera, then Minister of Public Health and a former 
Rockefeller Foundation fellow at Johns Hopkins University, had also visited the Asilo de 
Alienados, the mental health hospital in the capital where he reported on an epidemic of typhus 
that had resulted in the death of approximately 20 percent of all infected inmates.414 Herrera said 
he could not obtain accurate numbers from the staff at the psychiatric institution despite requests 
from the Guatemalan public health department.   
 The Guatemalan public health department with the assistance of the IIAA quarantined the 
psychiatric institution, military hospital, and the prison. They deloused the patients, and 
vaccinated the technical administrative personnel in the psychiatric institution, the penitentiary, 
the general hospital, military hospital, and the Casa del Niño, a daycare center for children.415 
The health workers also collected “specimens” from autopsies and sent them for examination at 
the U.S. Army Medical Museum.416 Once again, it is not clear whether the researchers gained 
consent for these autopsies. U.S. and Guatemalan personnel also received vaccinations along 
with U.S. military personnel stationed in Guatemala City. Notably the health workers did not 
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appear to vaccinate the patients. The IIAA and public health department apparently did not value 
the patients’ lives enough to try to prevent future disease.   
  Researchers also may not have vaccinated the patients because they wanted to use this 
population to conduct experiments. IIAA and Guatemalan officials planned to experiment with 
DDT and its potential to lower the spread of typhus, malaria, and onchocerciasis.417 During the 
war, the discovery of DDT used to control the fleas and lice that transmitted typhus promised 
newfound possibilities to control the disease.418 Not a single soldier died from DDT, and the 
insecticide had not yet been recognized for having toxic effects on humans. Although little 
information remains about these experiments, U.S. and Guatemalan officials applied DDT 
powder to psychiatric patients to understand its effects in eliminating the disease. Not until the 
1960s with the publishing of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring would the detrimental effects of 
DDT become more widely recognized.419 In fact, health officers at the time viewed the delousing 
and use of insecticide powders as more humane than stripping people’s clothes and forcing them 
to bathe, as PHS had done with Mexicans on the U.S.-Mexico border.420 Still, no evidence exists 
indicating that the researchers received consent from people in the psychiatric institution to apply 
DDT.  
 The Guatemalan government also enthusiastically agreed to work with the PASB on a 
program to study the results of a large scale vaccination campaign for typhus in the Guatemalan 
highlands.421 Guatemalan officials had encountered difficulties containing the spread of typhus 
during World War II. The disease was concentrated in particular in the highland region where the 
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majority of the indigenous population lived.422 PASB officials and Guatemalan health officials 
planned to delouse the population with DDT. It remains unclear whether they gained consent 
from the Mayan communities and people whom they sprayed.423 Although photographs in health 
bulletins suggest that people accepted the campaign, it remains unclear if they understood the 
effects of DDT. Beginning in 1945, the campaign continued for three years. In 1947, President 
Juan José Arévalo, the president of a new and revolutionary Guatemala, referred to the typhus 
campaign as “focusing on the indigenous race, because of the misery and lamentable hygiene in 
which they live.”424 The PASB did not confine their research on the effects of typhus 
vaccinations to Guatemala. In Colombia, the Typhus Committee experimented with vaccines and 
DDT.425 The Committee also exchanged information with the Mexican Typhus Committee.  
 By 1946, the PASB with the assistance of IIAA and the Guatemalan public health 
departments, had spearheaded the vaccination of one million people in Guatemala against typhus 
in both rural and urban areas.426 Historian David Carey has reported that highland populations 
viewed the typhus vaccinations favorably. In contrast to previous governments, officials working 
under Arévalo made efforts to educate Mayan groups on the campaign using Mayan languages. 
Some Kachchikel communities claimed that “Arévalo” himself actually came to their homes to 
talk about the typhus campaigns.427 Indigenous Guatemalans viewed this initiative as evidence of 
the commitment of the revolutionary government to uplifting their standard of living.428 Other 
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activities carried out by the PASB did not receive as favorable responses from indigenous 
populations.   
 During the Revolution, while research was underway on venereal disease, typhus, and 
onchocerciasis, U.S. and Guatemalan scientists and officials were also building a new nutrition 
institute that would grow into a world research center during the Cold War. U.S. institutions 
including the Rockefeller Foundation had come to believe that malnutrition was a key problem 
of development in countries in the “Third World” and also served as a catalyst for the spread of 
communism.429 In the interwar years and continuing into World War II, the Rockefeller 
Foundation had used Mexico and China to study malnutrition.430 In the post-World War II era, 
Guatemala’s Revolution offered an opportunity to build a new nutrition institute in the country 
because Guatemalan health professionals sought to bring foreign researchers and money to their 
country to spur development. Dr. Julio Bianchi, the Guatemalan Minister of Public Health (from 
1945 to 1947) invited nutritionist Robert Harris of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) to Guatemala and proposed the creation of a nutrition institute in the capital.431 Harris had 
worked with the Rockefeller Foundation on nutrition research in Mexico during World War II.432 
The shared interest of Bianchi and Harris in solving malnutrition problems led to the institute’s 
creation. U.S. government officials viewed research on malnutrition as a key priority of the Cold 
War. 
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 In 1949, U.S. and Latin American scientists celebrated the inauguration of the Institute of 
Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP) on the day of Guatemalan independence, 
which was not a coincidence.433 The organization’s mission was to research nutrition in the 
isthmus region and develop solutions to malnutrition that would help Central American 
governments to implement.434 Latin American professionals who worked for INCAP continued 
to believe that the organization would lead to Central American independence from the United 
States and food sovereignty. Yet, funding and support for the development of the new institution 
came primarily from U.S. organizations. The new nutrition institute operated under the PASB 
administration. W.K. Kellogg Funding gave the majority funding for the center. Kellogg also 
provided fellowships to Latin Americans to study at U.S. universities so they could then return to 
work at INCAP.   
 Dr. William Darby, one of INCAP’s scientific advisory committee members and a 
professor at Vanderbilt University, came to Guatemala to oversee the malnutrition program’s 
development. Around the time he was in Guatemala, he was conducting studies at the Vanderbilt 
prenatal clinic in Tennessee in which he served iron laced with radioactive substances to 
approximately 830-850 unsuspecting pregnant women.435 Darby told the women that he was 
serving them a “vitamin cocktail.” His study was just one of the human radiation experiments 
that began in the 1940s. That Darby served as an adviser for the nutrition institution suggests the 
ethical understandings concerning human subjects that circulated at the new institute.  
 The early establishment of the PASB field office in Guatemala City and the creation of 
the nutrition institute made the country a hub for research. U.S. and Latin American scientists 
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studying malnutrition came to view Guatemala as a “Third World Model” to study the affliction. 
They believed that Guatemala’s indigenous and poor populations were representative of other 
countries in Latin America and Asia. The PASB field site in Guatemala also continued to grow 
despite strained relations between the United States and Guatemala during the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. Although U.S. aid to Guatemala decreased after the coup that President Jacobo 
Arbenz implemented agrarian reform and legalized the communist party, the field site remained 
active.436 The Kellogg Foundation continued to provide funding to the nutrition institute. The 
fact that the PASB operated as both an international health and sanitation organization and a 
scientific research institution gave U.S. researchers greater leeway to continue their work in the 
country.  
 
A Colonial Home in Guatemala 
 As the PASB field site and the IIAA Servicio performed medical experiments and public 
health campaigns, U.S. researchers and their families built an American community in 
Guatemala. They organized an English-speaking Protestant Church, an American School that 
provided bilingual classes, a Brownies club, plays, charity events, a library and community 
center. These networks sustained researchers and their family members during their temporary 
stays in Guatemala, creating the pleasures of an American home in a foreign land. By 
establishing these ties, researchers and their families formed networks that helped to cement 
Guatemala’s role as a laboratory for medical research. They built some relationships with 
Guatemalan doctors and researchers who collaborated in their programs. Yet, in transplanting an 
American community to Guatemala, they also segregated themselves from the local culture and 
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the populations upon which they conducted their research. This community enabled researchers 
to gain greater distance from the subjects of their campaigns and research and also helped to 
convince them of the humanitarian nature of their work.  
 Even in the main central plaza of Guatemala City, the heart of the capital’s cultural and 
community life, the American research community constructed an oasis. The Union Church in 
Guatemala City had a loyal following that included transient populations of U.S. researchers, 
diplomats, teachers, corporate leaders, and their families.437 Located near the presidential palace 
and government administration center, the church contained many members who worked with 
Pan American institutions, including the PASB, IIAA, the Inter-American Educational 
Foundation, and the Agricultural Institute.438 As an English-speaking Protestant church, it 
offered members a chance to socialize and practice their faith in their own language. Regular 
attendees included the family of Nevin Scrimshaw, the director of the new nutrition institute. His 
wife and daughter were avid Brownies members.439 Colvin Gibson, the onchocerciasis researcher 
on assignment with the USPHS, formed part of the church administration. His wife, Ethel, made 
guest contralto soloist appearances in the church choir.440  
 When church members returned to the United States, they continued to receive copies of 
the church newsletter, The Voice, and sent updates about their lives. The fact that the American 
scientists and their family members stayed abreast of developments in the church suggests the 
strength of their community in Guatemala. In 1952, William McNally, who served as the PASB 
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Director for Central America during the time that the venereal disease experiments were 
underway and also oversaw typhus research in Guatemala, wrote in the newsletter that he often 
thought of the church community. He had begun his Master’s in Public Health at the University 
of Pittsburgh, where USPHS Surgeon General Parran had recently established a public health 
school.441 Other members wrote about their feelings of “homesickness” and nostalgia for 
Guatemala.442 Since the American community had little ties to the country itself, it appears that 
what McNally really missed were his researcher friends. Although the PASB and IIAA had 
competed for funding, their employees fraternized in the church, suggesting the close 
connections between these institutions. It served as a key instrument establishing ties among the 
U.S. research community in Guatemala.  
 As scientists and medical doctors helped to promote U.S. intellectual leadership in 
Central America, the Union Church viewed its role as advocating for American culture and 
science through the Protestant faith. The church’s motto was that it, “seeks to make religion as 
intelligent as science, as appealing as art, as vital as the day’s and as inspiring as love.”443 The 
Voice repeatedly stressed the important role of the Union Church in demonstrating the “vigor of 
the Protestant faith” in a Catholic country.444 Newsletter articles said it was vital that church 
members practice their faith with “dignity and beauty,” as part of their efforts to build support 
for the Protestant Church in Guatemala.445 The Church also saw as its role to help guide the 
behavior of the English-speaking community, which church leaders warned “may easily become 
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a very unwholesome community.”446 The Church seemed more concerned with behaviors 
surrounding alcohol or romantic relationships that challenged the sanctity of families than it was 
with the medical research being conducted on Guatemalan populations. A non-denominational 
Protestant Church, the members appeared to view it more important to promote the Protestant 
brand of Christianity rather than a specific faith. By allowing for all denominations of 
Protestantism, the Church was successful in building ties within the American community and 
strengthening the bonds of the scientific community.   
 The Union Church also served as a platform for scientists to promote and gain support for 
their research from other community members. Gibson presented a talk to the Women’s 
Auxiliary at the church on “Medical Research in Tropic Lands,” where he spoke about the work 
of the USPHS on tropical diseases including malaria, yellow fever, hookworm, and 
onchocerciasis (the focus of his research).447 He appears to have withheld details about placing 
agricultural workers in cages for his experiments. Nevin Scrimshaw also wrote an article in The 
Voice on the establishment of the new nutrition institute.448 The researchers viewed their work in 
the country as adhering to churchly principles. Their ability to profile their work in the newsletter 
and the support they received from the Union Church community strengthened the researchers’ 
perceptions of themselves as ethical actors.    
 American scientists and their families received many benefits living in Guatemala. 
Although U.S. researchers and administrators generally had middle class salaries in the United 
States, they lived as members of the Guatemalan elite. Children of the U.S. scientists often went 
                                                      
446 John G. Blane and Charles T. Holman to Charles T. Holman, “Union Church of Guatemala,” June 20, 1948. RAC, Nelson 
Rockefeller Records, RG 4, Box 37, Folder, 290. 
447 “The Voice of the Union Church of Guatemala,” III, Num. 2 (February 1952): 3. RAC, Nelson Rockefeller Records, RG 4, 
Box 37, Folder 290. 
448 “The Voice of the Union Church of Guatemala,” III, Num. 7 (July-August 1952): 1. RAC, Nelson Rockefeller Records, RG 4, 
Box 37, Folder 290. 
 119 
to the American School, a non-profit educational institution established in 1945, which continues 
to provide one of the best educations in the country. The American School was located in the 
“sun-drenched” fields of the Finca de Conchas, near the Guatemalan airport.449 It offered classes 
in English that were modeled after the Cincinnati, Ohio school system, and classes in Spanish 
that were run by the Guatemalan Ministry of Education. Several of the American School teachers 
also attended the Union Church, suggesting its close ties with the American community.  
 Many appeared also driven by the optimistic belief in science during the postwar era. 
Richard and Betty Adams, who both worked for PASB (with Betty serving as the secretary to the 
onchocerciasis researchers), were close friends of the Scrimshaws. The Adams recall Nevin 
Scrimshaw as a “visionary,” “inspirational,” and a “commanding leader.”450 The nutrition 
institute promised to eliminate world hunger. Others seemed more taken with their power. John 
Cutler, the director of the venereal disease experiments, and his wife, Elise, were friends of 
Dalmat, the onchocerciasis researchers, and his newlywed wife, Ethel. The couples explored 
Guatemala together. Elise recalled the couples’ “exotic outing” to Dalmat’s “little empire” on the 
Pacific Coast where he was conducting research. Through ironic, Eliese Cutler’s comment 
suggests the American couples’ awareness of their status in the country and sense of impunity 
when conducting research. As Eliese Cutler came from an upper-class New York family, her 
husband John had working class roots. He may have felt more able to provide her with the life of 
luxury in Guatemala that she was accustomed to than he could have in the United States.451 
Another night, Eliese Cutler described how she, John, and the Dalmats danced the night away to 
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a marimba band.452 This “exoticism” that Eliese Cutler described and the chance to live free from 
their concerns and obligations in the United States, appeared to inform the nostalgia that 
researchers felt went they left Guatemala. Dalmat thought about moving his family permanently 
to Guatemala, but then decided to leave in response to the increasingly tense political situation 
that came later during the revolutionary period.453 The American community in Guatemala, the 
relative youth of many of the researchers, and post-World War II energy for scientific research 
helped to fuel investigations in Guatemala during this time period. The researchers brought hope, 
energy and adventure, along with typical American hubris, to their research.  
 
Protecting Pan Americanism in World Health 
 In the post-World War II period, at the very moment that USPHS initiated venereal 
disease research, the creation of the new World Health Organization (WHO) threatened to take 
over international health and render the PASB obsolete. Both U.S. and Latin American scientists 
and officials, determined to maintain an American medical infrastructure free from European 
intervention, fought to maintain the organization’s independence. Through their advocacy, U.S. 
and Latin American scientists and officials forced the WHO’s decentralization, making PASB 
the office of the new world health organization in the Americas. They established a boundary 
between Pan American health and the international health network pursued by the WHO in other 
parts of the world.  
 The creation of the WHO came as part of peace-building efforts in the post-World War II 
era. In 1945 at the United Nations conference, delegates from Brazil and China called for the 
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establishment of an international health organization.454 Following the U.S. dropping of the 
atomic bomb and the devastation caused by World War II, delegates viewed health as a means 
for preventing future wars. They thought it offered a means for countries to build diplomacy 
through participating in cooperative efforts to protect global health. In February 1946, the UN 
Economic and Social Council created the Technical Preparatory Committee to establish a new 
international health organization. WHO’s rise precipitated the end of other international health 
organizations, including the Paris Office International d’Hygiéne Publique and the Health 
Organization of the League of Nations. The WHO had now replaced them. Its mission 
conceptualized the broadest definition of health as yet to be defined by an international health 
organization, framing it as a human right and encompassing physical, mental, and social well-
being.455  
 Yet, the construction of postwar international health infrastructure could not escape the 
tense backdrop of the early Cold War. PASB Director Cumming fought vociferously against 
WHO’s absorption of the PASB. At a meeting to establish the WHO, he warned PASB members 
from both the United States and Latin America about a potential communist takeover of the new 
world health organization.456 His comments emerged from his concern about the participation of 
Eastern European delegates. Later Cumming lambasted the WHO in a 70-page report to the U.S. 
Department of State, denigrating it as “overly-ambitious” and designed by “star-gazers.” 457 He 
further accused the creators of the organization to be driven “out of an insane desire to destroy 
existing institutions.”458 Brock Chisholm, the Canadian psychiatrist who became Director of 
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WHO, grew frustrated with the PASB’s efforts to maintain its independence. He shot back, “the 
world has drastically changed, and the time had come to aim for an ideal; this ideal should be to 
draw lines boldly across international boundaries and should be insisted on at whatever cost to 
personal or sectional interests.”459 Yet, Chisholm did not just contend with Cumming: U.S. 
representatives and the majority of Latin American delegates also wanted the PASB to maintain 
a separate existence.  
 Surgeon General Parran tried to assuage delegates’ alarm at Cumming’s comments, while 
also arguing on PASB’s behalf. He helped convince delegates that it was possible for American 
countries to have membership in both the PASB and WHO.460 By the post-World War II period, 
Latin American delegates also had pride in the organization and wanted to maintain its 
independence.461 In the containment of the plague and during the wartime efforts, Latin 
American officials and scientists had seen tangible benefits from their PASB membership. The 
American delegates made a strong case for the WHO to adopt a decentralized structure with 
regional offices that acted separately from the central office in Geneva.  
 PASB’s continued independence from WHO was primarily secured by Fred Soper, who 
became the PASB director after Cumming.462 His zealous approach to public health and 
ambitions to eradicate disease from the American continent, fueled his defense of the Bureau. He 
thought it vital that PASB maintain its independence from a large and centralized world health 
organization in order to implement effective public health programs. In 1948, at the First World 
Health Assembly, convened to plan WHO’s future and draft its Constitution, Soper passionately 
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argued that the new organization adopt a decentralized structure, claiming that the WHO regional 
offices would be better equipped to fight disease.  
 Soper also acknowledged his interest in maintaining the PASB’s “broad power” to 
respond to diseases in the Western Hemisphere which was not allowed for in the WHO 
Constitution.463 He explained that the Code provided PASB the right to develop “close 
collaboration on the technical level,” which the American states could not give up to European 
powers.464 Soper’s interest in maintaining the PASB’s authority likely stemmed more from his 
interest in disease control rather than his desire to use the organization to maintain U.S. 
hegemony in the Latin American region. His tenure was also marked by efforts to bring more 
Latin Americans into the Bureau.465  
 Aside from his impassioned arguments to world health delegates, Soper was primarily 
able to secure PASB’s independent future through his efforts to grow its budget. In addition to 
support by the U.S. government, PASB received contributions from member states that were 
notoriously inconsistent and late.466 Soper also faced the withdrawal of U.S. funding for the 
Bureau following World War II. The U.S. government reduced funding for PASB after World 
War II and hoped that the organization would rely upon the WHO, despite American doctors’ 
desire for PASB’s independence.467 The USPHS also had plans to develop its own international 
office and to withdraw staff from the PASB.   
 Concerned about the organization’s future, Soper arranged to make it possible for the 
organization to receive voluntary contributions from countries and private philanthropies. With a 
                                                      
463 Dr. Fred Soper, “Remarks Espousing Early Regional Organization of the World Organization at the First World Health 
Assembly,” WHO Official Records, No. 13, 1948, 254. The Fred. L. Soper Papers, NLM. 
464 Soper, “Remarks Espousing Early Regional Organization of the World Organization at the First World Health Assembly,” 
255. 
465 Stepan, Eradication, 115. 
466 Ibid., 320. 
467 Soper, Ventures in World Health, 317. 
 124 
sharp increase in support from eight Latin American countries and the Kellogg Foundation, 
PASB’s budget grew to the point that it was not possible for the WHO to absorb such a large 
organization. Soper managed to build the PASB budget at a time when WHO was still in its 
incipiency, allowing him to secure the independence of the organization.468 This arrangement 
ensured that PASB would have little competition in the Americas. In 1947, PASB officially 
became the WHO regional office in the Americas, leaving the United States as the dominant 
medical power. 
 Soper’s role as the director of PASB reflects the continued influence that the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the United States, had in the development of post-World War II international 
health. Soper was one of the many doctors who left the Foundation after it changed its focus to 
the “Green Revolution.” Yet, the Rockefeller Foundation paid Soper’s salary during his first 
several years as director. In his autobiography, Soper wrote, “my move to the official 
international health field was not one of abandonment of the Rockefeller Foundation but rather 
of fulfilling its program. It was quite in keeping with Foundation policies to make my services 
available to PASB.”469 The Rockefeller strategy of disease control, which focused on vertically 
imposed technical solutions to improving health while avoiding the development of public health 
infrastructure, infused WHO policies.470   
 The PASB also gained independence as a result of the United States’ new role as a world 
hegemon. It became ever more important that the United States government cooperate with 
efforts to build international health in order to develop a viable World Health Organization. 
Previously the Health Organization of the League of Nations had been stymied by the fact that 
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the United States had refused to become a member. Given the influence of the United States in 
the post-World War II period and the fact that it provided significant funding to international 
organizations, the WHO was willing to make concessions to allow for the PASB’s independence 
in order to ensure U.S. participation. In fact, WHO created an exception for the U.S. ratification 
process that was not extended to other member countries. The U.S. Congress was concerned that 
the WHO constitution could be amended without agreement from the United States. Therefore, 
the WHO allowed for the United States’ ratification of the constitution to not be unconditional 
and allow it to withdraw from the organization’s membership at a year’s notice.471 Although the 
WHO was founded on international cooperation, it put America’s interest first. 
 PASB’s independence from the WHO gave U.S. and Latin American researchers leeway 
to shape their own agenda in the organization. Soper focused his first efforts at the WHO/PASB 
in malaria eradication in South and Central America, which depended in large part on spraying 
DDT to kill the Aedes aegypti population.472 Policy scholar Javed Siddiqi has argued that this 
campaign fit the foreign policy agenda of the United States. During the Cold War, the United 
States used technological developments to showcase an alternative model to development than 
communism. In 1949, President Harry Truman announced his “Point Four Program,” a technical 
assistance initiative intended to win the “hearts and minds” of people in “developing countries.” 
The U.S. foreign policy mission was also driven by the postwar moment that was marked by 
heightened confidence in science and its potential to solve the physical and social ills of the 
world, despite trepidation over the U.S. dropping of the atomic bomb in Japan during World War 
II. Even as Americans feared the power of science, they viewed its progress as critical to 
securing national security, the American way of life, global progress, and human wellbeing.  
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 Other countries took a more critical view of U.S. power to shape international health. The 
Soviet Union viewed the WHO as a tool used by the United States to increase its influence in the 
“Third World.”  In 1948, months following the formation of the World Health Organization, 
Soviet bloc countries left the organization. These countries complained that they did not believe 
countries that had been subjected to German occupation were receiving enough assistance with 
efforts to address the destruction caused by World War II and that membership was too costly.473 
The fact that Soviet bloc countries left the WHO left the United States with more power to shape 
the international health organization in its early years. U.S. officials did so but also with the 
support of many Latin American scientists and physicians. Moreover, the independence of the 
PASB allowed for U.S. medicine and science to continue to have considerable control over the 
development of an American medical infrastructure in the western hemisphere at the beginning 
of the Cold War.    
 
Conclusion  
 By World War II, Guatemala had become a well-established research hub, a key piece of 
an American medical research infrastructure developed in Latin America during the first half of 
the twentieth century. The war precipitated the U.S. government’s investment in the creation of 
an international health and research infrastructure Latin America. It built upon the work 
conducted previously by private institutions such as Rockefeller Foundation and United Fruit and 
through the networks that had been established previously between U.S. and Guatemalan 
medical researchers. While Latin Americans challenged U.S. imperial medicine and racial 
understandings that denigrated their nations, they also supported efforts to build public health 
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and medical programs that benefitted their countries. Guatemalan doctors, many of whom had 
received fellowships from the Rockefeller Foundation and IIAA to study at U.S. institutions, 
served as key collaborators with American health professionals and researchers.  
 Yet, the international health and medical research constructed in the region was always 
informed by the divide between the northern and southern hemisphere. It was also marked by 
sharp inequalities between U.S. and Latin American health professionals and marginalized 
members of Latin American society. U.S. health officials and researchers and military personnel 
continued to view Latin America as a place rife with disease and immorality. These perceptions 
informed their work in the region and shaped their ethical understandings in their approach to 
public health campaigns and medical experimentation. They were particularly acute in 
Guatemala. Regardless of the tactics that they often used, U.S. and Guatemalan health 
professionals and researchers appeared to believe that their work in the country was 
humanitarian. U.S. researchers, creating closed social world with other U.S. researchers in 
Guatemala City, encountered little pushback in regards to their studies and health campaigns. 
They also aligned themselves with Guatemalan health professionals and researchers who 
appeared to believe in the virtue of their work.  
 By the end of World War II, U.S. and Latin American health professionals and scientists 
fought to maintain the infrastructure that they had built for public health and medical research. 
The influence of the PASB grew significantly during the Cold War as it became the office of the 
WHO in the Americas. The presence of the PASB in Guatemala helped to maintain the country 
as central site of U.S. research during the Cold War, thereby enabling U.S. medical 




CHAPTER 3: MAKING MEDICAL SUBJECTS 
 
Tracing exactly how Guatemalans became medical subjects in experiments on sexually-
transmitted infections (STIs) requires a close examination of Guatemalan law, policy, 
institutions, and social structure in the forties and fifties. During the period known as “Ten Years 
of Spring,” Guatemala underwent a Revolution (1944-1954). An exploration of the lives of 
people subjected to experimentation, including sex workers, prisoners, soldiers, disabled, gay, 
lesbian, and indigenous Guatemalans, shows that the Revolution offered no reprieve from state 
repression, arbitrary arrest, police razing of homes and neighborhoods, and domestic and sexual 
violence.474 Political elites, doctors, lawyers, and intellectuals connected to the new government 
strove to implement a regeneración (regeneration) of the population. In an effort to heal 
Guatemala’s “wounded body” and to build a unified, morally and physically fit national 
population, they passed new public health laws and policies aimed at transforming Guatemalans’ 
bodies and minds.475 This chapter argues that the work of an activist state was the critical 
enabling factor granting researchers access to Guatemalan’s genitals and blood.476 
 The Revolution fell short of its egalitarian promise. It began in 1944 when a cross-class 
coalition of military officers, doctors, lawyers, students, urban workers, teachers, and 
intellectuals came together in Guatemala City to overthrow the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico 
Castañeda and then his handpicked successor, Juan Federico Ponce Vaides. Guatemalans from 
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all economic sectors mobilized to form a democracy. They advocated for rights to land and the 
dignity of workers.477 “Ten Years of Spring” spurred widespread grassroots organizing in the 
United Fruit Company’s banana enclaves, the countryside, and in Guatemala City.478 Yet, during 
the presidency of Juan José Arévalo (1945-1951), a formerly exiled philosophy professor who 
had been living in Argentina, government reforms brought little change to the country’s 
entrenched social hierarchies. Two landmark policies, the 1947 labor code and the social security 
system which was established in 1948, largely benefited Ladinos.479  Gender-based violence and 
inequality also persisted during this time period.480 The government of President Jacobo Arbenz 
went further to implement economic and social change and passed agrarian reform.481 Still, this 
policy bred violence, uncertainty, and fear in rural and indigenous communities.482 Although the 
government’s reforms may have eventually brought sustained social change, the CIA backed a 
1954 coup of the Arbenz government, ushering in counterinsurgent forces.     
As social and economic inequality endured in this ten-year period, the very institutions 
and doctors touting regeneration helped bring about more intensified methods of social control. 
Social reformers used public health and education as a means to instill Ladino middle class 
values in indígenas and poor populations and assimilate them into the nation.483 Reflecting the 
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government’s stated interest in uplifting disenfranchised members of Guatemalan society, social 
reformers claimed that these policies aimed to provide Guatemalans with greater access to public 
health and educational services. Yet, the Guatemalan government remained unable both 
economically and technologically to implement public health reform alone. The IIAA and the 
PASB supported and financed many of these programs.484 Although the Guatemalan government 
sought to assert national sovereignty, government public health officials continued to seek 
guidance from U.S. and Latin American bureaucrats in the realm of public health and 
medicine.485  
This chapter examines how Guatemalan social structure, laws, and policies during the 
Revolution brought Guatemalans into the pipeline for experimentation. Although the people 
subjected to experimentation had markedly different societal roles, cultural backgrounds, and 
regional affiliations, what united them was their marginalization in Guatemalan society. 
Although state efforts around the world to regulate sexuality and disease have focused on 
women, in these experiments authorities believed that they could also access male bodies and 
sexuality for research and observation. The authorities’ understandings of soldiers and male 
prisoners’ masculinity informed their views that they were accessible for experimentation. In 
Guatemala, the sex worker and male soldiers and prisoners occupied similar roles in society. 
Guatemalan society viewed sex workers and soldiers as necessary for fulfilling the physical 
needs of sex and war. In the experiments, physicians sought to harness what they perceived as 
the deviant sexuality of their “subjects” for social, scientific, and diplomatic purposes.  
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This chapter further examines the lives of specific people. Guatemalans subjected to 
experimentation came from throughout the country. Many resided in shantytown settlements that 
twisted along ravines on the borders of Guatemala City. These neighborhoods had names such as 
La Palmita, San Pedrito, El Gallito, and La Recolección. Others hailed from rural areas. 
Governors, plantation owners, police, and family members sent suspected criminals or those 
suffering from mental and physical ailments to the capital for detention and treatment in jails and 
hospitals. These men and women often came to the capital on trains owned by the United Fruit 
Company that connected the capital to ports on the Pacific and Atlantic coastlines. In the 1930s, 
the construction of the Pan-American Highway in the western part of the country made 
communities in rural areas more accessible to outsiders. Guatemalans came together through 
their associations with institutions that would later participate in the experiments; they included 
the lock hospital, the military barracks, the prison, the psychiatric institution, and the 
orphanage.486 Located primarily in the capital near the government administrative offices and 
business districts, the institutions’ proximity to each other proved convenient for medical 
researchers. 
My examination of the individuals caught up in medical experimentation also reveals 
how Guatemalans challenged the state’s efforts to reform them. During the revolution, the state 
continued to lack legitimacy in many sectors. Sex workers bit police officers, soldiers evaded 
military service, and mental health patients contested doctors’ assessments of them as “unfit” to 
participate in society. Although Guatemalans contended with a repressive state, the making of 
medical subjects was never an uncontested nor inevitable process. 
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patients. I will discuss the schools in more detail in chapter four. 
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 “Mujeres Públicas” (Public Women) and the Lock Hospital 
In March 1944, Rodrigo Contreras Bracamonte wrote a letter to the municipal governor 
of Guatemala City, denouncing Teresa Mendoza Vargas for practicing clandestine 
prostitution.487 Just twenty-four years old at the time, Mendoza was the mother of Contreras’ 
four-year-old daughter. Contreras was forty-two and lived at the military base in Port San José, 
Guatemala’s oldest port town located on the Pacific coastline and built in the nineteenth century 
for the coffee trade. He had originally met Mendoza in Port San José. Contreras demanded that 
the judge order Mendoza to give him custody of their four-year-old daughter so that he could 
educate her and remove her from the “bad example” of her mother. A few days later, Mendoza 
responded to the letter. She did not deny occasionally having worked as a sex worker but refused 
to give him their child. Contreras had not delivered on his promise to provide child support and 
she said that he had been a “bad father.” A poorly paid domestic worker in Guatemala City, 
Mendoza had barely been able to support herself and her daughter.  
Just one month after Mendoza became known to authorities, the Jefe Político, the title of 
the municipal governor overseeing Guatemala City, reported that Mendoza had “voluntarily” 
registered as a sex worker at the sanitation department, meaning that she probably also had to 
give up custody of her daughter. In Guatemala during the forties, a woman who admittedly 
earned money as a prostitute had little hope of convincing government authorities of her 
“fitness” for motherhood. She likely would have been labeled as a “madre desnaturalizada” 
(unnatural mother), a term that police officers and journalists frequently used to describe women 
who endangered their children’s wellbeing.488 The law also dictated that sex workers were not 
                                                      
487 I have used pseudonyms for all the people subjected to experimentation by the USPHS, PASB, and the Guatemalan 
government. Jefatura Política, Guatemala, 1944, Caja 3, AGCA, Guatemala, C.A. 
488 Carey, I Ask for Justice: Maya Women, Dictators, and Crime in Guatemala City, 1898-1944 (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 2013), 136. 
 133 
allowed to live in the same house with their children if over the age of four, although this 
measure was rarely enforced. If Contreras had not sued, Mendoza may never have had to register 
with the state as a sex worker at all. Prostitution laws enabled men to manipulate women who 
they had partnerships with or to get revenge following an altercation. 
The registration rendered Mendoza not only visible to state authorities but also vulnerable 
to medical experimentation. A few years after Mendoza formalized her profession as a prostitute, 
her name would appear on Cutler’s list of experimental subjects.489 Although Mendoza entered 
the registration system before Ubico, she remained registered with the state as a prostitute during 
the Revolution. For Guatemalans such as Rosales, the Revolution did not mark a break from 
repressive state laws and policies. Rather this period brought an intensification of state 
intervention into their daily lives.  
Like the majority of registered sex workers, Mendoza lived in the capital where the state 
concentrated its venereal disease control efforts. In 1945, police arrested 601 women for 
clandestine prostitution, which was defined as a woman who sold her body for sex without 
registering with the state. Police made the majority of these arrests in the capital. As some of 
these women may had been wrongfully accused of prostitution, others likely wanted to avoid 
intrusive medical examinations and fines. Moreover, some of these women may not have 
identified as sex workers but rather viewed it as a side gig that they did when strapped for 
money. The government required that they formalize their roles and professions in society as sex 
workers, when in practice this work was often more transient for women. 
                                                      
489 Although Cutler dropped “Rosales” from her name, state authorities often omitted and miswrote the names of sex workers, 
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Sex work was choice for women but typically among other unattractive options. A survey 
by social worker of 105 “mujeres públicas” (public women), almost a third of the registered 
prostitutes in the capital, provides a rough profile of Guatemalan sex workers during the 
revolution.490 Her survey represented almost a third of the registered prostitutes in the capital. 
Although Contreras stigmatized her interviewees as “public women,” the survey shows that these 
women struggled to maintain their autonomy. The lives of these women followed a pattern that 
was similar to the lives of sex workers in countries around the world.491 Some of the poor women 
did not identify as sex workers but rather engaged in this profession temporarily when strapped 
for money. These women were young, primarily between the ages of 18 and 21 years of age, 
although many reported having begun to work at an earlier age.492 They were primarily single 
and supported themselves; only one was married and several were divorced or widowed. Many 
of the women had originally moved to the capital looking for work as servants. Like Mendoza, 
most women were domestic workers who earned money on the side as sex workers. Domestic 
work was one of the only options available to poor and indigenous women to earn a livelihood, 
along with other poor paying jobs such as working as a waitress, market vendor, laundress, or 
seamstress. Of the 105 registered prostitutes who Contreras interviewed, 81 listed their 
occupations as domestic workers. The other most common profession was waitressing.493   
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The Revolution did little to increase protection for women who worked as domestic 
laborers. Women from rural areas frequently came to Guatemala City in search of domestic labor 
because wages were higher in the capital than the meager sums they earned in rural areas.494 Yet 
even in the capital domestic servants hardly earned enough to sustain themselves and often had 
to find other means to survive.495 The 1947 Labor Code, a key piece of revolutionary reform, did 
not bring significant change to the regulation of domestic work. Their workday was not subject 
to the same restrictions as agricultural laborers; employers were legally allowed to make servants 
work fourteen-hour shifts. Domestic workers also did not have a minimum wage and could be 
paid as little as one time per month. Given that the money domestic workers earned was typically 
less than half of the mandated minimum wage and they only received a paycheck one time per 
month, it is not surprising that women would turn to prostitution.496 The few job opportunities 
offered to women and the state’s weak regulation of women’s labor often left them with few 
options but to enter the sex trade.       
During her interviews, a social worker discovered the endemic sexual assault of female 
domestic workers by their employers. She found in her interviews that after male employers had 
subjected servants to “moral evil” and fired them, women then turned to the “snares” of 
prostitution.497 Despite the lack of protection offered by labor laws from workplace harassment, 
servants protested this abuse by writing letters to the Jefe Político in Guatemala City. The Jefe 
Político was viewed as a paternalistic figure in Guatemalan society. Marginalized populations 
who endured harassment from authority figures would often appeal to the protection of the 
municipal governor in their letters. Matilde García, a sixteen-year-old domestic worker in 
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Guatemala City wrote to the municipal governor of the Department of Guatemala requesting that 
the son of her former employer send her money for their child.498 She said that the employer’s 
son had raped her and she had then become pregnant. As a result of the pregnancy, she had lost 
her job and could not provide for her daughter.  
Even in the Revolution, women continued to have little power to fight sexual abuse. In 
the Latin American honor/shame gender code system, poor and indigenous women who did not 
have “purity of blood” have been deemed as sexually available by middle and upper class men. 
Women who were viewed as “dishonorable” or who were poor almost never were successful 
pursuing rape charges against men with more social capital.499 During the Revolution, women 
continued to have little success securing convictions of men who had assaulted them.500 Many 
white male elites harbored beliefs that their blood was superior to the indigenous “race” and 
probably viewed the rape of indigenous maids as a favor.501 Predominant societal perceptions 
also deemed the sexual accessibility of poorer and non-white women as necessary to allow elite 
women to maintain their honor. Still, through writing letters to the municipal governor, poor 
women sought to reclaim their honor and challenged male ownership of their bodies.  
When women failed to gain protection from the governor and entered into the sex trade, 
they had to contend with an entanglement of state authorities, clients, pimps, and matronas 
(female heads of brothels) who sought to capitalize off of their precarious positions. The 
matronas and male pimps tried to exert complete control over the women’s lives.502 The 
matronas demanded at least half of the women’s earnings.503 A number of women in the survey 
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were afraid to participate in studies by social workers. They feared repercussions from the 
matronas and pimps for providing information about their lives without their oversight.504  Police 
also took money from the women and repeatedly sexually and physically abused them.505 If a 
woman refused the advances of a police officer, she risked being arrested for violating the 
sanitation code. Prostitution laws were vague and left women vulnerable to arbitrary arrest. For 
example, the law stipulated that sex workers were only allowed to wear “moderate makeup.” 
Police officers were allowed to enter a woman’s residence at any moment to ensure she was 
complying with venereal disease laws. State laws effectively enabled police officers’ repeated 
sexual and physical assault of these women with impunity.506     
Police documents contain the arrest records of some of the women who would later be 
subjected to experimentation. These women were well known to police authorities. Fichas, or 
arrest cards, contain sparse information about arrestees: such as the names of the person, their 
charge, and date of detainment. Many of the women were brought in by police for crimes in 
addition to prostitution that included theft, public brawls, swindling, assaults, inebriation, and 
“immoral acts in public.” The frequency with which they were arrested suggests their poverty 
and that they did not have a secluded place in which they could earn money. Maria Garcia 
Espinosa, whose name appears in Cutler’s records, was first arrested for “public brawling.”507 
The police later picked her up for practicing clandestine prostitution, twice for violating venereal 
disease regulation laws, and once more for public brawling. Another woman, Rosa Escobar 
Cruz, whose name also appears in the Cutler records, was arrested four times for theft and once 
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for clandestine prostitution, indicating that she had limited resources to support herself and as a 
result turned to illicit measures to obtain money.508 The repeated arrests highlight that police 
were frequently involved in the lives of women from urban poor communities.  
Police officers not only sexually assaulted women but also apparently misled authorities 
about their encounters with sex workers. A medical student found that sex workers had been 
spreading syphilis by biting police officers.509 The police officers who had worked in the 
brothels had chancres in the same area where they had been bitten by sex workers.510 Since 
syphilis is transmitted through sexual intercourse or congenitally, it is more likely that the police 
officers were acquiring syphilis as a result of their sexual assault of women, or that they coerced 
women into having sex with them in order to avoid arrests for various “violations.” Police 
officers were as likely to have been infectors as the women. They may have claimed that they 
were bitten so that they would not be blamed by authorities for catching syphilis through having 
sex with prostitutes. The evidence of chancres may or may have not come about from the 
prostitutes themselves. These claims also may have had some truth and reveal women’s 
resistance to sexual assault.  
Women who were registered as sex workers and had to visit the lock hospital twice per 
week for gynecological inspections faced further stigmatization. The visibility of sex workers 
who reported to the lock hospital made it difficult for them to ever escape their designation as 
“public women.” The overwhelming societal perception was that the venereal disease hospital 
only served “mujeres de mal vivir” (women who lived evil lives). Until the late thirties, the 
hospital had been an annex to the women’s prison. The state then moved the hospital to an 
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independent building located near the sanitation department in an effort to combat the view that 
it was only for female prisoners. Still, continuing into the forties the lock hospital was seen as a 
hospital for “dishonorable” women.511 It was in poor condition and did not have enough beds for 
all of the women who needed to stay for treatment.512 The overwhelming social perception was 
that gynecological exams served as punishment for women who had allegedly made sexual 
transgressions.  
The hospital did not have any quarters for men, showing how the burden of the crime of 
prostitution and venereal disease was placed squarely on women. In fact, the law explicitly 
defined sex work as a female profession.513 Although male sex workers likely existed during this 
time period, the state did not pursue clandestine male prostitution nor require men to register 
with the state. Although heavily stigmatized in Guatemalan society, homosexuality was not a 
crime in Guatemala.514 The state also did not pursue the arrests of pimps or matronas who 
operated without licenses or who were deemed to be potential threats to venereal disease control. 
The lock hospital continued to be a place for women who were deemed to be the primary vectors 
of sexually-transmitted disease. 
During the revolution, the government implemented new measures that subjected women 
to stricter measures of social control. Doctors, including those who would later participate in the 
experiments, sought to reinstate a law originally passed at the request of the U.S. military during 
World War II and mentioned in Chapter Two. It required that women who worked in comestible 
establishments serving men also had to report for monthly inspections.515 As this law had been 
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met with widespread resistance within Guatemalan society during World War II, the government 
had retracted it following the war. In May 1947, the government again required that all female 
employees at restaurants, cabarets, bars, refreshment stalls, and “similar establishments” report 
for regular medical inspections and undergo gynecological examinations one time per month.516 
The stated intention of the law was to suppress clandestine prostitution and to ensure better 
control of venereal disease. Although revolutionary leaders aimed to assert independence from 
the United States, policymakers continued to draw upon laws that the U.S. military had requested 
be passed during the war to protect soldiers stationed in allied countries.517 The history of U.S. 
imperialism in the region influenced policies and laws that later rendered greater sectors of 
economically and socially disadvantaged women as vulnerable to medical experimentation.518   
As before, national newspapers met the decision to mandate gynecological inspections of 
waitresses and barmaids with sharp rebuke. The response shows that the general population 
supported authorities’ stigmatization of prostitutes but would not withstand the denigration of 
poor women more generally. When efforts were underway by physicians and lawmakers to pass 
this regulation, a prominent newspaper published an editorial arguing that it constituted an 
affront to the women who worked in these establishments.519 The journalist stated, “there are 
among hundreds of girls who work in restaurants and bars who perform honest work despite the 
difficult circumstances of dealing with the nuisances and rudeness of inebriated patrons.” These 
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newspapers opposed the shaming of “honorable” women and that they would have to undergo 
the same treatment that prostitutes endured when registering with the police and visiting the lock 
hospital. They thought that only sex workers or women of ill repute should have their bodies 
probed with speculums and inspected by male physicians. They were concerned that some of 
these men may not have been married, and as a result their inspections of these women also 
placed them at moral risk.520 Although the newspapers opposed this poor treatment of waitresses, 
they did not oppose the regulation system in general. By protesting on behalf of some women 
and by ignoring others, the newspapers effectively supported the punishment of those presumed 
to have transgressed moral boundaries.  
Along with laws mandating medical inspections of women working in service 
occupations, the government also intensified its inspection of the establishments where they 
worked. The increased number of petitions during the revolution from restaurants requesting to 
remain open into the early morning hours suggests greater vigilance on the part of the 
government to monitor the “morality” of the pueblo.521 During debates over the Labor Code, 
some legislators advocated that women older than eighteen-years-old should be prohibited from 
working in establishments that sold alcohol.522 The article mentioned a 1919 law passed in 
Washington, DC that prohibited women from working in establishments that sold alcohol, 
revealing another moment when Guatemala’s revolutionary leaders looked to U.S. law for 
                                                      
520 In other countries, the speculum has also been associated with prostitution. Historian Judith Walkowitz says that because the 
speculum was first used by medical doctors to examine sex workers for venereal disease in Parisian lock hospitals in the 1830s, 
the British populace in the mid-nineteenth century had deemed it an “immoral” instrument that should not be used with 
“virtuous” women.520 See Judith Walkowitz, Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the State, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press): 1982 55-56. As the speculum was developed on poor women in England, in the United States Dr. 
Marion Sims, the so-called “father of modern gynecology,” devised the duck-billed speculum by experimenting on enslaved 
African American Women. His legacy as one of the “great doctors” continues to be contested due to his research practices. See 
Susan M. Reverby, “Memory and Medicine: A Historian’s Perspective on Commemorating J. Marion Sims,” AHA Today, 
September 18, 2017. Forster, “Violent and Violated Women,” 68. 
521 The Reglamento de Profilaxis Sexual y Enfermedades Venéreas mandated that police officers should regularly inspect 
restaurants, cabarets, and hotels to ensure that owners did not tolerate clandestine prostitution within their premises. 
522 “El Trabajo de la Mujer: Comentarios al Proyecto de Código de Trabajo,” El Imparcial, 25 de agosto, 1945. 
 142 
guidance on the implementation of moralizing efforts. In response to heightened surveillance on 
the part of the state, the Jefe Político received a number of letters from restaurants requesting 
that their businesses be allowed to remain open during the nighttime hours.523  
Although the state also intensified its policing of male behavior, women continued to 
remain the primary targets of moralizing campaigns. As newspapers defended the honor of 
waitresses and barmaids, upper and middle class neighborhoods drew upon the rhetoric of 
political leaders. They participated in surveilling women and poor populations. Residents of the 
neighborhood of Luna Park, which was located just outside the business district, published an 
article in the main newspaper of Guatemala complaining about the growth of prostitution in their 
community.524 The fact that the neighborhood was located close to the business district may have 
made it attractive for bars and brothels that young men would visit after work. Neighborhood 
representatives mentioned the recent establishment of saloons, dance halls, and brothels near the 
park. They described intoxicated and “libidinous” partygoers awake late into the nighttime hours 
who were slamming doors, fighting, falling asleep on the sidewalks, playing loud music, and 
partaking in other “scandals.” “Is this the regeneration of Guatemala, the springing forth of a 
new Guatemala?” the neighbors queried in the article. They argued that these circumstances led 
to the further degeneration and impoverishment of Guatemalans.  
Yet, neighborhoods had more power to enforce policing in their communities than 
indicated in the article. Venereal disease laws dictated that anyone who suspected a woman of 
“clandestine prostitution” had an obligation to report her to police authorities.525 Once a woman 
had been denounced to the police, officers would then surveil her for a period of ten days to 
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determine whether or not she was a sex worker, granting the police inordinate power to 
determine the woman’s fate. If the police suspected that the woman was indeed a prostitute, they 
would subject her to a gynecological inspection to determine her “honorability.” Women who 
were poor or outsiders in these neighborhoods had to tread carefully in order to avoid gossip that 
might place them under the suspicion of authorities.526  
Although policymakers’ main emphasis was to police and punish women, some 
Guatemalan social welfare proponents advocated rehabilitation. One agency wanted to develop a 
farm where prostitutes would learn skills to find alternative forms of employment.527 A medical 
doctor who was the director of sanitation proposed using the lock hospital as a place to train sex 
workers in domestic trades. The government also abolished a law requiring that registered sex 
workers contribute part of their monthly allowance to a savings account.528 That measure had 
been intended to help sex workers save money and leave the trade, but it served to impoverish 
them further. Although intended to regenerate sex workers and poor women, the policy had the 
effect of placing their lives under greater scrutiny by government officials, police, and 
community members. As a result, not just sex workers but poor women in general became 
susceptible to medical experimentation by Guatemalan and U.S. researchers. 
 
Soldiers and the Military Barracks 
Military buses came often to Federico Ramos’ town, San Agustín Acasaguastlán, located 
in the dry, mountainous area of eastern Guatemala. All men who could not pay a fee had to 
serve, or else face prison time. In 1948, Ramos was just twenty-two years old. Seeing no other 
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option, he boarded the bus and made his journey to the capital. He worked for thirty months in 
the air force, standing guard over the planes on the air force base in Guatemala City. During his 
time in the military, Ramos recalls being examined by doctors from the United States. He 
believes that they gave him syphilis, but Ramos did not know he had the disease until many 
years after he left the military. At the time, he thought that the doctors were performing routine 
medical examinations. He had grown accustomed to medical inspections by doctors. As part of 
the revolution, the government sought to strengthen the military through the establishment of 
sanitation programs. Military surgeons held that science could transform poor and indigenous 
men into a fighting force fit to defend a new Guatemala.529  
 During the Revolution, the government viewed the military as a key site in which to 
ladinoize indigenous enlistees and transform them into men prepared to protect the newly formed 
democratic government. The majority of soldiers came from marginalized communities. Since 
the late nineteenth century, state law mandated that men who could not pay a fee had to report to 
military duty. Guatemalan policymakers sought to strengthen the military as part of efforts to 
centralize the government and gain control over the labor force. Although the government 
initially only drafted literate and ladino men, it had no choice but to rely upon indigenous labor 
in order to meet sufficient numbers.530 Anthropologist Richard Adams has described a “caste” 
that has existed in the military; officers primarily hailed from elite families while soldiers came 
from urban and rural poor communities.531 Soldiers were treated as the “objects” of the military 
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and not the “subjects.532  They were expected to quiescently adhere to officers’ commands. 
Indigenous soldiers in particular underwent harsh treatment. Although revolutionary policies 
aimed to improve conditions for the men, many soldiers saw conscription as a continuation of 
policies formed by past dictatorships  
Venereal disease control was central to the military’s efforts to build new men. In 1945, 
at the beginning of the revolution, Guatemalan military surgeons established a policy to eradicate 
venereal disease. The military sought to follow U.S. military policies passed during the second 
world war, but it did not have the financial means to do so. Instead, the Guatemalan military 
reprinted a Spanish version of the U.S. military’s sanitation plan.533 The U.S. government had 
provided this pamphlet to the Guatemalan government as a guide for sanitation efforts at the 
beginning of World War II. This pamphlet emphasized that venereal disease control efforts 
should include the distribution of condoms and require that soldiers report to chemical 
prophylaxis treatments after they returned from their evenings out.534 Although Guatemalan 
military wanted to give condoms to the men free of charge, they were too expensive. The 
military also did not have resources to offer chemical prophylaxis.535  Military leaders instead 
settled for providing the condoms to the men at cost and to ensure that they were of good 
quality.536 They required that military cantinas have condoms available for the soldiers to 
purchase.537 This measure in the cantinas along with the new law passed requiring waitresses to 
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report for vaginal examinations were aimed at suppressing the spread of venereal diseases at one 
of its main sources. The Guatemalan military also required that unit commanders teach soldiers 
about venereal disease and safe sex practices. Like the U.S. military, the Guatemalan military 
adopted contradictory policies by preaching continence while at the same time believing in the 
futility of controlling male sexuality.  
In Guatemala as in other parts of the world, the sex worker and the soldier have occupied 
similar roles in society. The government and society at large have deemed them “necessary” to 
protect society but have simultaneously seen them as threats to public health. As in the United 
States, the sex worker and the soldier have been viewed as the uncivilized or “barbarian” 
elements of society that are nonetheless crucial for satisfying the physical demands of sex and 
war.538 In Guatemala and other Latin countries that had the regulation system, societal norms 
largely represented the sex worker as necessary for protecting elite women from rape, while the 
soldier killed to safeguard families, communities, and the nation. Although the Guatemalan 
military sought to reform soldiers, their roles as the lowest rank of soldiers and their poverty and 
indigenous ethnicity kept them from ever assuming an idealized version of manhood. Likewise, 
women without financial resources or who did not ascribe to Ladino middle class domestic 
values could never live up to quintessential feminine values in the country.  
The similarities between sex workers and soldiers in Guatemalan society are also evident 
in that they both were subjected to routine medical inspections. The military and the lock 
hospital both sought to exert total control over their bodies. Only soldiers lower than a rank of 
sergeant had to submit to weekly medical examinations. Military surgeons instructed the men to 
strip naked so that they could find evidence of venereal disease in its early stages. The military 
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implemented this policy because they had found that some “reluctant elements” refused to report 
to the military surgeons when they had become sick.539 The enlistees may have not trusted the 
military medical team, or have wanted to avoid disciplinary measures for contracting venereal 
disease. The men also may have felt uncomfortable having the doctors inspect their genitals. 
Following the guidelines laid out in the U.S. pamphlet, the sanitation team aimed to do these 
exams in the early morning hours or immediately after the men returned from their duties.540 The 
fact that Guatemalan soldiers had forced examinations suggests the coercive power dynamics in 
the military.  
The military was also a major vehicle for implementing venereal disease control policies 
in the country. During the Revolution, some government doctors wanted to abolish the regulation 
system which they saw as ineffective in lowering the rates of venereal disease, but they faced 
pushback from lawmakers who continued to see prostitution as “necessary” to prevent sexual 
assault. The military also continued its policies of working closely with the Department of 
Sanitation and the police to enforce prostitution laws. Since military officials worried that 
venereal disease would impede soldier strength, women continued to be susceptible to arrest and 
harassment. The military demanded that the soldiers help them track down women suspected of 
clandestine prostitution. It required that men infected with venereal disease report the names of 
the women who had infected them.541      
In addition to regulating sex and disease, venereal disease control also reflected anxieties 
about perfecting the “race” and national formation. During the Revolution, the Guatemalan 
military followed the example of the United States by developing propaganda to deter men from 
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visiting brothels. The Guatemalan military sought the help of local artists in order to save costs. 
In 1945, the military held a competition for artists to design posters that would deter soldiers 
from visiting brothels. El Imparcial, the most widely read national newspaper, published the 
poster that won the competition: it depicts a soldier walking during the night towards a female 
figure beckoning him in an illuminated doorway. The woman appears to be in a brothel located 
in the red light district. Above the man is the ominous outline of King Kong’s claw; this image 
suggests the man’s impending fate as a monstrous figure unfit for civilized society if he becomes 
susceptible to his animalistic temptations.542   
This poster responded to a request from the military for representations of King Kong as 
a symbol of venereal disease.543 In the United States, Hollywood films have used the figure of 
King Kong to represent black male hypersexuality and a threat to white women. While in the 
United States King Kong was often shown grabbing white women, in Guatemala he menaced 
soldiers. This figure embodies concerns about interracial relations and the eugenic future of the 
nation. These ideas undoubtedly crossed borders and were taken up within Guatemalan society. 
In theses at the medical school, students also discussed people of African descent as particularly 
prone to syphilis. In Central America, African-descendent populations typically resided near the 
banana enclaves since they were the preferred workers of the United Fruit Company.544 In 
Guatemala, the general perception was that West Indian populations were rife with venereal 
disease and responsible for bringing syphilis and gonorrhea to the highland region.545 Using the 
image of King Kong implies the goals of the revolutionary state to promote white, European 
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values and to shun what were understood to be the “uncivilized” cultural practices of non-white 
communities. 
The belief that whiteness represented blood purity can also been seen in a pamphlet 
entitled “La Sífilis” (syphilis). It shows a black male figure as representative of the vector of the 
disease and a healthy white female figure. After these two individuals marry, they are presented 
as black, indicating that the woman’s body has been contaminated through sexual intercourse. 
Their children are also depicted as a mixture of black and white figures, showing how syphilis is 
transmitted hereditarily. Inside the pamphlet, the text explains that syphilis causes the 
“inutilización” (disablement) of a person. As the word útil was frequently invoked during the 
Revolution, it suggests how a person infected with syphilis represented the antithesis of the ideal 
for citizenship and manhood during this period.546 This pamphlet and the King Kong poster 
suggest notions linking European heritage to blood purity were deeply entrenched in the 
Guatemala belief system.547 The presentation of these figures indicates how blackness continued 
to be associated with pollution and disease. 
The venereal disease campaign was only part of the military’s modernization efforts. At 
the beginning of the revolution, the government granted the military autonomy for the first time 
in history and initiated a reorganization. This included a revision of its training methods and 
investment in its medical services and military equipment. In military documents, the officers 
discussed methods to instill discipline, morality, honor, and loyalty in enlistees.548 Although the 
venereal disease campaign was a key part of these efforts, soldiers had to undergo widespread 
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changes. The military would be the institution to impress habits on men who would serve as the 
bulwark for a new military and a new Guatemala. 549    
Yet, military officers and doctors had difficulty persuading soldiers of their vision. The 
head of the military sanitation department observed the “brusque” changes that campesinos 
underwent during military training.550 The head military doctor, Ignacio Alfaro Sánchez, 
described how the soldier had to adjust to living in army barracks apart from family and 
relatives, eating new types of food, and coping with a different climate than their home 
environments. These changes often caused depression and afflicted soldiers’ physical wellbeing. 
When the campesinos arrived for military duty, they were “shy” and “aloof.”551 The author 
blamed this attitude on their ignorance and lack of educational training. The soldiers also may 
have been afraid of the military leaders or responding to the coercive conditions of their new 
living situation.  
In spite of efforts to facilitate nation building through military enlistment, draft evasion 
continued throughout the revolution. Police arrest logs are replete with desertion cases.552 In 
September 1945, in the municipality of Izabal which is located on Guatemala’s Atlantic 
coastline, police authorities found 36-year-old José Rivera Sánchez, otherwise known as “José 
Yuca,” asleep on the steps of the United Fruit Company’s administrative office at seven-thirty in 
the morning, having deserted military service and carrying a sack with a hammock, telephone 
cord, and wire. The sack apparently belonged to a UFCO laborer and the telephone cord came 
from the administrative office. When Rivera appeared before the justice of the peace, he 
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admitted to having been intoxicated and said that he did not remember taking these items. In 
1940s Guatemala, drinking was associated with criminality. Although the crimes of stealing a 
hammock and a telephone cord were relatively minor, his inebriation and evasion of military 
service further marred his character. Rivera was sent to prison and his name later appears in the 
Cutler records as a subject of the experiments. As he had not reported for military duty, he now 
was forced to provide research labor on behalf of national development.553  
Other enlisted men capitalized upon the military’s anxieties over venereal disease to 
evade service. John C. Cutler, the USPHS director of the experiments, stated that a number of 
soldiers had been intentionally infecting themselves with gonorrhea in order to find reprieve 
from military duties. The men were allegedly inserting matches infected with gonorrhea into 
their urethras. Cutler saw this as a boon for his research: he planned to use these men in his 
experiments.554 Although the gonorrheal infection allowed them to avoid military service, it 
certainly did not protect them from other forms of exploitation. These men clearly had no interest 
in becoming soldiers. The fact that the men apparently went to extremes to infect themselves 
with gonorrhea highlights just how harmful they viewed the government’s efforts to redeem 
them.  
 
Jailed Men and the Prison 
In November, 1945, the Guardia Civil arrested Ruben Ramos Díaz on the train to Puerto 
Barrios for stealing four “Victor” cigar packets.555 Witnesses described Ramos to police as a 
“malicious” man who had been inquiring about expensive “Arrow” brand shirts outside the 
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United Fruit Company offices. They further said that Ramos was a “negro,” gazapo (dishonest), 
short, with a pockmarked face. Twenty-six years old, Ramos testified that he stole the cigars 
because he was short on cash. Court records list his profession as a cobbler. This arrest was not 
the first time he had been picked up by police authorities and sent to jail. According to the report, 
police had a record on him for theft and robbery. After admitting to stealing the cigars, Ramos 
served three months in prison. While in jail, he encountered U.S. and Guatemalan physicians 
who used him in experiments; Ramos paid a high price for four packs of cigars.  
During the revolution, the government upheld penal laws that enshrined economic, 
gendered, ethnic and racial hierarchies. The term “negro” which was used to describe Ramos 
could have indicated either that he was of African descent like many of the laborers who lived 
near the banana enclaves, or that he was of indigenous heritage. More generally, this description 
signified that he was non-white and as a result presumed as prone to criminal behavior. Like the 
sex workers, almost all of the male prisoners who became medical subjects were repeat 
offenders. They had been charged with a range of crimes that included theft, military desertion, 
vagrancy, swindling, inebriation, homicide, armed robbery, and brujería (witchcraft). As leaders 
aimed to regenerate Guatemalans during the revolution through enforcement of venereal disease 
laws and military training, civilian men were also the targets of police campaigns. To be non-
white or poor in Guatemala meant one underwent constant harassment by police and frequent 
imprisonment.556  
State efforts to clamp down on the production and sale of alcohol also resulted from 
policymakers’ fears that the revolution’s efforts to improve wages and better conditions for 
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workers would increase opportunities for alcoholic consumption. Policymakers often spoke of 
alcohol and prostitution as interconnected “vices” responsible for national degeneration. Dr. Juan 
Funes, the doctor in charge of the lock hospital who later participated in the experiments, 
claimed that alcohol and social misery bred prostitution.557 In 1945, the Guardia Civil reported 
that the consumption of aguardiente (moonshine) was on the rise.558 The leading national 
newspaper published an editorial stating that the free time of rural workers was of particular 
concern. Urban workers apparently had more options for entertainment at movie theaters, billiard 
halls, and lectures at the national university. The newspaper claimed that as a result urban 
populations were not “at risk” as opposed to their rural counterparts.559 The focus on rural 
communities suggests how alcohol was a euphemism to express anxieties about the 
government’s limited control over Mayan groups.  
The presumption that indigenous communities were prone to alcoholism had a long 
history in the country. In Guatemala, alcohol has historically been an affliction associated with 
indigenous communities in popular and intellectual discourse.560 The coffee economy relied 
upon alcohol to secure indigenous labor for harvest. Plantation representatives ensured access to 
laborers by plying men with alcohol and demanding the repayment of huge debts after they 
sobered up from their drinking binges.561 During the Ubico dictatorship, the Guatemalan state led 
a police campaign against the clandestine production and sale of aguardiente, boj, and chica, all 
forms of illegal homebrews important for religious ceremonies and local economies in 
indigenous communities. The state sought to root out clandestine production of alcohol because 
it relied upon licensing fees, regulations, and taxes from aguardiente production for state coffers. 
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Although large companies that produced alcohol could afford to pay these fees, moonshiners 
often did not have the funds and had no choice but to evade these costly fines.562 The 
criminalization of moonshiners had the effect of reinforcing the identification between Mayan 
culture and criminality. During the revolution, the state government increased taxes on the 
production and sale of alcohol.563 It also continued to pursue arrests for the clandestine 
production of aguardiente.564  
Nonetheless, the increase in taxes did little to dissuade the consumption of alcohol during 
the revolution.565 The Guardia Civil continued to avidly pursue the crime of “inebriation.” Police 
reports show that arrests for “inebriation” far exceeded those of other crimes. In 1945, the 
Guardia Civil made 5,636 arrests for inebriation (5,075 for men and 561 women).566 Although 
the number of arrests was less during the revolution than it had been during the Ubico era, the 
national police still made the repression of alcohol a primary goal.567     
The government also kept up with its criminalization and efforts to regulate traditional 
healing practices. At least one of the prisoners in Cutler’s record was detained for practicing 
witchcraft. As mentioned in Chapter One, in the 1930s the state began its pursuit of midwives 
and traditional healers as part of its campaign to establish biomedicine as the nationwide 
healthcare system. During the revolution, the state expanded efforts to punish traditional healing 
systems.568 Dr. Juan Funes, the head of the venereal disease hospital who participated in the 
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experiments, repeatedly supported this initiative and advocated for the “drastic application” of 
laws that criminalized healers who did not practice with a license. He argued that these healers 
exploited their patients and impeded efforts to bring a biomedical system to rural areas.569 In the 
early fifties, the Ministry of Health mandated that all midwives undergo a training course with a 
nurse or doctor. Those who did not comply were subject to arrest. Still, it was not until the sixties 
that most midwives started to undergo training in biomedicine. Although doctors such as Funes 
sought to bring medical care to communities that had long been ignored by the state, this effort 
was also part of racist and sexist policies that denigrated indigenous cultural practices.  
Many indigenous and poor Guatemalans preferred to see traditional healers rather than 
medical doctors. By attempting to suppress Mayan healing practices and to promote 
biomedicine, the state aimed to change people’s deeply held beliefs and bodily practices. In 
Mayan communities, girls born on certain days were assigned the role of midwifery. As they 
grew older, many midwives claimed to be in communication with supernatural spirits. 
Particularly indigenous women who thought it shameful to have a male doctor examine their 
sexual organs preferred visiting a midwife for reproductive care. Midwives served as both 
healthcare providers and as guidance counselors for women.570 The campaign against midwifery 
undercut women’s authority in their communities and also sought to reshape norms of intimacy. 
Despite the efforts by the state to impose a new medical system in rural areas, many from 
indigenous communities continued to uphold their own traditions.   
Just as the campaign against alcohol and traditional healing practices targeted indigenous 
communities, so did the criminalization of vagrancy. The 1945 constitution defined labor as the 
“right of the individual and a social obligation.” Although the state abolished Ubico’s 1934 
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severe vagrancy law mandating that all men without “adequate profession” or land had to work 
on a coffee plantation between 100 to 150 days per year, vagrancy remained punishable and the 
national police aggressively pursued it.571 Landowners strongly opposed changes to the vagrancy 
law because they believed it to be essential for maintaining adequate numbers of laborers and 
therefore the government did not repeal the law. In 1945, the Guardia Civil made 815 arrests for 
vagrancy.572 This number was less than half of the arrests typically made in any year during the 
Ubico era.573 Yet, the vagrancy law still made it more likely that men from the laboring poor 
would have frequent encounters with police. As the criminal justice system had previously 
worked to ensure labor on plantations, during the revolution it worked to place men in the 
service of economic and national development. 
 
Hospital Patients and the Asylum 
In 1947, police requested that Erica Aguilar Romero who was serving a 20-year sentence 
for the murder of another woman be transferred to the Asilo de Alienados, the state-run 
psychiatric institution located in Guatemala City.574 Aguilar was registered with the state as a sex 
worker. Despite her denial of this crime, she was widely condemned by Guatemalan society. In 
what appears to have been a crime of passion, she had allegedly decapitated the woman. A 
prominent local newspaper advocated that Aguilar receive the death penalty for the gruesome 
murder.575 The fact that she was a sex worker did not help garner public sympathy. Following 
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her sentence, Aguilar attempted suicide. As a result, the police determined that her case should 
be reviewed by the psychiatrists at the mental institution.576 It was during her time in the hospital 
that she encountered U.S. doctors and became a subject of the experiments. 
 The revolutionary government sought to change the reputation of the hospital from a 
ward for irredeemable members of society to a site of regeneration and scientific study.577 
Nevertheless, throughout the forties the Asilo was stigmatized as overcrowded, filthy, and 
diseased.578 In his medical notes, Cutler described the asylum as “desperately and pathetically 
poor, both financially and in terms of the medical attention that patients received.”579 Located in 
a Spanish colonial-style building with a central courtyard area, patients mingled with one another 
during the daytime hours. Cutler added that the physicians and staff remained dedicated and that 
the conditions in the hospital were often better than what the patients had experienced 
previously.580 Many of the attendants in the psychiatric institution were from a Catholic religious 
order. Still, Cutler’s reflections may have been part of his efforts to justify using hospital patients 
for his experiments.  
Not just the psychiatrists working in the Asilo, but family members, employers, town 
mayors, police officers, and neighbors observed and diagnosed individuals as mentally unfit.581 
A number of patients were first sent to the hospital by their relatives. Often they had few 
resources and little time to care for their family members. Since the hospital had a bad 
reputation, many families sent their relatives there only as a last resort.582 Dr. Miguel Molina, the 
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hospital’s director during the revolution, received a plethora of letters from family members 
pleading with him to alleviate their burdens of caring for their family members. Some of the 
patients later used in the experiments had been sent by plantation owners and several were 
admitted at the request from the United Fruit Company’s doctor, Neil MacPhail. Military 
officials sent a soldier to the asylum because he was an alcoholic and had not been able to 
demonstrate necessary discipline.583 A number of patients also entered the hospital through the 
criminal justice system. When police and the judicial courts suspected that a patient suffered 
from a mental illness, they would request a psychiatric examination from the forensic 
psychiatrist on staff at the hospital. The fact that criminals mixed with other patients had the 
effect of stigmatizing the population in the hospital as dangers to society.584   
The lack of regulations governing the institutions meant that people often were 
committed to the hospital with little evidence that they suffered from a mental illness. A doctor 
wrote in a medical journal that the national police was largely responsible for classifying people 
as insane.585 Almost one third of the patients in the asylum were epileptics, which was much 
higher than in other countries including Cuba and the United States. The doctor said that the 
police took any person in public view who suffered a convulsive attack to the mental 
institution.586 The majority of people at the hospital used in the experiments were also epileptic. 
Other common mental illnesses in the institution included “trastornos mentales” (mental 
disorder), “oligfrenia” (mental incapacity), and psicosis infecciosa (infectious psychosis).  
The author said the rates of these “diseases” were also higher in Guatemala than in other 
countries, indicating that people had been erroneously diagnosed with mental illness. He added 
                                                      
583 Fondo de la Salud Pública, Asilo de Alienados, expediente, 24115, AGCA.  
584 Dwyer, Homes for the Mad, 95. 
585 Dr. Ricardo Ponce Ramirez, “Enfermedades mentales en Guatemala durante el año 1949,” Revista de la federación médica, 
No. 17, (abril, mayo y junio): 4-7. 
586 Ibid., 4-5. 
 159 
that the high rates of mental illness may have been due to the inadequate efforts on the part of the 
sanitation department to eradicate infectious disease, including syphilis, which caused mental 
illness (such as syphilis) and the large indigenous population in the country. The doctor 
explained that the Mayan population did not know that factors such as pregnancy, malaria, 
intestinal parasites, alcoholism, and inadequate nutrition could harm genes.587 Although he 
blamed police for falsely diagnosing people with mental illnesses, he upheld racial 
understandings that the indigenous population was largely at fault for mental and physical 
degeneration in Guatemalan society. 
Once the patients were accepted into the institution, psychiatrists diagnosed their 
conditions and determined their length of stay in the Asilo. The patients later used in the 
experiments were found to have a range of disorders. These included “enajenación mental,” or 
loss of mental faculties. Psychiatric examiners found others to be “idiots,” “demented,” 
“alcoholics,” “psychopaths,” “hysterics,” “epileptics” or as having “sexual psychosis.” One 
physician wrote in a hygiene publication that approximately a quarter of the people in the Asilo 
suffered from mental health problems that developed due to untreated syphilis.588 In the mind of 
this doctor, prostitutes or sexual relations outside of marriage were blameworthy for a significant 
portion of the mental “degeneration” in the country. The fact that medical doctors believed that 
syphilis was prevalent in a sizeable portion of the population may have served as a justification 
for including them in the experiments.589   
                                                      
587 Ibid, 6. 
588 Julio Fuentes Novella, Alfabetización Higiénica (octubre de 1947): 7.  
589 In other experiments with the mentally ill in the United States, doctors have claimed that they were performing “studies in 
nature” because they were not altering conditions that were endemic to the institution. Bioethicist David Rothman found that 
medical researchers infected disabled children in the Willowbrook School in Staten Island, New York with hepatitis, based upon 
the justification that the disease was endemic to the institution. 262-265. See David and Sheila Rothman, The Willowbrook Wars: 
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984): 262-265. 
 160 
 Dr. Miguel Molina first began working as a forensic examiner at the Asilo under the 
direction of Dr. Carlos Federico Mora, who had been formative in the revolutionary overthrow of 
Ubico. During the Revolution, Mora became president of the Guatemalan League of Mental 
Hygiene and wrote a manual on eugenics.590 His views greatly influenced Molina. As a forensic 
examiner, Molina held inordinate power over his patients’ lives. He approached his work with a 
high sense of moral purpose. In his letters to other government institutions, he discussed the toll 
that his work took upon him daily and the “transcendent social responsibility” that he felt in his 
work. Molina was concerned that he did not have the resources to perform up to his standards.591 
Although he made requests for additional staffers to relieve his burden, it is unlikely that he 
received the support that he requested given limited funding for the asylum.  
 Oral histories have supported the view that Molina was a doctor with a strong sense of 
social responsibility. Dr. José García Noval, one of Molina’s students in the medical school at 
the national university where he taught neuroanatomy, described him as highly generous, ethical, 
and just. He recalls that Molina had tremendous patience with his patients at the psychiatric 
hospital. In his private life, he also tried to live up to the values that he preached in his work, 
although he was not as rigid. He would invite students to his house where he would play his 
piano for them. One time a student showed up at his house with a jug of wine. Molina told him, 
“look I have told you that alcohol kills brain cells. But tonight we are going to kill some.” He 
then took a large gulp. García said that he has struggled to understand why this medical doctor 
beloved by students would partake in the experiments. Yet like other medical professionals of 
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this time, García believes that Molina’s views were influenced by paternalism, race, and class 
prejudices.592  
 Molina’s professional writings vividly illustrate how understandings of race informed his 
forensic assessments. In the early thirties, Molina gave a presentation at the national university 
about the degenerative physical and psychological effects of alcohol.593 He claimed that 
alcoholism threatened to create a “new race” with children prone to vagrancy, epilepsy, and 
prostitution.594 Given the association between alcohol and Mayans, this statement implicitly 
blamed indigenous groups for crime, madness, and degeneration in Guatemalan society.595 
Molina also reflected national discourse in connecting alcohol with prostitution. His comments 
furthered associations of sex workers as propagating the country’s poor and syphilitic. The “new 
race” that Molina envisioned stood in opposition to what liberals hoped to foster in a productive 
and healthy labor force.  
 Years later during the revolution, Molina published a paper that revealed that race 
continued to have a central role in his examinations.596 The article entitled, “Study of a 
Psychopathic Personality in Guatemala,” described Molina’s assessment of an indigenous man 
named José M. Bux who had allegedly conducted a rash of murders and sexually assaulted 
children with a ladino named Mariano M. Miculax. During Molina’s assessment, he interviewed 
Bux and performed a physical examination. He concluded that Molina did not have the “creative 
intelligence” to perform these crimes on his own, and therefore determined Miculax to be the 
                                                      
592 Interview with José Garcia Noval, Guatemala City, November 2015. 
593 Dr. Miguel F. Molina, “Degeneración del Origen Alcohólico,” Boletín Sanitario de Guatemala Nums. 14, 15, 16 (octubre-
diciembre 1930): 408; Records of John C. Cutler, “Final Syphilis Report Part 1,” 18. 
594 Molina, “Degeneración del Origen Alcohólico,” 408. 
595 Also in Brazil, psychiatry developed as a way to implement social control over non-white populations that had formerly been 
slaves. Meyer, Reasoning Against Madness, 11. 
596 Miguel F. Molina, “Study of a Psychopathic Personality in Guatemala” Psychiatry 10, no. 1 (February 1947): 31-6.  
 162 
author of the crimes.597 He added that Bux was a “wretched product of Indian origin with Asiatic 
features, lacking culture, ignorant to an extreme and only possessing an intelligence which gives 
the superficial impression of an astuteness of a wild animal.”598 Molina’s denigration of Bux’s 
intelligence and his invocation of animal imagery suggests longstanding racist views of Mayans 
as uncivilized and easily manipulated. In effect, Molina blamed the whole of Mayan culture for 
Bux’s crimes.  
Hospital records show that Molina’s racial prejudices also informed his examination of 
patients who were later subjected to experimentation. In March 1946, police charged Manuel 
Ajpu’, a 45-year-old indigenous kaqchikel man and day laborer from Chimaltenango, with the 
murder of his brother, Celestino. Labeled by judicial authorities as demente, he was then 
transferred to the central penitentiary. As Ajpu’ did not speak Spanish, Molina had to rely upon 
interpreters throughout his assessment. The interpreters described him as “deaf and mute.” He 
denied the charge that he had killed his brother. In his testimony, he said that his brother returned 
home intoxicated and began to consume all of the family’s food. After the two brothers got into a 
physical altercation, Celestino ran away. The next day, Ajpu’ claimed that he found his brother 
and he had fallen on his knife. The story did not convince Molina of Ajpu’s innocence. Molina 
concluded that his “vulgar” crime was driven by his “primitive” instinct and lack of ethical, 
social, and legal inhibition. Like with Bux, Molina blamed Ajpu’s lack of culture and civilization 
for his crime.599  
Molina’s pathologization of Ajpu’s character likely influenced the decision by the asylum 
staff to designate him as an experimental subject. In the Asilo records, Manuel Ajpu’s name was 
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on a list of “enfermos trasladas por los doctores americanas” (patients for the American 
doctors).600 The document contained the name of Dr. John C. Cutler on the top of the sheet and 
was stamped by the secretary of the Neuro-Psychiatric Hospital. As was the custom of the time, 
U.S. researchers did not seek consent from the individual patients but rather obtained it from the 
institutions. Molina’s medical examination may have led asylum authorities to conclude that 
Ajpu’ would serve as an ideal candidate for medical experimentation because he was assessed to 
be beyond the hope of rehabilitation.601  
Yet, not just indigenous patients but poor ladinos as well were subjected to 
experimentation. People placed on lists for the American doctors often had the slimmest patient 
files, as opposed to members of the middle class who also used the hospital and received more 
attention.602 In the file of a woman with little means named Virginia Romero, whose name also 
appeared on Cutler’s list, the examiners just checked boxes.603 Doctors had diagnosed her with 
epilepsy. The examiners also checked on the chart that she was “agitated” would often “cry,” 
“scream, and “talk to herself.” Other boxes indicated that Romero was “disobedient,” “sad,” and 
sometimes insulted others. The back of the form contained the record for the electric shocks that 
she repeatedly received, which was a common treatment in the hospital. The records indicate that 
there was little inquiry from Romero or from others outside the institution regarding her status or 
demanding justification as to why she remained in the psychiatric institution for all those years. 
This silence is revealing of the limited abilities of psychiatric patients to protect themselves from 
doctors. In contrast, one former officer in the military was a patient in the hospital. His file was 
thick, demonstrating that he received better care.604 With too many patients and very few 
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resources, the staff had to make decisions about which patients should receive their attention. 
Social hierarchies established in Guatemalan society informed the treatment that patients 
received in the hospital.   
During the Revolution, policymakers tried to improve the asylum’s reputation and sought 
to find better methods for rehabilitating patients. Molina wanted to fashion a new image of the 
institution as committed to science and as having the potential to cure patients so that they would 
become “useful” members of society, rather than as a place in which to indefinitely house the 
country’s mentally ill. As part of these efforts, he renamed the asylum the Neuropsychiatric 
Hospital.605 He also spearheaded efforts to create a society for neuropsychiatry with the most 
preeminent physicians in the country and members of the university. The plan was that the 
society would help to perfect the study of mental illnesses and find ways to cure them.606 
Leading doctors such as Luis Galich, the head of the department of sanitation who later 
participated in the experiments, was part of these efforts. Molina wanted to correct the 
impression in the general public that the hospital was a dirty and miserable place and a site of 
contagion for various diseases.607 The government also funded a literacy program in the 
asylum.608 The teacher, Luz Adela Muralles, wrote about the motivation of female patients to 
learn to read and write in Spanish. Especially since indigenous women had high rates of 
illiteracy, this program provided an important opportunity for women. These skills would allow 
them to write letters to government authorities to push for better care within the institution. 
Yet these efforts at regeneration could lead to increased social control of patients. In 
1945, Arévalo signed an order requesting that the police send alcoholics who they arrested for 
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treatment in the asylum. Although many alcoholics would be released after they had sobered up 
in the prison, the asylum would now conduct a psychological examination that could further 
pathologize patients.609 While the psychiatric institute treated many of the patients arrested for 
alcohol quickly, some remained in the institution to be treated for “chronic alcoholism.” For 
instance, Arturo Barrios Jimenez, whose name appears in the Cutler records, had been detained 
several times in the psychiatric institution for alcoholism. In his medical examination, physicians 
determined to keep him in the asylum for an indefinite period of time due to the “organic 
disorders” that had resulted from his “chronic alcoholism.”610 As the “scientific” improvements 
in the hospital were intended to help cure patients, in some cases they committed them to more 
time needed to be served in the institution.  
In their efforts to make the hospital more scientific in its approach to mental illness, 
Guatemalan medical doctors held a meeting to discuss the ethical implications of performing 
surgical operations on the mentally ill. They wanted to create a surgical center in order to cure 
the physical as well as the psychological causes of patients’ afflictions. During this meeting, one 
doctor advocated that medical professionals approach the treatment of mental illness in the same 
manner as attempting to cure dysentery. Molina mentioned that he had visited a mental 
institution in Havana and St. Elizabeth’s in Washington, D.C., which was the U.S. Public Health 
Service hospital. Molina looked to St. Elizabeth’s as an example of one of the best psychiatric 
institutions in the world. He said that operations were regularly performed at St. Elizabeth’s to 
treat mental health diseases.611 For the Guatemalan doctors, the U.S. mental health institution 
served as an example of scientific and modern medical care. 
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The doctors’ ideas about what types of surgeries should be performed were influenced by 
their understandings of sexuality. Several of the doctors mentioned that medical professionals 
around the world well understood that gynecological conditions caused mental illnesses in 
women. Guatemalan physicians including Galich, supported subjecting women to gynecological 
surgeries, but did not mention exactly what types of procedures would be performed. In the 
Asilo, psychiatrists used hysteria as a diagnosis for women with mental disorders. In other parts 
of the world when doctors found cases of hysteria to be extreme, they would perform 
hysterectomies. Although no evidence exists that the doctors did indeed carry out these surgeries 
with women in the mental institution, their discussion illustrates how attempts to cure what was 
perceived to be abnormal sexuality were closely associated with physicians’ attempts to form 
new Guatemalan subjects. Both the hysteric and the prostitute have been used to demarcate what 
has deemed to be abnormal as opposed to normal female sexuality.612 While hysteria has thought 
to be caused by deviance from normal female reproductive function, the prostitute has been 
associated with masculine sexuality.613  
Although efforts intensified to cure Guatemalans of their afflictions, evidence indicates 
that some Guatemalans fought back against their designations as mentally unfit to participate in 
society. In the asylum records, Rodolf López Morales, whose name also appears in the Cutler 
records, has one of the thickest files.614 Although patients such as López who came from humble 
backgrounds often did not receive much attention from staff members, he demanded that Molina 
examine his case. At the age of seventeen, López had initially been arrested for the crime of 
theft, but had been transferred to the asylum at the request of the police who required he receive 
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a medical examination. In this assessment, Molina had identified him as a “psychopath” and 
determined that he had difficulty adapting to his surrounding social environment.615 He 
determined that López should remain in the hospital as he was perceived to be a threat to society.  
López challenged this assessment. For several years, he pressed Molina to reexamine 
him. When Molina ignored this request, López wrote to the Ministry of Government to 
investigate his case. He complained that he was losing his youth and requested a transfer to the 
penitentiary so that he could carry out his sentence. He also said that he wanted to visit his 
family and find employment, appealing to the ideals of the revolution. He wrote to the Ministry 
of Government about his treatment in the asylum. This treatment could have included his role in 
the medical experiments; López was also listed in Cutler’s record. The records show that López 
left the institution in 1948, but it does not mention whether he went to the penitentiary, or was set 
free.616     
As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, some of the worst abuses during the 
experiments occurred in the asylum. This may have been because the Guatemalan government 
had less investment in these hospital patients as future citizens. The hospital was overcrowded 
and most patients got very little attention. Disabled mental health patients were also likely the 
least able to defend themselves.  
 
Children and the Orphanage 
When Marta Lidia Orellana was just five years old, her parents passed away. No one ever 
told her why her parents died. At the time, the family had been living in Guastatoya, a small city 
in the Department of El Progresso in the east-central part of Guatemala. Following the death of 
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her parents, she went to live with her older sister in the capital. She only stayed with her sister a 
short while because she could not afford to care for her. One day without explanation, Orellana’s 
sister brought her to the national orphanage. Although she cried when her sister left her, the 
people who worked at the orphanage gave her a café with milk. She described her life in the 
orphanage as “linda” (lovely) for several years. She found other children to play with and 
enjoyed her time there.  
Then when she was about nine years old, a medical doctor who she did not know 
summoned her to the clinic. The doctor was with several other medical professionals and nurses. 
They began calling her back for regular gynecological inspections and for injections of various 
substances. The doctors never explained to Orellana what types of substances they were injecting 
into her body. Orellana said those gynecological inspections, injections, and blood draws 
transformed her childhood and her entire life. When she was released years later from the 
orphanage, she tested positive for syphilis. She believes that during those medical examinations 
that the doctors gave her syphilis. 617 
 Forcing youth to perform research labor was not the first time that orphaned and poor 
Guatemalan children had been coerced into various types of work. Children who lost their 
parents were often regalado, or given as a gift to their relatives so that they could assist with 
household chores and bring in additional income.618 Continuing into the present day, youth born 
to families with many children may be given to relatives without any offspring. Unlike in the 
United States, birth parents in Latin America have not always legally relinquished their rights to 
their offspring before sending them to relatives. The assistance children provide to household 
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budgets or domestic labor has been highly valued particularly in poor families around the 
world.619 Often when children grew up in these situations, their relatives would work them day 
and night. Sometimes the children were subjected to physical abuse.620 In addition to being gifted 
to other families, many children struggling with poverty labored as servants and sometimes as 
prostitutes.621  
The Labor Code established during the Revolution regulated the work conditions for 
children. It prohibited children from working in cantinas or other establishments that sold 
alcohol. The Labor Code also forbade children from working in situations that were dangerous or 
unsuitable for their age, although it did not describe what were these positions. But the Labor 
Code did allow children to contribute to the family business or to assist parents with income 
when they were extremely poor.622 Child servants were also subject to the same rules as domestic 
workers, meaning that they had few state protections. Moreover, many aspects of the new labor 
regulations were never enforced. As a result, forced child labor continued through the 
revolutionary period. 
At the same time that the government was lax in its oversight of child labor, state policies 
that focused on childhood development and on helping mothers brought about new forms of 
social control as well as opportunities for women to gain assistance. These policies were not so 
much directed towards helping women as they were informed by eugenic policies.623 Still, many 
women sought out these programs; they wanted to take advantage of opportunities to secure 
better healthcare services for their families and support for childrearing. State authorities 
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established maternal health and childcare centers in poor neighborhoods, expanded the national 
orphanage facilities, built schools and trained teachers in rural areas who brought the principles 
of hygiene to their students. Since social reformers saw the development of patriotic and 
hardworking children as essential for the vision of the revolution, policymakers made the 
investment in mothers and children their priority.624 Still, there was a fine line between providing 
aid to poor children and expropriating their bodies for medical research.   
Although many policies claimed to help women, social reformers were quick to blame 
mothers. The law dictated that the state should place children in the national orphanage located 
in the capital if a mother had more than five children, was extremely poor, or found to be 
mentally unfit.625 Perhaps social reformers presumed like many have that children from families 
with multiple siblings would be neglected. Sex workers who were labeled “unnatural mothers” 
were most vulnerable to having the state remove their children and place them in an orphanage. 
These stipulations gave the state broad power to intervene in women’s personal lives. Sexual and 
physical abuse remained commonplace during the revolution and resulted in women having 
unwanted pregnancies who did not have access to birth control.626 Although some documentary 
evidence from court cases and in anthropologist’s notes indicates that women gave themselves 
abortions through taking herbs or through visiting “empiricists,” little is known about the ways 
that women prevented unplanned pregnancies.627 What remains apparent is that social reformers 
labeled women incompetent mothers who did not have adequate means to control their 
reproductive health. 
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Since the domestic practices of urban poor and indigenous families differed from Ladino 
families with more financial resources, social reformers could find ample cause for intruding in 
their daily lives. Directly following the revolution, a British anthropologist did a study on urban 
poor families living in Guatemala City. She discovered that families did not reside in isolated 
family units but rather shared homes with neighbors. A number of couples preferred 
“impermanent unions” to marriage. These partnerships made women vulnerable to their male 
partners, neighbors, and family members who could easily paint them as prostitutes to authorities 
and made them susceptible to police harassment. Because the concubines of wealthy men were 
generally better equipped to avoid unwelcome encounters with police, poor women were much 
more likely to be charged with clandestine prostitution. As poor families often did not reside in 
single family homes and women worked, their children were more frequently on the street. If a 
woman was fortunate, her mother would take care of her children while she worked long hours 
as a domestic worker or in another job. Yet many times women had no option but to leave their 
children alone.  
Moreover, women also came under scrutiny by social workers and doctors when they 
took their children to local healers. Women may have taken their children to traditional healers 
because they could not afford a physician. Many were following well established practices that 
had been passed down by women in their communities. Social reformers pathologized mothers 
for failing to address their children’s healthcare needs by refusing to take them to medical 
doctors.628 Like in other countries, the denigration of traditional healthcare practices formed part 
of efforts to promote biomedicine in the country.629 
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As social reformers blamed mothers with limited financial resources for neglecting their 
children’s needs, they sought to use the orphanage to fashion poor youth into able-bodied 
citizens. During the revolution, the state wanted to increase the capacity of the national 
orphanage in Guatemala City to serve more children throughout the country. At the time, the 
Hospicio Nacional (the national orphanage) was filled beyond its limits with children from 
regions throughout the country. The orphans ranged between infancy and eighteen years of age. 
Located in a two-story Spanish colonial style building in Guatemala City, the orphanage 
crammed upwards of five-hundred children into rows of beds located in long and narrow rooms. 
It had trouble meeting all the requests for entry. The state tried to use the institution to reform the 
habits of the laboring poor. Employees provided training to the children so that they would be 
able to be economically independent once they had to leave the institution. They offered 
vocational training programs in textile production, cobbling, baking, hairdressing, and painting. 
They also built nutritional programs and gave the children access to regular medical 
examinations. Particularly talented children could receive grants to attend more advanced 
schools. Yet most often once the orphans left the institution they would fill the ranks of jobs 
typically performed by the laboring poor.630  
Along with expanding orphanage facilities to accommodate more children, the state also 
established maternal and child healthcare and daycare services for women in poor 
neighborhoods. This program sought to alleviate the social and economic conditions that made 
childrearing a burden for many poor women. Elisa Martinez de Arévalo, the president’s wife, 
used her role as first lady to launch a daycare center and maternity ward for impoverished 
mothers in Guatemala City. Martinez was Argentinian and brought the idea of these daycare 
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facilities from her country where they had been established for the working classes.631 Six 
months after Arévalo took office, the government opened its first day care center and maternity 
ward in El Palmita, one of the shantytown communities on the edge off the city. The 
establishment of this center was unprecedented in a neighborhood long neglected by the state.632 
The program offered maternity care, childcare services, and training for the new mothers. 
Following delivery, the physicians would administer vaccinations to the children and the center 
would ensure that they received adequate nutrition.    
Dr. Juan José Hurtado, who worked in the center as a young medical student in 
pediatrics, said that the program gave medical doctors “complete control” over the development 
of children. The center provided impoverished children who likely would never have visited a 
doctor with access to medical care.633 Hurtado added that participation on the part of mothers 
was voluntary. The mothers did not have to pay anything for the program but were required to 
work one afternoon per week in the center. They also had to learn principles of hygiene, 
nutrition, and child rearing from the nurses at the center. Although this program appeared more 
focused on ensuring the healthy development of children than with the empowerment of women, 
the mothers who were part of the program eagerly sought out the services. At the same time that 
the program rendered women’s intimate lives and their children subject to greater control by the 
state, it also helped women left with no other options for childcare or medical services. This 
program shows the complicated nature of reform efforts that were both intrusive and at the same 
time a welcome intervention on the part of many women.634  
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The state-led effort to monitor the development of children aligned with goals to reduce 
venereal disease in the population. Syphilis was a primary cause of infant mortality and birth 
defects, which policymakers aimed to address through programs such as the one started Arévalo. 
Dr. Funes advised doctors to perform blood tests in pregnant women to determine whether they 
were infected with venereal disease. He wanted advocates of “puericulture to join efforts to 
eradicate venereal disease in the population.635 Puericulture was of particular interest to many 
Latin American eugenicists.636 Historian Nancy Stepan said that in Latin America, “children 
especially were thought of as biological-political resources of the nation, and the state was 
regarded as having an obligation to regulate their health.”637 Puericulture had the effect of 
placing mothers under suspicion while their children became the priority of state-led efforts to 
regenerate the populace. Reflecting the gender inequalities in the country, fathers were not 
subjected to the same intrusive state policies. The state placed burden of raising “healthy” 
citizens directly onto women.  
While many of the reforms enshrined patriarchal values and placed the blame on poor 
mothers who lacked the resources to care for their children, some programs such as the maternal-
child care center provided women with the support that they needed so that they could work and 
support their families. Still by rendering poor women in particular as unfit for motherhood, state 
workers justified intrusion into families’ intimate lives and the removal of children. The state’s 
presumption that it had authority over the children of marginalized members of society was what 
would later make children vulnerable to medical experiments. Orphans did not have an adult 
authority member who could protected them.   
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Conclusion 
The government’s efforts to regenerate women, indigenous, and marginalized groups 
during the revolution conversely led contributed to the making thousands of Guatemalans 
vulnerable to becoming medical subjects. Despite claiming to champion the rights of the poor, 
the state upheld laws and policies that enshrined Ladino and patriarchal cultural and social norms 
and economic inequality. The government also passed new policies that enabled greater control 
over marginalized groups. Women who were viewed as responsible for rearing the next 
generation were the focus of many campaigns led by medical doctors connected to the 
government. Yet, soldiers, civilian men, and hospital patients were also increasingly scrutinized 
by medical professionals and social reformers. By passing new laws and policies that undercut 
the authority of poor and indigenous parents and traditional healers, doctors further sought to 
gain control over the development of children. These efforts made these groups more likely to be 
become the subjects of research.  
Nevertheless, the process of making Guatemalans into medical subjects was never 
inevitable nor always successful. Many women, indigenous communities, and marginalized 
members of society did not support the new revolutionary state. Rather they saw it as 
continuation of past regimes that upheld stark racial and gender inequalities. Guatemalans found 
ways to avoid cooperating with the new government. They refused to register as sex workers and 
evaded reporting for military duty. U.S. doctors viewed Guatemala as a convenient experimental 
site where they could find docile bodies for experimentation. They saw Guatemalans 
institutionalized in the lock hospital, the prison, army barracks, asylum, orphanage, and schools 
as available and docile “clinical material” for their research. But as later chapters will show, U.S. 
and Guatemalan doctors would be proven wrong. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE DOCTORS’ DEAL 
 
In the midst of World War II, Dr. John Mahoney made the momentous discovery that 
penicillin cured syphilis.638 Head of the USPHS Venereal Disease Research Laboratory (VDRL) 
in Staten Island, New York, Mahoney first used penicillin on syphilitic rabbits and found that 
their lesions rapidly disappeared.639 Immediately following this discovery, Mahoney gave 
penicillin to four sailors with early syphilis hospitalized at the U.S. Marine Hospital in Staten 
Island, New York. He was reportedly “stunned” by the results.640 In 1943, Mahoney and his 
colleagues presented their findings to a “jam-packed session” of the American Public Health 
Association meeting in New York City.641 The audience gave the researchers a roaring applause. 
The discovery of penicillin has been described as one of the most “earth-shattering” moments in 
the history of medicine.642 Penicillin was widely hailed as a “miracle drug” that would 
revolutionize venereal disease control campaigns and help win the war.643   
As the American public cheered a cure for syphilis, Mahoney and his colleagues worried 
that their studies on prophylaxis for venereal disease would cause controversy and even a 
potential lawsuit. Many social reformers in the United States regarded venereal disease as divine 
punishment for moral transgressions. They remained wary of prophylaxis and thought it would 
encourage couples to have sex outside of marriage. During the war, the military’s distribution of 
prophylactics to soldiers had caused an uproar in the United States. Military leaders adopted this 
policy because they had grown increasingly convinced of the futility of preaching “continence” 
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to male soldiers. They faced opposition not just from soldiers but also military leaders. Although 
in 1941 Congress passed the May Act that criminalized sex work near military bases, privately 
many commanding officers scoffed at this law as impractical.644 Some military commanders 
even established brothels for the troops in foreign locations, in violation of federal law.645 
Despite the likelihood of controversy, U.S. doctors with the support of military officials moved 
forward with their studies on prophylaxis that they deemed critical for national security. 
While U.S. doctors battled to conquer syphilis during World War II and postwar, 
Guatemala was undergoing revolution and hosting U.S. wartime forces. A physician with 
Guatemala’s sanitation department wrote in a local newspaper that venereal disease rates had 
skyrocketed during the war due to the U.S. troops’ presence in the Central American region and 
the migration of “girls” to “vice” centers.646 After the war, the United States pulled out its troops 
and left Guatemala government to cope with the burden of disease. U.S. military officials did not 
see themselves as responsible for the spread of diseases in host countries. Instead they construed 
U.S. soldiers as victims of Central American women, laws, and weak government regulations. 
Guatemalan doctors who ran the lock hospital and later participated in experiments saw 
the eradication of venereal disease as critical for building a democratic and sovereign nation. 
Venereal disease control was central to efforts during this period to control reproduction and 
quell the spread of “degenerative” diseases and deformities in the Guatemalan population. 
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Discourse on venereal disease reflected doctors and political elites’ anxieties about their abilities 
to implement the goals of the Revolution in a poor and predominantly indigenous country. 
Eradicating venereal disease was also central to their broader goals to build a new medical and 
public health infrastructure intended to redeem and unify the national population. Still, they had 
neither the financial means nor the technical resources to realize their ambitious goals. The 
Guatemalan government remained deeply dependent on the United States for aid and technical 
assistance during this period.647 
In this chapter, I show how a diplomatic alliance evolved between U.S. and Guatemalan 
doctors to conduct experiments on prophylaxis for venereal disease. Together, U.S. and 
Guatemalan doctors created a research space hidden from the laws and ethics of both countries. 
Guatemalan doctors offered U.S. researchers who had recently gained international renown 
Guatemalan bodies and a site for experimentation. By forming this relationship with USPHS 
officials, Guatemalan doctors sought to bring expertise and technological resources to their 
country that they deemed essential to fulfilling their revolutionary goals. U.S. doctors sought to 
capitalize upon Guatemala’s system of legalized prostitution and to avoid potential lawsuits and 
controversy in the United States. As research on sexuality remained controversial, doctors 
pursued their research in the imperial periphery of Central America where they believed they 
could follow a different set of ethical guidelines than in the United States. 
These physicians formed their agreement across borders; they had different interests in 
the research and their alliance was by no means made on equal ground. The role of Guatemalan 
doctors in these experiments indicates the compromises that doctors on the periphery of 
American empire have made to spur nation-building and gain membership in international and 
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elite medical circles. During the Revolution, the Guatemalan government aimed to break the 
shackles of American imperialism. For the first time they sought to constrain the power of the 
United Fruit Company and regulate labor on coffee, sugar, and banana plantations. Yet, 
following years of dictatorship, the Guatemalan public health and medical systems fell far short 
of the doctors’ lofty goals for reform. They relied upon external resources in order to realize their 
vision.  
I also argue that what bonded the doctors across national boundaries was their 
paternalism which was prevalent in the medical communities in both the United States and Latin 
America during the mid-twentieth century. U.S. and Guatemalan doctors viewed themselves as 
societal leaders and as uniquely positioned to guard the welfare of the body politic.648 They 
presumed access to the sexuality and bodies of sex workers, soldiers, prisoners, disabled, gay, 
lesbian, indigenous Guatemalans, and poor children to make observations and draw conclusions 
about disease. The doctors justified this research as humanitarian. U.S. military commanders 
have a history of relying upon local male elites from allied and poor countries to facilitate access 
to women for the sexual and domestic labor they believed necessary to maintain military 
missions abroad. The deal made by U.S. and Guatemalan doctors reflects an international male 
bond, harnessed in this case for the purposes of medical experimentation.649   
In sum, both U.S. and Guatemalan doctors believed that they were pioneering 
revolutions. The discovery of antibiotics promised unprecedented possibilities to eradicate 
disease that had plagued militaries since the fifteenth century.650 Guatemalan doctors saw 
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themselves at the vanguard of efforts to redeem the country following years of dictatorial rule. 
They saw no contradiction in making a revolution by exploiting the bodies of poor and 
indigenous Guatemalans. The story of the Guatemalan experiments begins with the war effort 
and the U.S. military doctors’ struggles to control venereal disease. 
 
Sex and Disease 
 In January 1942, as the United States fought the Axis Powers abroad, a battle raged on 
the home front about prostitution. The controversy had arisen in response to the publication of 
Surgeon General Parran’s book, Plain Words Against Venereal Disease, which lambasted 
military authorities for ignoring the May Act and allowing prostitution near military bases.651 
Amid the outcry, military officers put a new man in charge. Dr. Thomas B. Turner took control 
of the Army’s Venereal Disease Control Section. Under siege by reformers who accused the 
armed forces of facilitating sexual perversion among soldiers and in the military barracks, 
military officers asked Turner to head the program. A well-regarded syphilis specialist at Johns 
Hopkins University and a distant cousin and acquaintance of Parran, Turner said military 
officials asked him to lead the program because they thought he might possibly succeed in 
“having the dogs called off.”652 
 Yet, as director, he continued the same program. Turner found his daily life marked by 
duplicity. He preached continence as the military’s official policy, but he taught soldiers how to 
use condoms and perform daily chemical prophylaxis. “We were repeatedly impaled on the 
horns of this dilemma,” he later wrote in his memoir. “Some worthy folk urged a firm stand on a 
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high moral plane; others accused us of crass hypocrisy.” Both inside and outside the military, he 
said he faced the contention that “any man who won’t fuck, won’t fight.” Although Turner 
rejected “old beliefs” that men needed prostitutes, he grew to think it impractical that the military 
could control young soldiers who were at the “prime of their sexual life.”653 In one public 
meeting, Turner was driven to such exasperation that he “blurted out that sometimes I fancied the 
public thought the Army had invented sexual intercourse, which drew me a few moments of 
good-humored reprieve.”654  
 Unconvinced that sex education and disciplinary methods would protect soldiers’ health, 
Turner spearheaded efforts in the military to decriminalize the contraction of venereal disease. 
Since 1912, the Army had withheld pay from soldiers who acquired disease or injury “not in the 
line of duty.” In 1926, Congress passed a law mandating loss of pay specifically for soldiers who 
became infected with venereal disease.655 Commanding officers also could court-martial soldiers 
who concealed their infections.656 Nevertheless, since high rates of venereal disease served as a 
“black mark” on officers’ records, they instead often opted to implement their own disciplinary 
methods. Some commanders segregated soldiers by assigning toilets with a sign stating in bold 
letters, “FOR VENEREALS ONLY” and required men to wear tags on their uniforms if they had 
infections.657 Army physicians criticized these humiliation techniques as they increasingly 
impeded their efforts to cut venereal disease rates.  
                                                      
653 Thomas Turner, Lt. Col. Medical Corps, “Social Hygiene Problems in Wartime,” Delivered at Meeting of the National War 
Fund in New York City, May 28, 1943, RG 112, Office of the Surgeon General of the U.S. Army, Box 1280, Declassification 
Code: 795145.  
654 Turner, Part of Medicine, Part of Me, 74-76. 
655 Brandt, No Magic Bullet, 168-169. Parascandola, Sex, Sin, and Science, 108. 
656 Turner, Part of Medicine, Part of Me, 75.  
657 Letter from Joseph E. Moore to Colonel Hugh Morgan, August 10, 1942, RG 112, Office of the Surgeon General Records of 
the U.S. Army, Box 1265, Declassification Code: 795145. 
 182 
Commanders targeted African Americans in particular. Military officials blamed 
socioeconomic factors for causing higher rates of disease in black populations, but in practice the 
commanders made examples of African Americans and reinforced the perception that they were 
biologically predisposed to sexually-transmitted disease.658 While military leaders painted white 
GIs as susceptible to the advances of “parasitic” women, they were quick to frame African 
Americans as sexual aggressors. Historian Mary Louise Roberts found in her research on France 
during World War II that the U.S. military racialized rape as a crime perpetrated by black 
soldiers during the war, just as it had been racialized at home. This depiction aligned with 
stereotypes dating to slavery of black men as prone to the sexual assault of white women. 
Military officials scapegoated African American soldiers in order to protect white servicemen 
from potential legal complications and verbal attacks from the French public.659  
Although Turner never explicitly addressed racial factors affecting venereal disease, he 
argued that punitive policies kept soldiers from seeking treatment. These tactics, Turner said, had 
the adverse effect of raising rates of venereal disease in the Army.660 He argued for the adoption 
of uniform venereal disease policies regardless of race. Turner wrote, “stoppage of pay, 
prejudicial treatment from employers or superiors, restrictions on advancement, can only serve as 
powerful factors tempting the individual to conceal his infection and delay treatment until its 
effectiveness is reduced.”661  
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Dr. Joseph E. Moore, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Venereal Disease at the 
National Research Council, joined Turner in his crusade against these “barbarous” laws.662 
Moore was a professor at Johns Hopkins University and world renowned syphilis researcher. He 
had also originally recommended Turner for the job as Head of the School of Social Hygiene and 
was also a close friend of Parran. Moore helped to establish Johns Hopkins as a training center 
for PHS officers. Moore joined Turner in his efforts to reform venereal disease policies in the 
military. They finally won an important battle in September 1944 when Congress repealed laws 
that punished soldiers for acquiring venereal disease. Contracting venereal disease was now 
defined as an injury sustained in the “line of duty” rather than misconduct. Implicitly, sex with 
female prostitutes was deemed part of war.663  
Even as the military decriminalized venereal disease, it punished “sexual deviance.” 
Military police still aggressively pursued and arrested women accused of prostitution or 
“promiscuity.” On the home front, the USPHS, American Social Hygiene Association, (a private 
organization that had led the charge against prostitution and venereal disease since the first world 
war), and the Social Protection Division, (part of the Office of Community War Services), 
assisted in weeding out “vice” surrounding military establishments.664 While military doctrine 
grew more lenient towards male soldiers’ “immoral” heterosexual practices, they demanded 
continence of women.665 Female soldiers in the Women’s Army Corps did not receive condoms 
or access to birth control.  
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The military also expanded its measures to police same-sex relations among servicemen 
during the war. Although military psychiatrists developed screening methods to exclude men 
with “homosexual tendencies” from entering the service, the demands of war necessitated 
accepting gay men into the draft. In army barracks, many men found solace in each other from 
the demands and stresses associated with the war. Army psychiatrists attempted to humanize 
disciplinary tactics used against homosexuals; instead of sending them to jail, they issued 
“undesirable” discharges. Nonetheless, the Veteran’s Administration barred soldiers who 
received dishonorable discharges from receiving the entitlements of the 1944 GI Bill of Rights. 
A dishonorable discharge had the effect of stigmatizing the men so that they could not find 
employment following the war. Moreover, as with prostitution, military police aggressively 
policed homosexual relations in bars and similar establishments. Although psychiatrists sought to 
define homosexuality as a mental health problem rather than a criminal act, these policies 
continued to construct homosexuals as “deviant” members of society.666   
Commanders also created new humiliating tactics for soldiers caught having same-sex 
relations. Historian Allan Bérubé found in his interviews with servicemen that in the South 
Pacific, commanders placed soldiers awaiting discharges for homosexuality in pens with signs 
that said “QUEER STOCKADE” or “QUEER BRIG.”667 In order to avoid penalization for 
homosexual behavior, soldiers had to demonstrate to psychiatrists and military commanders their 
preference for heterosexuality. Although not explicitly promoted, sexual relations with female 
prostitutes would alleviate suspicion of homosexuality. The heightened concerns about 
homosexuality among military leaders and tensions in the army barracks had the effect of 
promoting sexual relations with female prostitutes.  
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The U.S. Army’s Surgeon General’s Office opposed the punishment of same-sex 
relations. Just as Turner had challenged the criminalization of soldiers for contracting venereal 
disease, medical officers urged the military to address homosexuality as a public health concern. 
By the end of the war, Turner and other military medical doctors knew of Alfred Kinsey’s 
wartime studies which had revealed high rates of homosexuality in the American population.668 
They had some success: between 1945 and 1947 the military had a brief period in which it issued 
honorable discharges for homosexuals. Yet, as the United States entered the McCarthy era, the 
public and military increasingly linked “deviant” sexual behavior to communism. Servicemen 
again began to receive dishonorable discharges. As the military grew to accept that young men 
would visit brothels and have sex with local women, it remained intolerant of “abnormal” sexual 
practices challenging patriarchal and heterosexual norms.669  
Despite these efforts, decriminalizing the contraction of venereal disease did not persuade 
many soldiers to seek out preventative methods or treatment. The military provided soldiers with 
free condoms, “pro-stations,” and chemical prophylaxis kits. These methods proved neither 
popular nor completely effective in protecting soldiers from disease.670 Moore reported 
“carelessness” or “ignorance” among the soldiers when they used condoms.671 The military did 
research on white soldiers’ sexual behavior and use of prophylactics. They conducted a survey 
with white servicemen; soldiers reported fearing that condoms would cause sterility or that they 
violated their religious views. Many did not know how to use them.672 As the survey on white 
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servicemen’s use of prophylaxis and preventative measures reflects officers’ concerns about the 
young men’s sexual preferences and health, they appear to have not conducted a similar survey 
with black soldiers.  
Soldiers also complained about chemical prophylaxis. The military mandated that 
soldiers visit “pro-stations” within three hours following sexual intercourse. The soldiers first 
had to urinate, wash their genitalia with soap and water, insert a proteinate solution into their 
urethra, and then apply calomel ointment.673 Soldiers protested that the “pro-stations” were time-
consuming, painful, and embarrassing.674 Military physicians had problems persuading soldiers 
to report to the “pro-station” immediately after sexual intercourse to guarantee highest 
effectiveness. The military also distributed chemical do-it-yourself pro kits; they contained 
directions, a tube of ointment with calomel and sulfathiazole, and a wash cloth. Soldiers 
protested that these kits were “messy.” In a survey the military collected from white GIs, some 
admitted that they could not use the “pro kit” when they were drunk.675 That the military 
apparently did not conduct a similar survey with black soldiers indicates their presumption that 
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Key Players in Wartime VD Research 
The militarization of the medical sciences during the war informed the types of research 
the U.S. government funded and researchers’ ethical understandings. The war brought a vast 
expansion of human subject research in the United States. As mentioned in Chapter Two, in 
1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development which oversaw research on humans and animals. Many Americans began to view 
participation in medical experiments as heroic and patriotic. In 1945, Life Magazine celebrated a 
group of male prisoners in Joliet, Illinois who volunteered for malaria experiments.676 As the 
photo series suggests, prisoners were stoic and brave as they endured bites from malaria-carrying 
mosquitos and high fevers.  
Convinced that only condoms and chemicals after sex could prevent venereal disease 
during the war, the American military researched how to make these measures more appealing to 
soldiers. They first planned to do studies in the United States. Moore, who was mentioned 
Chapter One as a preeminent syphilis researcher who became known as the “godfather” of the 
study in Tuskegee, Alabama, took charge of these efforts as the National Research Council’s 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Venereal Disease. As one of the foremost experts on syphilis 
in a field where many physicians knew each other and collaborated on research, Moore oversaw 
many of the studies during the 1940s. Historian Harry Marks has described Moore as a rigorous 
researcher highly focused on sound methodology.677 Yet, his scientific concern did not include 
consideration for the welfare of African Americans he used in his research projects.    
Still, Moore carefully planned studies on prophylaxis for venereal disease during the war 
in the United States. His caution shows his awareness that infecting healthy volunteers with STIs 
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would provoke criticism within the American public, even if they were prisoners and non-white. 
He had good reason to be scrupulous: previous research on venereal disease had proved 
controversial. In 1916, the American Medical Association (AMA) had come close to adopting a 
code of ethics in response to controversy over two studies: the first was at the Rockefeller 
Institute where a researcher injected an inactive solution of the bacteria that caused syphilis into 
children and hospital patients, and the second done at the University of Michigan where 
researcher who did “dental drill experiments” on neurosyphilis patients, which were mentioned 
in Chapter Two.678 The experiments on children had spurred particular outrage among anti-
vivisectionists and social reformers. Children were presumed to be innocent and not sexually 
active. Yet, scientists remained aware that infecting any patient with a sexually-transmitted 
disease was a risk. Although the AMA did not adopt a code requiring that researchers obtain 
voluntary consent until after World War II, scientists like Moore who had been researching sex 
and disease for years remained aware that they had to take care when doing human-subject 
research on STIs.679  
Along with syphilis, research on prophylaxis for gonorrhea was a high priority for 
wartime research. But gonorrhea presented a special set of research challenges. In the 
prophylaxis studies on gonorrhea, researchers had determined that using human subjects was 
necessary as they had not found an animal with which to experiment upon. The rabbits that 
scientists had used in syphilis experiments had not proved susceptible to gonorrheal infections. 
As a result, the majority of research on prophylaxis had focused on syphilis and little was known 
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about gonorrhea.680 During World War II, gonorrhea ranked first and sometimes second as the 
leading cause of loss of manpower.681 Although the military used both sulfonamide drugs and 
chemical prophylaxis as preventatives for gonorrhea, researchers had not proven in a controlled 
study that these methods were effective.682  
Moore wholeheartedly supported a human-subject study on prophylaxis for gonorrhea. 
Still, as a cautionary measure he sought the opinions of high-ranking authorities. Because of the 
sensitivity surrounding intentional-infection studies with STIs, the gonorrhea studies received 
more oversight from U.S. officials than possibly any other biomedical research initiative 
undertaken during the war.683 Moore asked Dr. Alfred Newtown Richards, Chair of the 
Committee on Medical Research, about use of human subjects in gonorrhea research. Just a few 
days later, Richards responded that that “human experimentation is not only desirable, but 
necessary in the study of many of the problems of war medicine which confront us.”684  
Surgeon General Parran agreed too but only if the researchers used “human 
volunteers.”685 The Surgeon General’s quest to promote syphilis awareness and research over the 
past ten years had made him sensitive to the potential explosiveness of research on this issue. 
Still, he gave no guidelines on how to find these volunteers or on the ethical standards for 
consent. He appeared less concerned that the researchers use volunteers than he was with the 
perception given to the American public that these studies were being done with people who 
freely gave consent.686   
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The study’s planners also took care in their selection of a subject population in order to 
avoid potential lawsuits and a public relations controversy.687 The researchers wanted to do 
research on groups isolated from the opposite sex and under their supervision for a minimum of 
six months. They apparently did not consider the possibility of same-sex transmission. The 
process of choosing subjects was starkly different than in the Guatemalan experiments. Moore 
explicitly emphasized that researchers should not use psychiatric patients because they could not 
provide “meaningful consent.”688 Although Moore initially explored the possibility of using 
soldiers, the military rejected this option because the men would not be sexually isolated and 
would lose valuable time from training or combat. The demands of the U.S. military precluded 
the possibility of using soldiers as research subjects.  
The NRC Subcommittee on Venereal Diseases settled on using prisoners. During the 
planning of the experiments, some discussions ensued as to whether prisoners could provide 
voluntary consent because they could claim that they granted their consent under duress. In 
planning the prophylaxis studies, the researchers showed more concern about obtaining informed 
consent from prisoners than they had with the malaria experiments.689 The fact that they decided 
to use prisoners in these particular experiments suggests their confidence that research on prison 
populations was indeed ethical.690 Nazi doctors later challenged this view. In 1946, the same year 
that the Guatemalan experiments began, Nazi defendants in the Nuremberg Trials argued that 
U.S. researchers violated ethical protocol through their widespread use of prisoners in medical 
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research. Andrew Ivy, the American Medical Association representative at the Nuremberg 
Doctors’ Trial, defended the U.S.-funded prisoner research as ethical because the researchers 
obtained informed consent from the human subjects, had conducted previous animal 
experimentations, and were qualified to conduct the research.691 Moreover, Nazi doctors’ self-
serving ethical claims were dismissed without consideration because they had no standing due to 
the crimes against humanity they had committed during the war. 
Although the study group thought that prisoners represented the least controversial 
population on which to conduct research, they still worried about potential lawsuits. The 
researchers eventually moved away from their original plan to conduct the experiments in a New 
York State prison due to fears that if a researcher harmed a volunteer it would violate the state 
statute against “maiming.”692 To avoid state statutes and potential complications, the 
subcommittee opted to conduct the experiments in federal as opposed to state prisons.693 They 
eventually settled on the penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana because it had the best medical 
facilities of all the federal prisons they considered.694 Terre Haute, Indiana was also a town 
famous for prostitution. It was near a coal mining center and the miners would come to the town 
for recreation.695  The researchers planned to gather strains of gonorrhea from local prostitutes to 
infect the prisoners. 
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Next, they ensured that they could prove that they had consent from the prisoners. The 
subcommittee constructed a waiver form that used medical as well as “street” language, 
describing gonorrhea as the “clap” or the “strain.”696 The waiver mentioned the contribution that 
prison volunteers would make to the war effort through their participation in the experiments and 
stressed that they would be given treatment.697 The prisoners would earn $100 for their 
participation, a considerable sum for experimentation during World War II, and they would 
receive a letter of commendation to the parole board and a certificate of merit.698 Still, these 
efforts to avoid legal and public relations controversy did not assuage the concerns of James 
Paullin, President of the AMA and member of the NRC Committee on Medicine. He cautioned 
that the project could “fall into the hands of a very unscrupulous lawyer” and voted to reject the 
proposal.699 Despite criticism from some medical authorities, the OSRD approved the 
experiments, emphasizing the research as critical to the war effort.700  
Mahoney, fresh off of his discovery that penicillin was an effective cure for syphilis, 
served as the principal investigator on the experiments which the researchers conducted at the 
federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.701 Mahoney’s discovery of penicillin as a treatment 
for syphilis was the culmination of his more than twenty-year career at the PHS. After serving in 
the Immigration Station on Ellis Island and in various parts of Europe, Parran appointed 
Mahoney head of the VDRL. During his time leading the VDRL, Mahoney gained the reputation 
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as a superlative researcher extremely focused on methods for improving treatment and diagnostic 
tests for syphilis and gonorrhea.702 Mahoney’ colleagues also regarded him as a supportive 
colleague and mentor, who embodied the meaning of his middle name, “Friend.”703 He continued 
to give credit for the discovery of penicillin to his “boys,” or the scientists who worked under 
him.704  
John C. Cutler, a novice PHS researcher, worked under the Mahoney’s direction at the 
prison. He joined the PHS directly after he graduated from medical school at Western Reserve in 
Cleveland, Ohio. He had also collaborated with Mahoney on the penicillin research.705 During 
the gonorrhea prophylaxis experiments, Cutler was just 28 years old and worked in the 
penitentiary attempting to infect the prisoners with gonorrhea. As a young and ambitious 
researcher, Cutler approached his research with zeal. Born in Cleveland, Ohio in 1915, Cutler 
grew up in a working class family.706 He managed to support himself during medical school 
working as a “coal salesman.” His brother Frank, an “ace” in the Air Force had been shot down 
over Germany.707 Cutler’s other brother, Harold, was killed in a training accident at his base. As 
his family dealt with the loss of his brothers during the war, Cutler focused on his research which 
he viewed as vital to protecting the U.S. population from deadly disease. 
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In September 1943, the experiments officially began. Prison staff selected 241 male 
prisoners, screened to make sure they would not pose behavioral problems, were between the 
ages of 21 and 45 years, never had a gonorrhea infection, fully understood the purposes of the 
study, and would be available for observation for the next six months.708 The researchers tried to 
infect prisoners by placing the bacterium directly onto the end of their penises. 709 They took 
some of the bacteria strains from local prostitutes “picked up” by the Terre Haute police. The 
experiments only lasted ten months as researchers could not find a reliable method to infect the 
prisoners. Mahoney made the decision to terminate the experiments because the researchers 
could not follow through on the primary aim of the study to examine prophylaxis methods for 
gonorrhea.710 Cutler wrote later that he experienced the decision to terminate the Terre Haute 
experiments as a major “blow.”711  
As USPHS researchers dealt with the disappointment of the prison experiments on 
gonorrhea, they also worried that their discovery of penicillin could bring new problems for 
controlling sexuality and disease. Penicillin had raised hopes that a “magic bullet” had been 
discovered, but many researchers were concerned that it would threaten marriage and sexual 
monogamy.712 John Stokes, a leading researcher on syphilis at the University of Pennsylvania, 
wrote that it would take a decade or more of research before the medical community could know 
for sure the effects of penicillin on syphilis. Stokes and other researchers also worried that 
penicillin would further relax sexual mores in the United States once people knew that a cure 
was available, thus raising the rates of disease within the population. Stokes wrote that if 
extramarital sex was not punished with disease then only a “few intangibles of the spirit” would 
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protect monogamous marriage.713 Many researchers who worked on STIs were not just 
concerned with protecting the military and national security, but also viewed venereal disease as 
a eugenic threat to the nation. They viewed monogamous marriage as a key institution for 
protecting families from the spread of disease.  
Turner’s views suggested the contradictory beliefs that medical doctors harbored about 
the discovery of penicillin in the 1940s. Although many years later Turner would reflect upon the 
discovery of penicillin and the rise of antibiotics as one of several technological “revolutions” 
that he underwent in his lifetime, he also had initial questions about how it would affect venereal 
disease control efforts. Following the war, the Army reported that the rate of venereal disease 
among troops stationed in Europe was the highest it had been since the beginning of the war.714 
Turner gave a talk at the ASHA meeting entitled, “Penicillin: Help or Hindrance?” in which he 
discussed the advantages that penicillin brought to venereal disease control as well as the new 
challenges that it presented. Like Stokes, he worried that penicillin would lead to amoral sexual 
practices in the United States.715 
As the war wound down, researchers looked for opportunities to continue research on 
prophylaxis and penicillin. They believed that they were ever closer to eradicating venereal 
disease but grew concerned that without the contingencies of war they would lose support for 
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Dreaming of a New Guatemala 
 During the revolution, Dr. Luis Galich wrote about his vision for a new Guatemala. He 
believed there should be no limit to physicians’ involvement in public life. As the director of the 
sanitation department, he argued that the physician should weigh into the military, industry, 
public health, and demography. To ensure the promises of the revolution, the country needed 
physicians who would attend to the “complete organism” of society.716 Like other members of 
the revolutionary government, Galich promoted an interventionist state that would take 
responsibility for the welfare of every citizen.717 The state would serve as the patriarch and 
doctors the vanguards in implementing a regeneración (regeneration) of Guatemalans and 
Guatemala.  
 Inspired by eugenic thought that circulated in Latin America during the 1940s, Galich’s 
commitment to Guatemalan welfare was spurred by his conviction that nations that failed to 
address the problems of public health would fall behind other countries.718 His brother, Manuel 
Galich, was a prominent revolutionary, playwright, and the education director under the Arévalo 
government. Following Luis Galich’s 1937 graduation from the national university with a 
concentration in gynecology and obstetrics, he would continue throughout his medical career to 
focus on reproduction and sexuality.719 He worked as the Director of the Hospital for 
Prophylaxis and Venereal Disease before becoming the Director of Sanitation.  
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 Following the Revolution, Galich served as mayor of Guatemala under the Partido 
Revolucionario (PR), the only anti-communist reform party allowed to operate following the 
overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz. Despite that PR continued to operate after the 1954 coup, 
paramilitary groups and members of the military teamed up to kill and disappear members of the 
PR leadership particularly in rural areas.720 Galich managed to escape the worst of the 
persecution. Later he would become Director of the Asociación Pro-Bienestar de la Familia de 
Guatemala (APROFAM), a private family planning organization accused of sterilizing 
indigenous women.721 Throughout his career, he drew upon his skills as a physician to advocate 
for his vision for Guatemala.  
During the Revolution, Galich drafted an ambitious proposal for public health. He wanted 
to build a new public health infrastructure within the span of ten years.722 During the 1930s the 
Guatemalan government had sought to extend biomedical services in rural areas, but the public 
health infrastructure still remained concentrated in the capital.723 Although some departments 
had hospitals, large swaths of the country had no access to public health resources. The 
government could also not provide the health clinics located in rural areas with sufficient funding 
and as a result the people who visited them received poor care.724 Guatemala had significant 
problems with infant mortality, malnutrition, intestinal parasites, malaria, typhus, and 
tuberculosis, among other diseases725 Galich promoted government efforts to build health clinics 
and hospitals in rural municipalities with adequate supplies and he urged the government to 
                                                      
720 Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 88-89.   
721 APROFAM was accused of conducting forced sterilizations of women and men during the civil war. See, René Augusto 
Flores, “La planificación familiar, un derecho humano,” La Revista, 13 de agosto de 1985,17. 
722 Luis F. Galich, “Puntos básicos para programa de Salud Pública en la República,” Guatemala, C.A., (enero 1951): 4, AGCA. 
723 David Carey Jr., Engendering Mayan History: Kaqchikel Women as Agents and Conduits of the Past, 1875-1970, New York: 
Routledge, 2006; 44-45. Galich, “Coordinación de los Servicios Asistenciales y de Sanidad Pública,” 30. Adams, Crucifixion By 
Power,185-186. 
724 Galich, “Puntos básicos para programa de Salud Pública en la República,” 7. 
725 Ibid., 3-12. 
 198 
improve prenatal care. He sought to build a water and drainage system, establish a school 
nutrition program, and provide immunizations for various diseases.726 The Institute of Inter-
American Affairs supported many of these efforts, but the Guatemalan government needed 
considerable financial resources to realize Galich’s ambitious plan.  
   Doctors saw venereal disease control as crucial to their goals of regeneration. Although 
the country had many pressing health problems, Guatemalan physicians even before the 
Revolution had long seen venereal disease control as critical to their efforts to build an able-
bodied population that would participate in economic development and democracy.727 Venereal 
disease also offered a way for physicians to address their concerns with class inequality and 
immorality, key concerns of revolutionary leaders.728 They finally focused on venereal disease 
because of the war. As mentioned in Chapter Two, a prominent Guatemalan doctor who worked 
for the sanitation department named Epaminondas Quintana, and who was closely connected to 
the new government, sardonically reported in a local newspaper that the “splendidness” of the 
“men in uniform” had brought a surge in prostitution and venereal disease.729 Quintana blamed 
the women, not taking into consideration how the lack of career opportunities and the 
displacement of the population in the war spurred the migration. 
  During the war, the U.S. military and Guatemalan government had instituted anti-
venereal disease dispensaries, which Quintana pointed out were really for the U.S. soldiers.730 
According to health workers at the dispensaries, the Guatemalan youth were “infested” with 
venereal disease.731 Following the war, the U.S. Embassy reported that the program for venereal 
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disease control “reverted to an ineffectual level.” Embassy reports added that the health facilities 
for venereal disease were “woefully inadequate” and at best the Guatemalan government only 
treated fifteen percent of the cases each year.732 The war had left the Guatemalan people ravaged 
with sexually-transmitted disease that the government remained unable to address.  
Quintana spearheaded efforts to teach sex education in schools to the youth as part of 
efforts to lower rates of infectious disease and protect the nation’s future. He wrote in a journal 
on hygiene education that young men often have a tendency to “despise marriage, preferring 
adventure or cohabitation with women. Have the young men prepared for sex? Yes, but this 
exists in the frequenting of the brothel overrun with the alcoholic or the venereal, the great 
danger of acquiring abnormal or perverse habits that can spoil the happiness of marriage.” 
Quintana viewed prostitution as having the potential to destroy the fundamental revolutionary 
goal of redemption. He believed that teaching sex education in primary school was critical in 
order to inform the youth about the dangers of syphilis venereal disease before the “turbulent” 
years of puberty.733 Quintana and other doctors zealously sought to change the sex habits of 
young boys so that they would not contract venereal disease and ruin their futures as productive 
workers and heads of stable households.734 Although “normal” women were thought to prefer 
marital union, men without proper guidance were believed to be prone to sexual excess. 
Quintana also wanted teachers to instruct young men how to sexually satisfy their future 
wives.735 Although this comment was perhaps viewed as radical for the time in that it openly 
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discussed both male and female sexuality, the doctors also wanted to promote stable marital 
unions and deter men from visiting brothels. Doctors promoted sexuality but within the confines 
of marriage. 
In addition to programs in schools, Guatemalan doctors sought to quell rates of venereal 
disease by reinstituting efforts that the United States had established or promoted during the war. 
The sanitation department, under Galich’s direction, spearheaded an aggressive legislative and 
public health campaign to lower rates of syphilis and gonorrhea. Galich worked with Juan M. 
Funes, a young venereologist in the Department of Sanitation and Alvaro Ydígoras Fuentes, a 
judge in the Juzgado de Sanidad which was charged with registering and prosecuting clandestine 
prostitution.736 These men reestablished rapid treatment programs in the venereal disease 
hospital, even though the government did not have access to penicillin. They also strove to 
abolish the regulation system and make prostitution illegal, a position supported by the United 
States as the best method for mitigating the spread of syphilis and gonorrhea.   
Guatemalan doctors’ support for the abolishment of prostitution grew out of 
revolutionary values. Galich and Funes denounced the regulation system as immoral and 
complicit with the pimps, madams, clients, and police officers who exploited these women.737 
Galich believed sex work reflected entrenched class inequality and the state’s failure to serve the 
needs of proletariat women. Prostitution, he argued, “results from publicly exposing, 
surrendering, and abandoning women to public dishonor.”738 The state had historically done little 
to intervene in the abuse of women in the private arena. Revolutionary physicians such as Funes 
and Galich wanted the state to protect working class women in this one area. 
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Even as revolutionary leaders criticized the regulation system, they extended it to more 
women. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the government passed a law requiring that women who 
worked as waitresses, barmaids, and in dance halls had to report for regular medical inspections 
in the venereal disease hospital. The Guatemalan government had passed this law during World 
War II at the request of the U.S. Army, but the law had been retracted following the war due to 
widespread protest. The government reinstated this law in response to the advocacy from Funes, 
Galich, and the lawyer Ydígoras Fuentes.739 They disregarded the previous outcry of the 
population and believed that as technical experts they knew what was best for the country. The 
doctors proved to have considerable influence on the passage of new public health laws during 
the revolution, when social reformers increasingly viewed science as a solution to longstanding 
problems in the country. 
As a young and idealistic physician, Funes committed his career to addressing inequality 
and fighting for the working class. In 1938, he had graduated from medical school at the national 
university.740 In medical school, he wrote his thesis on pelvic organ prolapse, an extremely 
painful condition that typically occurs in women following childbirth when the womb becomes 
dislocated and protrudes through the vaginal opening.741 His research highlighted the deplorable 
labor conditions of working class women who had to return to their jobs directly after giving 
birth and as a result became susceptible to this condition.742 During World War II, however, he 
served as a military doctor in Alta Verapaz and found that the high rates of venereal disease in 
the population posed a more pressing problem than prolapse. It was immediately following the 
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war that Funes received a scholarship from the IIAA to study at the VDRL in Staten Island, New 
York. When he returned, Funes headed the venereal disease hospital where he examined 
prostitutes and issued health cards verifying that they did not have infections.  
Funes felt the weight of responsibility as the medical doctor charged with protecting the 
Guatemalan population from venereal disease. Approximately eighty patients were interned at 
the hospital on any given day.743 He explained the uncertainty that came with detecting syphilitic 
lesions particularly in women’s vaginal tracts where he was unable to see them. Funes believed 
that the regulation system placed undue burden on medical doctors to protect the population from 
venereal disease. He did not mention the burden it had on the women who were forced to submit 
to these examinations.744  
In an effort to address the problem of venereal disease in the country, Funes joined with 
Galich in seeking to refurbish the hospital. They wanted to change its reputation as a place of 
punishment for “mujeres de mal vivir” (women who live evil lives). Since the nineteenth 
century, the hospital had been an annex to the women’s prison which led Guatemalans to believe 
that it served only prostitutes. In 1938, the government sought to improve venereal disease 
control and established the Sección de Profilaxis Sexual y Enfermedades Venéreas in an 
independent building located near the sanitation department. Still, it had a punitive regimen and 
continued to be associated with prostitution.745 The medical services that the women received 
remained minimal and the conditions dismal. It was the only hospital in Guatemala where some 
patients slept on the floor. The food was terrible and delivered from a nearby prison.746 Although 
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doctors touted regeneración, the conditions in the hospital reinforced its association with a 
prison.  
Despite the extensive needs of the hospital, Galich pushed forward with plans for reform. 
The hospital had established an obligatory literacy program for the women patients. He intended 
to extend the literacy program and offer training on domestic trades such as laundering sewing, 
and cooking. Instead of persecuting sex workers, Galich advocated for the scientific study of the 
women so that physicians could learn how to prevent women from entering the sex trade.747 In 
the face of what Galich referred to as a harmful discourse of free love in the movies, literature, 
and gossip (much of which came from the United States), he wanted to understand when and 
how the state could intervene to provide a proper sexual education for young women. The 
doctors wanted the hospital to serve as a central site of regeneration of Guatemalans rather than a 
place of punishment.748 
 Although the control of women’s sexuality had long been the primary concern of syphilis 
prevention efforts in Guatemala, Funes and Galich broke with this tradition by focusing on 
venereal disease in men. They began with the construction of a hospital in which to treat men for 
venereal disease. Funes said that the fact that public health campaigns on syphilis and gonorrhea 
had centered just on women was “as inefficient as it was absurd.”749 Challenging previous 
policies in Guatemala and around the world that had long presented the female sex worker as the 
primary vector of these diseases, Galich described men as akin to “vehicles disseminating 
disease.”750 Their interest in extending the campaign to men stemmed from their desire to 
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implement a more effective program of venereal disease control as well as their interest in 
gaining greater control over the social orchestration of a new Guatemala. The regulation system 
had primarily protected the male elite. Now the doctors argued that the sexuality of all 
Guatemalans had to be controlled in order to build a new nation.751    
 Along with extending the program to men, Galich and Funes pushed for these efforts to 
extend to rural areas where the majority of the indigenous population lived. Funes railed against 
the fact that the law did not require the indigenous population to undergo a prenuptial exam for 
venereal disease. In 1935, the government had passed a law stipulating that only ladino men had 
to undergo a prenuptial examination for venereal disease.752 Funes wanted both men and women 
from indigenous populations to be subject to medical examinations before marriage. Still, the 
doctors’ push for indigenous populations to undergo prenuptial exams required the functioning 
of a largely non-existent public health infrastructure. The physicians hoped to coordinate efforts 
with local municipalities and build health centers in rural areas that would combine maternal-
infant care with venereal disease control.753  
The exemption of indigenous population from prenuptial examinations no doubt resulted 
from racial perceptions held by some doctors who believed that Mayan populations were 
immune to syphilis as well as from insufficient infrastructure in the countryside. Dr. Erwin 
Jacobsthal, head of the serological laboratory for the sanitation department in the 1930s and early 
1940s, had found that syphilis was different in the European, Russian, Central African, and 
Central American populations.754 Jacobsthal had discovered no signs of neurological syphilis in 
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Central America. In contrast, medical doctors had found it prevalent among white populations in 
the United States and Europe. The longstanding myth that American indigenous groups gave 
syphilis to the Spanish conquistadores influenced Guatemalan doctors’ thinking. Many medical 
professionals and eugenicists believed that Mayans had developed immunity towards syphilis. 
Although controversial within the medical community, this idea no doubt influenced the legal 
exemption of indigenous groups from prenuptial examinations.755  
In opposition to this general tendency, Funes and other doctors closely tied to the 
Revolution challenged the scientific premise that indigenous groups were immune to syphilis. 
The government actually did not have the statistics to determine the prevalence of venereal 
disease since indígenas did not regularly go to doctors who could provide health reports to the 
central government. Funes deplored the indigenous communities did not want to visit licensed 
medical doctors but instead preferred to go to curanderos, midwives, and “charlatans” for 
treatments. He argued for the government to intensify efforts to criminalize healers who worked 
in indigenous communities. These healers, he claimed, greatly impeded the state’s efforts to 
clamp down on the spread of syphilis and gonorrhea. Funes added that venereal disease control 
in Guatemala was different than in other countries due to the numerous different languages and 
indigenous communities. The posters, radio programs, and propaganda used by the government 
to disseminate information to the general population about venereal disease could not reach 
indigenous communities. He argued that it was necessary to find people of the same “race” and 
“culture” as the targeted groups in order to communicate the message. In calling for 
criminalization of traditional healers, Funes denigrated indigenous culture as pathological.756 He 
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also suggested that the state accommodate the various languages of Mayan groups in public 
health programs. Funes’ proposal was more likely a practical measure rather than a measure 
stemming from concern for protecting the right for indígenas to speak their language. 
Yet, the doctors’ vision faced obstacles. As Funes and Galich pursued their ambitious 
goals, an editorialist in a prominent national newspaper depicted the “young doctors” as 
“dreamers.”757 Guatemala’s economy could not support the vast expansion of the public health 
system that the doctors desired. Although the price of international coffee had almost doubled at 
the start of the revolution, the 1945 and 1946 budgets were the highest they had ever been in the 
country’s history. The government continued to rely upon foreign aid from the United States to 
realize its goals.758 The doctors’ vision appeared a fantasy to many within the government and 
Guatemalan society. 
In fact, during the Revolution, Guatemala was struggling to complete one of the most 
important projects necessary to improve medical infrastructure, the construction of the new 
Roosevelt Hospital. As mentioned in Chapter Two, in 1944, when Ubico was still president, the 
Guatemalan government, in coordination with the Institute for Inter-American Affairs, embarked 
on an ambitious project to build Roosevelt Hospital. The construction of the hospital was 
essential to building Guatemala’s public health infrastructure. It was to be the primary public 
hospital in the country and located in Guatemala City. Yet, political leaders including Galich, 
who served on the Technical Committee for the construction of the hospital, did not believe that 
the project sufficiently ambitious. At the start of the Revolution, the new government had 
requested a vast expansion in the number of beds from 300 to one-thousand.759 Although the 
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Institute of Inter-American Affairs agreed to the plan, a few years into the project the 
Guatemalan government struggled to follow through on its portion of the funding.760   
Despite the setbacks on the Roosevelt Hospital project, Guatemalan physicians also 
wanted to build a network of hospitals throughout the country. This infrastructure was necessary 
in order to bring biomedical services to indigenous populations and to grant the government 
more information and control over their health. In 1946, Guatemala held the first medical 
hospital congress in Quetzaltenago, a city located in the highland region where the majority of 
the indigenous population lived. Doctors at the congress acknowledged that they were “woefully 
behind” on building a medical infrastructure that reached across the national territory as a result 
of the years of dictatorship.761 Yet, as the construction of Roosevelt Hospital fell behind, the 
plans for a new hospital system seemed more far-fetched. 
The limited infrastructure for medicine and public health had also stymied Guatemala’s 
efforts to build a eugenics movement like those that had arisen in wealthier Latin American 
countries such as Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. Dr. Carlos Federico Mora was a prominent 
Guatemalan medical doctor, revolutionary, and the former director of the Asilo de Alienados who 
had studied abroad at Johns Hopkins University and in various places in Europe. He had been 
pushing for the country to establish a mental hygiene league for years, but his plans had not 
materialized. As a result, he complained that the “eugenic conscience” in the country had not 
been cultivated with the intensity and commitment that he thought necessary.762 Only in 1952, 
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toward the end of the revolutionary period, did he gain the support with which to establish a Liga 
de Higiene Mental (Mental Hygiene League).  
Guatemala also had limited technical and educational resources with which to implement 
eugenic programs. Dr. Manuel A. Giron was the head of the newly formed Medical Federation 
which sought to promote science and investigation to support the redemption of the populace. 
The new Medical Federation published a journal which helped to facilitate discourse on public 
health and medicine during the Revolution. Giron wanted to adopt biotypology as a specialty in 
the national university. Yet, he said that the government did not have the financial resources to 
purchase the photographic equipment necessary to practice this science.763 First devised by 
Nicola Pende during the period of fascist Italy, biotypology categorized people by different 
“biotypes,” or hereditary constitutions that were thought to determine their propensities towards 
crime, illness, and psychic pathologies.764 “Latin eugenicists” began to favor biotypology in the 
late 1930s in response to the increased efforts to discredit neo-Lamarckian principles. Although 
biotypologists ascribed to some of the Mendelian hereditary theories, they also continued to see 
the environment as influencing the expression of different constitutions.765  
Biotypologists eschewed biological determinism, but they continued to uphold racial 
hierarchies in the country. Despite biotypology’s rejection of theories of Aryan or white 
superiority, Mexican biotypologists categorized indigenous tribes as abnormal types.766 Before 
the Revolution, Giron had done his medical thesis on biotypology in the psychiatric institution 
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and in schools. He hypothesized that the majority of indigenous people in the highland region 
were also abnormal, but he said that more studies were necessary. Now as the director of the 
Medical Federation, he advocated for the establishment of a biotypology specialty in the national 
university, but acknowledged that it would be difficult for the government to purchase the 
equipment to determine the various types.767 His aspirations to study and reform indigenous 
groups was hampered by the lack of technological and economic resources in the country. 
Still, venereal disease remained a more pressing concern for government leaders than 
starting a biotypology program. Although the Guatemalan military’s intensified campaign of 
venereal disease control which began at the start of the Revolution significantly lowered rates of 
venereal disease among soldiers, Carlos Tejeda, the head of the military hospital and venereal 
disease program, reported that it still was a serious problem among enlisted men.768 Influenced 
by Alfred C. Kinsey’s work and the U.S. military, Tejeda argued that a combination of chemical 
prophylaxis and the distribution of condoms was the best way to prevent venereal disease. Like 
the U.S. doctors, Guatemalan physicians were having doubts about their ability to control 
soldiers’ sexuality.769 Despite increased efforts to provide educational training to the troops on 
venereal disease and safe sex practices, the rates of syphilis and gonorrhea remained high. 
Guatemalan physicians also began to view venereal disease control efforts as increasingly futile. 
Guatemala further did not have near the infrastructure for medical research that existed in 
the United States or other Latin American countries. In their studies, Guatemalan doctors often 
learned about the types of treatment and prophylaxis offered in the United States and then tested 
these theories in their own research. They did not mention that they obtained the consent of the 
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“volunteers” in their studies, reflecting that their clinical practices were similar to the USPHS 
doctors who came to Guatemala, even though consent was recognized in both countries to be 
best practice. In 1947, several years after the United States had discovered that penicillin was an 
effective cure and had begun rapid treatment programs, a Guatemalan physician named Fernando 
A. Cordero who worked in the general hospital in San José, a small city on the Pacific Coast and 
near a military base, tried different combinations of arsenic treatments and penicillin on patients 
with primary syphilis who included pregnant women. Although he found that penicillin was the 
most effective and non-toxic treatment, the hospital had difficulty obtaining and paying for it. In 
fact, the hospital only gave patients penicillin when other treatments would endanger their lives. 
He concluded that he would continue with two arsenic treatments that were the most effective 
given Guatemala’s economic constraints.770 
Galich also acknowledged that penicillin was not yet an option for Guatemala. In 1947 
during another study, Galich reviewed all of the rapid treatment programs employed in the 
United States and England. He then selected the Pillsbury method, which was comprised of 
arsenic treatment over a 20-day period, to use on 132 sex workers at the venereal disease 
hospital. Like Cordero, he did not mention any efforts in his published report to obtain consent 
from the women that he used in these studies. The doctors took blood samples of all of the 
women before, during, and after the treatment. They also did spinal punctures to verify results in 
the blood tests. As with other arsenic treatments, some of the women experienced nausea and 
vomiting following the injections. One woman had a miscarriage fifteen days following her 
treatment. Galich considered it fortunate that no one died during the study. Nevertheless, Galich 
concluded that the method was beneficial for Guatemala because it was economical and the 
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majority of women did not have lesions after their treatment.771 Galich showed that he was 
willing to take extreme risks with Guatemalans’ health and wellbeing in order to prove scientific 
theories. 
Despite there being no discussion of research principles in these papers on medical 
research, oral histories and journal articles reveal that doctors frequently discussed ethics and 
clinical practice during the Revolution. These conversations were part of robust discourse during 
this period on reforming medical education. In a change from the previous dictatorships, the new 
government granted the national university autonomy. Doctors who taught at the university and 
were part of the administration passionately debated their ideas for the development of a new 
education program that would refurbish the “glorious” reputation that the school had during the 
colonial era.772 Carlos Martínez Durán, an esteemed medical doctor who later became the rector 
of the university, said that students needed to first have a clear understanding of the moral 
responsibility that they would hold in their profession before proceeding with their clinical 
training and medical education.773 Dr. Manuel A. Girón, called upon doctors to assume their 
roles as “vanguards” of community progress.774 Influenced by social medicine, he said that 
doctors needed to democratize medicine by visiting rural areas and understanding the needs of 
the people.775  
Dr. José Barnoya, a medical student at the national university during the revolution, said 
in an oral history interview that his teachers taught him strict standards of professional ethics, 
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which he said had unfortunately been abandoned by the government in later years. His teachers 
taught him about patient confidentiality. At the university, Carlos Federico Mora gave a course 
on deontology which focused on professional ethics.776 In this class, Barnoya said that student 
learned about respecting patients, no matter what their social class, and not violating the rights of 
patients. Barnoya added that students also learned these tenets about their responsibility to 
patients in their training in the hospitals.777  The principles that medical professors taught 
students in their classes and in clinical training reflected a broader focus on ethics and human 
rights during the Revolution. The 1945 Constitution, passed at the beginning of the Revolution 
which was modeled on the Mexican Constitution passed during the country’s Revolution, held 
that all inhabitants had access to “social justice” and “life, liberty, equality and security.”778  
Guatemalan doctors also implicitly criticized U.S. and European scientists for their 
clinical practice. In an address to the Guatemalan National Congress of Medicine, Dr. Carlos 
Martínez Durán warned about the “tyranny of technology.” He said that medical communities in 
certain countries, most likely implying the United States, had become so focused on 
technological advances that they had grown distant from man, his conscience, and ethos.779 
Durán called upon medical doctors to never lose touch with their humanity when pursuing 
medical practice.780 Aware of the potential political fallout that could come with promoting 
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social medicine at the beginning of the Cold War, Durán nevertheless argued that it could help 
fight class inequality and build a society with less “pain and anguish.”781 
As doctors raised ethical concerns about an overly technical approach to medicine, the 
problems with access to treatments for venereal disease and infrastructure limitations posed 
significant impediments to achieving revolutionary goals. By this time with the destruction of 
Europe and Japan in the war, the United States had established its role as a leader in medicine 
around the globe. Guatemalan physicians looked to the USPHS and military as the vanguard of 
venereal disease control and treatment methods, even if some questioned their ethical 
approaches. Moreover, many Guatemalan doctors appeared to be similar to U.S. physicians in 
their cavalier approaches to performing research on marginalized populations. The opportunity to 
bring the very U.S. physicians who were on the precipice of eradicating venereal disease was 
exciting for Guatemalan officials seeking to build a new country.  
 
The Deal 
 In 1945, Funes and Cutler met at the VDRL in Staten Island, New York. Funes had a 
one-year fellowship at the laboratory sponsored by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. 
Penicillin research energized the laboratory. The two men worked under Mahoney and became 
acquaintances. Cutler shared with Funes his disappointment over the Terre Haute experiments. 
As the Revolution had just begun in Guatemala, Funes likely discussed his aspirations for the 
venereal disease control program. One day they started talking about the possibility of continuing 
the studies on prophylaxis for gonorrhea that were started in Terre Haute in Guatemala. The 
researchers discussed using registered sex workers to generate “natural infection” in prisoners.782 
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As the “artificial” inoculation methods had failed in Terre Haute, now doctors saw an 
opportunity to both infect men with STIs and observe the sexual encounters that led to the 
transmission of disease. 
 According to his medical notes, Cutler recalls that the experiments were Funes’ idea. 
Cutler may have attributed the concept for the experiments to Funes in order to evade 
responsibility for the research. As a temporary fellow and a foreigner at the VDRL from a 
Central American country, Funes was an easy person to blame. The researchers also planned to 
use the PASB office in Guatemala to conduct the experiments. The PASB could only set up a 
technical assistance program if requested by officials in the country where it would be 
established. Funes’ role in requesting the assistance from USPHS/PASB was essential if the 
experiments were to occur in Guatemala. 
As young and ambitious doctors who saw themselves part of revolutions in healthcare 
and nation-building, Cutler and Funes viewed the experiments as beneficial for both parties. For 
the VDRL, this plan would solve the problem researchers had encountered during the war with 
infecting human subjects with gonorrhea. In Guatemala, they would bypass the laws of the 
United States and protect themselves from a potential public relations controversy. Instead, they 
would work within the parameters of Guatemala’s venereal disease control laws. By serving as 
the go-between with U.S. and Guatemalan doctors, Funes might advance his stature in the 
international medical field and in his own country.  
Yet, the doctors were not simply self-motivated; rather they justified their decision based 
on humanitarian principles. For Funes’ part, he likely saw an opportunity to bring U.S. medical 
researchers who had just found a cure for syphilis to Guatemala to assist with revolutionary 
goals. Without money and resources in Guatemala and overwhelmed by his responsibilities to 
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control venereal disease in his country, he welcomed the assistance from the United States. 
Cutler too believed that the research was pertinent for global health. They saw this agreement as 
promoting the wellbeing of humanity and the Guatemalan nation.  
Following his year at the VDRL, Funes returned to Guatemala in the midst of the 
Revolution and began to discuss the possibility of the experiments with doctors and members of 
the government.783 He received a favorable response from Guatemalan government officials; 
poor and marginalized Guatemalans would serve as currency to build Guatemala’s future role in 
a modern international world order. By distancing himself from the humanity of vulnerable 
Guatemalans, Funes cemented his ties with U.S. medical professionals and brought what he 
believed would be critical public health resources and technical expertise to his country. The 
doctors established an international agreement for medical research that was bolstered by their 
solidarity as male physicians and presumptions about the access to marginalized members of 
Guatemalan society. Funes’ role in the agreement also suggests the compromises that doctors on 
the U.S. imperial periphery have made in order to bring resources to their country.    
 Funes’ offer of access to Guatemalan human subjects came at a propitious time for U.S. 
medical researchers. The opportunities to continue with research on prophylaxis appealed to 
leading syphilologists. By the war’s end, Turner had grown convinced that prophylaxis was the 
only method for preventing the spread of venereal disease among soldiers. He sent a letter to 
Colonel Karl R. Lundberg, Chief of the Preventative Medicine Division in the Office of the 
Surgeon General of the U.S. Army, responding to the question about whether training methods 
should be restored following the war to ward against another increase in venereal disease. Turner 
wrote: 
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  Quite pertinent to this whole problem are the extraordinary studies of  
  Professor A.C. Kinsey of Indiana University on the sexual habits of the American  
  people. It seems that the army is engaging in the worst kind of wishful thinking if  
  it believes that it can change the habits of this group of people to such an extent  
  that the potential exposure rate will be substantially reduced.784 
 
Although physicians such as Turner had grown convinced about the futility of controlling 
male sexuality, following the war the U.S. military once again replaced condoms and 
prophylaxis with “character guidance.” Turner was still under attack from social reformers who 
criticized his program of prophylaxis. New military policy required medical personnel to spend 
no longer than ten minutes discussing prophylaxis in lectures. The military also resumed 
punishment tactics and recommended that venereal disease patients not be recommended for 
leave or promotion.785 At the same time that Kinsey’s studies continued to influence the thinking 
among military and medical officials, the growing concern about “sexual deviance” in the United 
States that was connected to political concerns about communism during the McCarthy era, 
made the possibilities to promote and continue with research on prophylaxis in the United States 
all the more difficult.  
 Prominent syphilis researchers with a vested interest in the experiments were embedded 
in the U.S. postwar research infrastructure at the NIH/USPHS. They greeted the idea for 
experiments in Guatemala enthusiastically. Many were the same researchers who at the time also 
knew about and even participated in the syphilis study in Alabama. To further their research, 
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they had little problem risking the lives of African Americans and Guatemalans marginalized in 
their own society. The VDRL began to move forward with the planning process for the 
experiments and even held a conference in order to discuss their feasibility.786 In 1945 following 
the war, approval and funding for research switched from the OSRD/CMR to the PHS/NIH, 
largely due to Surgeon General Parran’s efforts to maintain the infrastructure for research that 
was developed during the war.787 The review of grants for venereal disease research proceeded 
through a similar protocol as it had during the war: first reviewed by the Syphilis Study Section, 
revised then by the National Advisory Health Council (NAHC), before approval from the 
Surgeon General. Yet, the new infrastructure gave greater control to Surgeon General Parran.788  
The first committee to review the proposal, the Syphilis Study Section, included doctors 
who would directly participate or stand to benefit in their own research from the Guatemalan 
experiments. All of them knew each other well and had collaborated and trained each other in 
research. Following the war, Moore moved from chairman of the Subcommittee on Venereal 
Disease Research to head the Syphilis Study Section. Other members of the section included 
Turner who had returned to work as a professor at Hopkins, Harry Eagle also from Hopkins, 
Mahoney who still headed the VDRL, Stokes at the University of Pennsylvania, John R. Heller, 
chief of the Venereal Disease Division, and members of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Veterans 
Administration. Mahoney, who had submitted the proposal with the VDRL and would serve as a 
key adviser for the experiments, did not recuse himself from the grant review process. Turner, 
Eagle, and Stokes would use the experiments as an opportunity to check up on their own 
research.789  
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Unlike the Terre Haute studies, the Guatemalan experiments appear to have generated 
little discussion from the researchers about potential lawsuits and controversy, unless the 
researchers kept these conversations secret. In February 1946, the proposal appeared before the 
Syphilis Study Section. Just one month later, the NAHC gave a considerable sum of money for 
research for that time period. It provided Research Grant No. 65 with $110,450 of funding to the 
PASB to investigate venereal disease in Guatemala.790 No evidence exists that the study group 
worked on developing a consent form or carefully considered which populations they should use 
for research. The fact that these experiments would be conducted within a Central American 
country appeared to offer the opportunities for the researchers to bypass the “red tape” of the 
federal government and avoid having to respond to a moralizing public. They presumed that the 
Guatemalan government was not as captious and that it would not have to respond to the public 
in the same manner as was necessary in the United States.  
PASB demonstrated enthusiastic support for the experiments. The organization had 
wanted to develop venereal disease control programs and facilities outside the United States.791 
During the late 1940s, the PASB office became the seat of the World Health Organization in 
Guatemala and was seeking to expand its operations in the country. As part of the plan for the 
experiments, U.S. researchers promised the construction of a venereal disease research 
laboratory at the PASB. U.S. researchers capitalized upon the infrastructure for international 
health that the PASB offered in the postwar era in order to locate bodies for medical research and 
to do experiments that violated U.S. law. 
The plan for these experiments was also facilitated by the fact that research norms during 
this period placed the primary responsibility for experimental protocol under the purview of 
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scientists. The NIH postwar research infrastructure was designed to give individual researchers 
considerable leeway in their control over the experiments. Dr. Cassius Van Slyke, the Chair of 
the NIH Research Grants Division which was the administrative function of the NAHC, along 
with Parran, promoted the “integrity of independence of the research worker and his freedom 
from control, direction, regimentation, and outside interference.”792 Van Slyke had also been the 
former Assistant Chief of the PHS Venereal Disease Division. This model followed accepted 
research guidelines prior to the war that gave researchers wide discretion in determining best 
research practices and treatment techniques for their patients. Following approval of the 
Guatemalan experiments, the Syphilis Study Section gave control over their design and progress 
to Mahoney, who would serve as the principal investigator, and John Cutler, who would become 
director of the study. The researchers had received the go ahead from the leading experts in the 
field to move forward with this research.  
In Guatemala, the experiments also drew support from the highest members of 
government. The PASB signed agreements with ranking government officials in the Ministry of 
Public Health, the National Army of the Revolution, the National Mental Health Hospital, and 
the Ministry of Justice. These officials included Dr. Julio Bianchi, a prominent revolutionary 
critical in the overthrow of Ubico and the head of the Ministry of Public Health.793 While in 
Guatemala during “Ten Years of Spring,” Ernesto Ché Guevara had an interview with Julio 
Bianchi where the future revolutionary requested that he be allowed to work in Guatemala. 
Guevara Bianchi told Guevara that he would need to revalidate his medical license which would 
take years of study. Although Bianchi had been careful to validate the qualifications of a young 
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Argentinean doctor with sympathies for Guatemala’s Revolution, he signed an agreement with 
U.S. researchers that gave them broad authority to work with institutions across the government 
and to experiment on Guatemalans.794 These decisions suggest that Bianchi was not as much 
driven by idealistic revolutionary goals as much as he sought to position Guatemala as a leader 
of public health in the Latin American region.  
Guatemalan officials no doubt believed that U.S. doctors would bring important 
resources to the Revolution. The USPHS/PASB promised technical guidance and medical 
infrastructure development. The agreement said that the Guatemalan government would take 
control of the venereal disease research laboratory to be built for the experiments once the PASB 
had finished its training and research program. The laboratory would serve all of Central 
America, fulfilling the goals of many Guatemalan officials, including Julio Bianchi, for 
Guatemala to assume its role as a leader in the region. The USPHS/PASB also promised the 
training of local personnel to oversee the laboratory. The proposal furthermore presented the 
possibility of conducting surveys to determine the prevalence of the disease in the country, the 
establishment of prophylactic, diagnostic, and treatment facilities, and the development of an 
improved venereal disease control program.795 Guatemalan military doctors hoped that the U.S. 
doctors would help them to design a program of prophylaxis.796 As Guatemala struggled to 
recover from high rates of venereal disease that had been brought by U.S. troops during the war 
and sought to redeem the population following years of dictatorial rule, they welcomed the 
assistance of the United States.  
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In April 1946, venereal disease research in Guatemala began under the purview of the 
VDRL. As the experiments got underway, Mahoney reflected upon the benefits that Guatemala 
offered as a site for research on venereal disease, including the “highly cooperative attitude of 
the officials.” He wrote:  
 
  It has been considered impractical to work out, under postwar conditions  
  in the United States, the solution of certain phases concerned with the prevention  
  and treatment of prophylactic agent for both gonorrhea and syphilis and the  
  prolonged observation of patients treated with penicillin for early syphilis.  
  Because of the relatively fixed character of the population and because of the  
  highly cooperative attitude of the officials, both civil and military, an   
  experimental laboratory in Guatemala City has been established.797  
 
The “fixed” character of the population implies the researchers’ opportunities to conduct 
research with institutionalized populations who could not easily leave the experiments nor 
inform the public about them. Mahoney’s statement indicates the possibilities for research that 
Guatemala offered U.S. researchers that were increasingly under threat in the United States. 
Following the war, research on prophylaxis had waning support from the U.S. public. 
Researchers could no longer justify human subjects research as beneficial to the war effort. The 
war had relaxed some policies in the military regarding the control of sexuality among soldiers, 
but now the military had returned to America’s more typical approach of insisting that sex does 
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not happen. In private, many military officers acknowledged the importance of prophylaxis in 
lowering venereal disease rates, but it was too risky to say so publicly.  
Guatemalan officials enthusiastically agreed to the experiments, but they were hardly 
equal partners to the U.S. military and medical communities. Guatemala remained highly 
dependent upon the United States to realize its goals to redeem the nation and provide public 
health services to the people. The experiments reveal the problems of nation-building in a 
Central American country under U.S. domination. Still, the Guatemalan doctors simultaneously 
were in a comparable position to U.S. doctors by virtue of their class and their relationship with 
indigenous and poor Guatemalan people. As medical doctors, they also had their own careers to 
make. At the moment that the Guatemalan physicians fought the country’s role as a brothel for 
U.S. soldiers during the war, they reinforced that position by offering sex workers and bodies for 
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CHAPTER 5: “PURE SCIENCE” IN GUATEMALA 
 
 In April 1946, when Dr. John Cutler of the U.S. Public Health Service arrived in 
Guatemala City, he was welcomed by fellow U.S. researcher Dr. John Spoto.799 Spoto, also a 
USPHS researcher and head of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) office in Guatemala, 
offered important insider knowledge and connections in the region. He introduced Cutler to 
Guatemalan officials in public health, the military, and the central government and helped to 
finalize agreements with them.800 Spoto also offered a bit of know-how about running research 
programs in the country. In regards to the indigenous men in the Guatemala City prison, he 
advised Cutler to provide little or no explanation about the experiments. According to Spoto, this 
approach was necessary to avoid confusing his human subjects. Likewise, he recommended 
paying the prisoners less than the researchers had originally planned.801     
Spoto introduced Cutler to the norms of research for American scientists in Guatemala. 
His advice reveals researchers’ ethical understandings were shaped by Guatemala’s social 
hierarchy and research norms. Yet, these norms had not been developed in Guatemala alone. As 
the founder of the PASB Border Health Program in El Paso, Texas during World War II, Spoto 
had inspected Mexican farmworkers.802 Views of race and disease informed PASB officers’ 
anatomization of the farmworkers’ bodies and their assessments of whether they posed biological 
threats to the United States. Spoto then went to Guatemala where he conducted studies on 
onchocerciasis, which was understood to be an indigenous disease.803 During this research, he 
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gained a sense of the liberties American scientists could take while conducting research on 
Mayan populations. He learned from his Ladino colleagues that views of indigenous populations 
as unintelligent, easily manipulated, and docile carried over to medical research.804 
Senior USPHS scientists saw Spoto as an invaluable resource to Cutler and his team. It is 
important to highlight senior scientists’ roles in setting up the experiments to avoid simply 
blaming what happened on Dr. John Cutler.805  In reading the gruesome and often shocking 
details of Cutler’s medical notes, it can be tempting to paint him as an especially malignant and 
aberrant character. Although Cutler’s personality certainly influenced the experiments, systemic 
factors played a greater role. USPHS and PASB senior scientists enabled Cutler and he operated 
within norms deemed acceptable by them in the imperial periphery. He also did not challenge 
Guatemalan standards of research. Yet, doctors’ masculine identities and the conduct of their 
research were also shaped by these experiments. They grew increasingly drastic in their methods 
in response to the secrecy in which these experiments were conducted, their excitement about the 
“possibilities” for research on human subjects, and the fraternal bonds that U.S. and Guatemalan 
doctors formed with each other. In general, Guatemalan doctors occupied a subordinate role 
relative to the American scientists in these experiments. Yet, in this chapter, I show that U.S. and 
Guatemalan doctors built solidarity with each other through their denigration and assertion of 
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control over the Guatemalans on whom they experimented.806 These relationships forged across 
national borders enabled and condoned the violence that doctors enacted upon Guatemalans. 
Although the archival record reveals little information about the people subjected to 
experimentation, oral histories nevertheless show the imprint that this history continues to have 
on Guatemalans. The few oral histories I have collected of survivors suggests their continued 
suffering and sense of sexual and bodily violation. I have not been able to verify using Cutler’s 
records that the men and women I interviewed were part of the experiments. Yet, I argue these 
oral histories nonetheless provide an impression of Guatemalans’ experiences of bodily harm and 
how the experiments continue to shape their present. By relying upon “official” records, we 
privilege the colonizers’ construction of history and erase the stories of people subjected to 
violent policies.807 The oral histories raise questions about what serves as evidence and whose 
stories count when writing history. Moreover, although the historical record contains no evidence 
of Guatemalans uttering a word to the doctors, by reading medical documents against the grain 
and analyzing ethnographies, I argue that we gain hints of Guatemalans’ claims to bodily 
sovereignty made within the context of their severe power imbalance with U.S. and Guatemalan 
researchers.808 Their resistance was informed by their different ethical understandings of 
healthcare, illness, and the body. Medical documents and ethnography show an understanding of 
rights from below as expressed by Guatemalans subjected to experimentation.  
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Still, Guatemalans’ protestations did not stop the experiments. After Cutler arrived in 
Guatemala City, researchers began their research in the men’s prison located in Guatemala City. 
They then continued to the soldier barracks, the lock hospital, the psychiatric institution, and to 
children in schools and in the national orphanage. Physicians conducted these experiments in a 
haphazard and chaotic manner. Between February 1947 and October 1948, researchers carried 
out a total of 50 experiments (32 gonorrhea experiments, 17 syphilis experiments, and 1 
chancroid experiment). Records show that they infected more than 1300 Guatemalans with 
venereal disease and that only 678 received some form of treatment. Many experiments began 
before others had ended and did not follow a logical progression.809 Physicians did experiments 
to determine the rates of infection after they began the prophylaxis studies and did not wait until 
the results from pilot studies were completed before they began new experiments.810 Later the 
researchers continued their serological research in schools and the orphanage. Except for the 
schools which were located in rural areas, all of the other institutions that participated in the 
experiments were located within proximity to one another in Guatemala City.  
In describing these experiments, I have included many disturbing details. Only by closely 
examining what occurred can we begin to understand how researchers managed to have so little 
empathy for Guatemalans and the institutional norms and cultural ideals that emboldened 
USPHS officers and Guatemalan military and medical doctors to conduct these experiments in 
the mid-twentieth century.      
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The Intentional-Exposure Experiments 
 In preparing for the experiments in the men’s prison in Guatemala City, U.S. doctors 
schemed about how they could win the inmates’ cooperation. Spoto urged Cutler to offer some 
treatment programs.811 Although the treatment offered would not interfere with the results of 
their research nor cure the men of syphilis, the doctors thought they might convince the prisoners 
and staffers who did not know about the experiments of their benevolent intentions. This idea 
reflected USPHS practices in Tuskegee, Alabama where doctors and nurses provided African 
American men “inadequate treatment” to convince them that they were receiving care for “bad 
blood.”812 The doctors also considered other ideas such as giving the men a pack of cigarettes or 
a bar of soap for each blood draw.813 Prison conditions were so dire that the doctors did not have 
to offer much to improve the inmates’ circumstances. U.S. doctors had originally planned to pay 
the prisoners, but decided to forego giving them money following Spoto’s recommendation. 
USPHS doctors wanted to avoid all expenses they deemed unnecessary, including fairly 
compensating the men for their participation in the research.814 In contrast, USPHS researchers 
had provided compensation to prisoners in the study in Terre Haute, Indiana. U.S. scientists 
presumed that they would find cheaper research labor in Central America. 
 Sex too, scientists believed, could be used as a favor for the men. Throughout the 
experiments, the doctors presumed that they could profit from both men and women’s sexuality. 
They assumed that prisoners, soldiers, and sex workers would be willing. As Cutler stated, “It 
was thought that the prostitutes serving the penitentiary could furnish a means of securing the 
desired infection.”815 In the prison, inmates could arrange visits from sex workers but they had to 
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pay them.816 Evidence indicates that the doctors footed the charge for at least some of the men. 
Cutler further wanted to convince all of the prisoners that they would be receiving a prophylaxis 
method before the exposure experiments. In reality, many prisoners only received a placebo. 
Although Cutler’s notes do not reveal exactly what he told prisoners, it appears that he did 
explain some aspects of the experiments to them, while lying about others.  
 Since Cutler and his team encountered protests from prisoners for their blood draws, they 
understood that they needed to gain rapport with the men if their experiments were to happen at 
all. Prisoners were not the docile subjects that the doctors had anticipated when they were 
planning the experiments. In his medical notes, Cutler expressed his frustration: 
 
  The inmates were, for the most part, uneducated and superstitious. Most of them 
 believed that they were being weakened by the weekly and biweekly withdrawals of 
 blood and complained that they were getting insufficient food to replenish it. The fear of 
 what they saw was much more important to them than the potential damage which 
 might be done by syphilis years later and could not be countered by promises or actual 
 administration of penicillin and iron tablets to replace blood.817 
 
Cutler’s comment is puzzling given he hid from Guatemalans his plans to infect them 
with syphilis. He belittled inmates for their superstition and fear, when in truth they had good 
reason to be suspicious. Guatemalans’ responses also reveal their understandings of bodily harm 
according to their own conceptualizations of health and disease. Many Mayan and poor 
Guatemalans today still believe that the body contains a finite amount of blood that cannot be 
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regenerated. They feared that losing their blood would create an imbalance within their bodies 
and render them susceptible to a host of diseases. Guatemalans believed that a loss of blood 
could harm their physical, psychological, and spiritual wellbeing.818 Among indigenous and poor 
communities, few people knew about microbiology during the 1940s.819 Most people did not 
understand the etiology of disease according to the biomedical model. A medical doctor who 
worked in the Guatemalan highlands during the 1940s and 1950s said that he explained bacterial 
infections to his mainly indigenous patients as being an “animalito” (little animal).820 He found 
that this explanation helped his patients connect the biomedical conception of disease to their 
own understandings of the body and healing.  
 Deriding prisoners’ fears as ignorant, Cutler remained confident in his scientific and 
rational approach to medicine that upheld notions that socially constructed categories had 
biological significance. Yet, U.S. and Guatemalan medical doctors also clung to superstitions 
about blood. As Swedish Sociologist Gunnar Myrdal observed during World War II, the 
perception among white Americans of African American blood as unclean was akin to a 
“primitive” form of religion.821 Medical researchers in Guatemala also thought that indigenous 
blood was different and that research on indigenous people could threaten the viability of their 
research. Cutler stated in his notes that almost all of the men in the prison were of “pure or 
predominant Indian blood,” disregarding many of the men’s self-identification as Ladinos.822 
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 USPHS physicians were interested in comparing diagnostic tests between indigenous 
populations in Central America and Mexico, Native Americans in the United States, and African 
Americans in the southern United States (likely in Tuskegee, Alabama), but no evidence 
suggests that they completed this study.823 Some preliminary studies by USPHS scientists John 
Mahoney and R.C. Arnold had indicated that Native Americans tested positive for syphilis in 
blood tests when they had no other sign of the disease.824 During the syphilis study in Tuskegee, 
Alabama, USPHS researchers had also proposed comparing results from untreated syphilis with 
Native American populations.825 The idea that disease differs according to socially-constructed 
racial categories is false.826 But these beliefs nevertheless reveal clues about how racial thinking 
about venereal disease and science developed and were influential in doctors’ research. Cutler 
would later defend his research by stating that venereal disease was no different in indigenous 
Guatemalans than in other populations, challenging the views of his superiors at the USPHS and 
prominent scientists researching syphilis in the United States. 
 Due to the problems that the researchers faced in the prison drawing blood, the first 
experiments they performed did not take place in the prison as originally planned; they took 
place in the military barracks and hospital in enlisted men. The support from Guatemalan 
military officials convinced U.S. doctors that they would find a more cooperative research 
population. The majority of the exposure experiments occurred with soldiers over a 60-day 
period in the Military Hospital and in the soldier barracks located in Guatemala City. Cutler 
reported that the Guatemalan military’s medical department showed considerable interest in the 
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research and offered patients at the Military Hospital and various units for the experiments.827 
Since soldiers would be some of the main beneficiaries of improved prophylaxis methods, 
Guatemalan military doctors saw a direct benefit from the experiments.  
 Several doctors from the Guatemalan military had key roles in the research. Dr. Carlos 
Tejeda, the Chief of the Guatemalan Army Medical Department, wholeheartedly cooperated with 
the U.S. doctors and made a concerted effort to ensure their success. Dr. Raul Maza of the 
Military Hospital worked on both the syphilis and gonorrhea experiments, and Colonel Juan 
Oliva of the Guardia de Honor (an army unit) participated in the syphilis experiments.828 They 
had a number of tasks that included helping to prepare the prophylaxis solution.829 Guatemalan 
military doctors also assisted the research by selecting soldiers for experimentation. In general, 
they assumed a secondary role to the U.S. researchers but were nonetheless necessary to 
complete the experiments. 
 In selecting which men to use for the experiments, Guatemalan military doctors 
presumed total control over the soldiers’ bodies. Like the prisoners, the soldiers did not consent 
to the experiments, nor did they receive any type of compensation. The average age of the 
soldiers was 22 years old. As enlistees, they were of the lowest military rank. In a letter to a 
senior scientist, Cutler described the soldiers as “Mayans from the backwoods.”830 Researchers 
assumed the men could be easily manipulated. As mentioned in Chapter Two, because soldiers 
did not have knowledge about venereal disease, some thought remaining in the hospital with 
syphilis or gonorrhea was preferable to performing regular military duties or undergoing training 
activities. It seems that they did not understand nor were informed about the dangers associated 
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with venereal disease or viewed this disease differently according to their own beliefs about 
health and illness. Some men had even intentionally infected themselves with gonorrhea by 
inserting a matchstick coated with pus from other men’s lesions as a way to gain reprieve from 
military service.831 Cutler then used these men in the experiments. He may have viewed these 
men’s actions as an open invitation to experiment upon them. Other soldiers were healthy at the 
start of the study.832  
 Although Guatemalan military officials showed little concern about spreading disease 
among soldiers, they also believed that they would receive treatment and a prophylaxis program 
created by the USPHS. Tejeda, for example, requested that the U.S. doctors draw up an 
emergency plan of prophylaxis for venereal disease.833 The Guatemalan military participated in 
the research because they saw a long-term benefit to working with the American doctors. 
USPHS scientists understood that the Guatemalan military assumed that they would receive 
technological assistance. Cutler responded to Tejeda’s request. Guatemalan military doctors may 
have also expected that the United States would provide them with penicillin. Cutler inquired 
with Mahoney about providing a penicillin treatment program to the Army, but this request was 
denied. He may have wanted to treat the Guatemalans who were the subjects of his study, but he 
did not have the resources necessary to do so. The U.S. government only had limited supplies of 
penicillin at this time, and prioritized its use to treat venereal disease in U.S. citizens.834 
Mahoney instead recommended that the doctors conserve their supply of penicillin and use it for 
demonstration programs and to “build good will.”835 The doctors used penicillin to manipulate 
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Guatemalan institutions into participating in the research. They knew that treating the men was 
not in their plans. 
A senior USPHS official traveled to Guatemala to conduct the first “natural exposure” 
experiment in the Army. USPHS scientists may have wanted a more experienced researcher to 
do the first experiment since they had never used this “method” of infection. Dr. Richard (R.C.) 
Arnold of the USPHS Venereal Disease Research Laboratory (VDRL) arrived in Guatemala to 
conduct the research. In addition to developing a method for “natural” exposure, Arnold traveled 
to Guatemala for his own self-interest. He wanted to test a prophylaxis solution that he had 
developed for gonorrhea comprised of penicillin in a peanut oil and beeswax solution that he 
thought would bring about a measured release of the prophylaxis. He used commercial sex 
workers known to have gonorrhea to infect eight soldiers and seven other men as controls.836 The 
doctors administered the prophylaxis solution onto the infected men’s genitals ten minutes 
following contact with the women. They took blood tests of the men before and after the 
experiments and urine samples to examine their immune response to gonorrhea.837 The doctors 
did not take blood tests from the sex workers because they were “quite apprehensive.”838 
Researchers failed to verify whether the women actually did have gonorrhea. They rather 
presumed that they would be infected with venereal disease. Despite being convinced of their 
scientific approach to the experiments, the doctors’ prejudices towards the women adversely 
influenced the credibility of their work. 
During the experiments and in their later observations, the doctors talked among 
themselves about Guatemalans’ sexuality and bodies. The jocular manner they used to 
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communicate suggests how they strengthened their relations with each other and distanced 
themselves from the people they experimented upon through humiliating commentary. Cutler 
assisted Arnold and took notes on possible ways to improve the experiments. He timed the men 
having sexual intercourse. In a letter to Arnold, he wrote “perhaps it is that the men are like 
rabbits.”839 Throughout the experiments, Cutler spoke interchangeably about Guatemalans and 
the rabbits they had used in animal experimentation.840 This association reflects his continued 
dehumanization of the men and women as the experiments unfolded. Through making comments 
about what they perceived as their non-normative sexualities, the researchers further 
strengthened their perceptions that Guatemalans were laboratory animals useful for 
experimentation.  
The Guatemalan military doctors reinforced U.S. researchers’ views of the indigenous 
men’s deviance. Both U.S. and Guatemalan doctors’ perceptions of the soldiers’ sexual practices 
were informed by their racial understandings. Although the doctors had different views of 
Mayans which were shaped by their national contexts and cultural views, their perceptions also 
overlapped. Guatemalan military doctors claimed that the short amount of time that indigenous 
soldiers spent with the sex workers was characteristic of their “culture group.”841 Cutler further 
blamed the problems infecting soldiers with gonorrhea in part upon their sexual practices. He 
thought their exposure to the sex workers was too limited to induce infection. The doctors’ 
understandings of the men’s sexuality provided them justification for using the soldiers but also 
cast doubt upon the viability of the research population. These conflicting understandings reflect 
both the prejudices and the anxieties that researchers had throughout the experiments.   
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Cutler also boasted to his superiors about the liberties he could take experimenting on 
Guatemalans. He remarked to Mahoney about the opportunities for “pure science” in Guatemala. 
He said that researchers could “shoot living germs into human bodies” in the same manner that 
researchers had infected rabbits in laboratories in the United States.842 Again, Cutler equated 
Guatemalans with laboratory animals. In letters, Cutler also told senior USPHS scientists 
including Mahoney and Arnold that he was not telling his “patients” that he was infecting them 
with syphilis. He wrote, “as you can imagine, we are holding our breaths, and we are explaining 
the patients and others concerned with but a few key exceptions, that the treatment is a new one 
utilizing serum followed by penicillin. This double talk keeps me hopping.”843 Cutler was 
excited by the secrecy of the experiments and the advances that he thought he was making in his 
research. The fact that he shared this news with his superiors reflects that he did not believe they 
would reprimand him for his actions. In fact, he seemed to believe that he would win accolades 
from senior scientists for his capability to detach himself from Guatemalans’ humanity. 
While military personnel provided U.S. researchers with access to male soldiers for 
experimentation, Guatemalan doctors in the lock hospital, which regulated and treated registered 
sex workers in Guatemala City, established themselves as authorities in determining the 
women’s sexual value and benefit to the American researchers. Doctors in the lock hospital 
selected which sex workers they would use to infect the men. Dr. Juan Funes, in charge of the 
lock hospital, and Dr. Luis Galich, who directed the sanitation department, chose the women. 
According to Cutler, the Guatemalan doctors selected sex workers who were the “lowest on the 
social scale of prostitutes and most frequently infected with syphilis and gonorrhea.”844 Typically 
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in Guatemala, prostitutes on the “lowest scale” were indigenous women who were not viewed as 
desirable to elite and middle class men.845 The women also may have been on a lower scale 
based on the fact that they were frequently infected with venereal disease. Regardless of how the 
doctors assessed the sex workers, they both pimped and infected them.  
Nevertheless, the women showed they could not be controlled as easily as the doctors 
hoped and presumed. Cutler reported that “contrary to what might be expected, it proved 
extremely difficult to obtain prostitutes willing to serve under experimental conditions.”846 
Although the doctors believed that the women’s bodies would be fodder for sex and research, the 
women maintained control over their business choices. Some notes indicate that the women 
received payment for participation in the experiments.847 Yet, even the money did not persuade 
the women to work for the doctors. They likely understood that they had venereal disease and 
may have wished to avoid infecting the men. The sex workers showed more scruples than the 
doctors. Another researcher expressed surprise that some of the sex workers had left the 
experiments to marry.848 The researchers apparently saw the sex workers’ occupations as 
permanent, when typically sex work has been a temporary profession. In contrast to other groups 
in these experiments, the women appeared to hold a greater degree of choice in their decisions to 
participate in these experiments.  
During the course of the experiments, Cutler received visits from other senior researchers 
who criticized his methods, but not his treatment of Guatemalans. A few months after the 
intentional-exposure experiments began in the Army, senior U.S. government medical officers 
visited Guatemala. They included John Mahoney, John R. Heller, Chief of the Venereal Disease 
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Division, and Cassius Van Slyke, the Chief of Research Grants at the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH). Despite his efforts, Cutler failed to impress these high-ranking officials. Cutler 
had the visiting doctors watch Guatemalans have sexual intercourse during the “natural” 
exposure experiments in the Army. Although Cutler perhaps thought that this ability to observe 
the transmission of venereal disease would impress the scientists, Van Slyke upbraided him for 
failing to verify whether or not the sex workers were infected with gonorrhea before introducing 
them to the soldiers. As in earlier experiments, Cutler appears to have presumed that the sex 
workers would have venereal disease just by virtue of their profession. Senior scientists were 
also disturbed by the frequency with which the women had sex with the soldiers. Some saw 
several different men just a few minutes apart and one woman had contact with eight soldiers in 
less than 70 minutes. Scientists’ concern seemed based more upon the lack of control that Cutler 
had over the experiment and that the results of the research would be tainted, than they were 
concerned with Guatemalans’ welfare.  
 In response to these critiques, Arnold gave Cutler advice on gaining approval from his 
superiors. He said that Cutler should “not put on any more shows unless you are sure of 
everything” and added that perhaps Cutler should do a little “blanket stretching” beforehand.849 
Cutler had revealed his shoddy research practices in his zeal to impress his superiors. By 
recommending “blanket stretching,” Arnold may have been using a common expression used in 
the United States that means stretching the truth, or fixing the results of studies so that Cutler had 
something to present to senior scientists. The mention of “shows” suggests the jesting manner in 
which the doctors communicated. Arnold maintained a friendly approach by making light of 
what he viewed as the pornographic nature of the experiments, as if Guatemalans were putting 
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on a show for scientists’ enjoyment. In spite of senior researchers’ sharp critiques and the 
problems with “natural exposure,” they gave Cutler the go-ahead to continue with the 
prophylaxis experiments. Cutler’s missteps did not lead them to reassign him or put another 
researcher in charge.   
Following the departure of Cutler’s stateside supervisors, U.S. and Guatemalan doctors 
conducted numerous experiments for more than a year. Cutler’s notes provide examples of the 
physicians’ daily work. In one experiment with the Army, physicians wanted to test the orvus-
mapharsen prophylaxis method. Arnold and Mahoney had previously used this method on 
rabbits but never with humans. They wanted to compare its effectiveness to the Army “Pro Kit” 
which had been used by the military during World War II and had received many complaints 
from U.S. soldiers. The researchers thought that the orvus-mapharsen solution would be more 
comfortable for the soldiers than the Army “Pro Kit” and have an “aesthetic appeal” due to its 
deodorizing qualities.850  
Seeking to appease American soldiers, the doctors planned to experiment upon 
Guatemalans. The doctors first infected twelve sex workers five to fourteen days before their 
sexual contact with male soldiers by inserting a cotton swab with the infective agent of 
gonorrhea into their cervixes. They used a total of 105 male “patients,” 68 of whom received the 
orvus-mapharsen prophylaxis and 37 who used the Army “Pro Kit.”851 One week prior to 
exposure and two weeks afterwards, the doctors restricted the male soldiers to the military base 
and Military Hospital so that they would not have any other contact with women. Physicians may 
have brought the women to the Military Hospital and the army barracks to infect the men, 
although Cutler did not describe where and how the sexual contact occurred. Following 
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exposure, the physicians administered the two types of prophylaxis by rubbing them on the 
men’s genitals for as long as two minutes. They then attempted to insert some of the substance 
into their urethras. Soldiers may have experienced this as more akin to sexual assault or 
humiliation rather than as part of an experiment. For the next two weeks, the doctors examined 
the soldiers every day at six in the morning and inspected their urine for signs of an immune 
response to gonorrhea. Researchers found no significant difference in the effectiveness of the 
orvus-mapharsen solution and the Army “Pro Kit,” providing evidence that soldiers could choose 
a prophylaxis solution depending upon their preferences.852 To prove this point, they had 
infected over 100 Guatemalans with a deadly disease. 
Although the Guatemalan doctors primarily assisted U.S. researchers and selected 
subjects for experimentation, Dr. Juan Funes conducted his own research in the lock hospital. 
Claiming his commitment to the Revolution’s cause and to his patients, Funes wrote that he 
pursued the experiment because prophylaxis had not received the same attention in women as in 
men. He further stated that prophylaxis for women was important in countries like Guatemala 
that had legalized prostitution. Physicians in countries that had regulation systems, Funes said, 
regularly interacted with sex workers and could teach them about preventative measures.853 His 
paper was the only one published on the experiments. Perhaps because he saw his experiment as 
therapeutic, the doctors were less concerned that his research would provoke controversy. The 
doctors could have also decided to publish his paper as opposed to other articles on these 
experiments in order to reduce suspicion about the other research they were conducting.  
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Funes professed concern for the women, but he also revealed his belittling views of them. 
In the study, Funes also tried using an orvus-mapharsen prophylaxis solution with the women in 
the hospital. Explaining this decision, he wrote that anyone who understands the mentality of the 
“common prostitute” and the conditions in which she lives would realize that a prophylaxis 
solution would only be effective if it was “simple,” could be applied in “primitive conditions,” 
and offered a “cosmetic advantage.”854 The doctors chose six sex workers who were “subjected” 
to “legal supervision” by having to participate in the regulation system. No evidence indicates 
that he obtained consent from the women. Rather the doctors “selected” these “volunteers” who 
they had observed over a period of time.855 The fact that the women were legally obligated to 
have medical inspections two times per week by these same medical professionals would make it 
difficult for them to refuse to cooperate. Yet, the women may have also been interested in trying 
the prophylaxis solution in order to improve their work conditions and protect themselves from 
disease. Between June 15 and December 15, 1948, Funes gave all the women the equipment to 
prepare the solution and a vaginal douche. Funes concluded that the solution was effective in 
lowering the rates of gonorrhea. Although the women experienced some discomfort, they were 
“satisfied” with it as a sanitation and deodorizing solution.856   
As Funes completed his experiment on prophylaxis with sex workers, ongoing 
prophylaxis experiments by Cutler and his team continued to be stymied by the lack of reliable 
ways to infect Guatemalans with the diseases under study. As in the Terre Haute study, giving 
subjects gonorrhea proved particularly difficult. The doctors worried that they would have to 
shut down the project as a result of these problems. The “natural” method had not been the 
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solution that the doctors anticipated. In a letter to Mahoney, Cutler wrote in ironic exasperation, 
“It seems that clandestine affairs, with respect to gonorrhea, are far safer than ever before 
imagined.”857 The researchers tried everything they could imagine to raise the rates of infection. 
Cutler had the men spend more time with the women, hoping to increase the amount of sexual 
contact. He had the men have sex repeatedly with the women. Cutler became desperate in his 
efforts to induce infection. Disregarding the advice of senior researchers who preached a more 
careful approach to infection, Cutler had some women have sex with the men less than one 
minute apart. Physicians also plied the men with alcohol. They hypothesized that the liquor 
would more likely raise the likelihood of an infection.858 In these experiments too, alcohol and 
sex work remained linked in doctors’ minds. Still, the transmission rates were low and Cutler 
increasingly struggled to convince Mahoney that these experiments should continue. 
 Cutler grew increasingly desperate to infect Guatemalans. As a result of the problems 
transmitting gonorrhea through “natural exposure,” he began trying “artificial inoculation” in the 
Army. The researchers used swabs for “superficial” inoculation. Yet for the “deep” inoculation 
methods, the researchers used toothpicks and inserted the infectious material into the urethra.859 
This approach would have been excruciatingly painful and dangerous for the soldiers. 
Disregarding concern for the study participants, the researchers were pleased that the “deep” 
inoculation method was successful almost one-hundred percent of the time. In contrast, the 
superficial method worked only fifty percent of the time.860 In another experiment on the military 
base, researchers tried using these different infection methods to test another Mapharsen 
prophylaxis solution. They appeared more concerned with proving that the prophylaxis solution 
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was effective than they were in running a controlled experiment. Physicians employed 
superficial inoculation methods to infect soldiers in the experimental group, and deep inoculation 
with the control group.861 By using different inoculation methods across the groups, the 
researchers introduced a confounding variable and compromised the integrity of the experiment. 
The researchers apparently wanted to fix the results given that they knew that “deep inoculation” 
led to more contagion. Cutler appears to have taken Arnold’s advice to do some “blanket 
stretching.”  
At the same time that experiments were underway with the Army, Cutler also sought 
permission from his superiors to use patients in the psychiatric hospital.862 In his notes, Cutler 
wrote that Dr. Carlos Salvado, the medical chief of the psychiatric institution, invited him to do 
work there on serology. He offered potentially more “cooperative” subjects than Cutler had 
found in the prison.863 Yet, U.S. doctors planned to do more than blood draw. Increasingly 
zealous in his efforts to infect Guatemalans, Cutler planned to use the patients to try “artificial” 
exposure and prophylaxis experiments on venereal disease. It was not possible to bring sex 
workers to the psychiatric hospital, and this method had shown to not be as successful as Cutler 
had hoped. The psychiatric institution provided access to people who had arguably the least 
amount of power to push back against his increasingly drastic efforts to infect them. Although he 
acknowledged that the psychiatric institution lacked adequate medical reports on its patients, 
Cutler was undaunted.864 The researchers did not know whether any of the patients had 
conditions that could affect their results, but went forward with the experiments anyway. 
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Senior researchers expressed concern about the prospect of using the hospital patients, if 
only because of the potential controversy that it could cause. Arnold said that he was a “bit, in 
fact more than a bit, leery of the experiment with the insane people.” “If some goody 
organization got wind of the work,” he continued, “they would raise a lot of smoke.”865  He 
explained that the hospital patients could not give consent, nor could they be expected to 
understand the experiments. Since researchers were not obtaining consent from other people in 
the experiments, it appears that Arnold was more concerned that the doctors would not be able to 
hide their methods from potential critics should they find out about the experiments. For the 
researchers, obtaining consent was more about protecting themselves than protecting 
Guatemalans. Arnold appeared to believe that soldiers or prisoners would make better research 
subjects primarily because of the perception that they could give consent, not because they had in 
fact voluntarily agreed to join these experiments.    
Despite senior scientists’ concerns, Cutler moved forward with his research in the 
hospital. In fact, he grew increasingly reckless in his methods. Cloistered within the psychiatric 
hospital, Cutler tried infecting the men and women in their rectums, urethras, and eyes.866 The 
doctors also abraded the genitals of the men in an effort to improve infection rate. Although 
senior researchers such as Mahoney opposed the abrasion methods and called them “drastic,” 
Cutler continued to employ them, justifying his activities as unique “opportunities” for 
research.867 In addition to the exposure experiments, the researchers performed blood studies 
with the hospital patients and sought to verify their results with spinal taps which were likely 
terrifying to the patients, especially since they did not know what the doctors were doing to 
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them. Even though Mahoney expressed concern about Cutler’s methods, he did not demand that 
he stop the experiments. 
Although the researchers also lacked an effective diagnosis for syphilis and thus could 
not conclusively assess the effectiveness of prophylaxis, they performed a number of studies on 
syphilis in the psychiatric institution and the prison. In one, Cutler and his team tested whether 
they could use syphilis strains found in rabbits to infect humans. Other researchers had 
reportedly been infected with rabbit strains of syphilis due to laboratory accidents, but the 
method of using the bacteria taken from animals to infect humans had never been formally 
tested.868 The doctors wanted to use the rabbit strains because the syphilis-causing bacteria could 
be produced in large quantities if cultured in live rabbits.869 This experiment was yet another way 
in which the researchers reinforced their associations between Guatemalans and rabbits during 
the course of research.  
Using the rabbit strains in the experiments proved to be a logistical feat. VDRL 
researchers first infected rabbits in New York and then air-lifted them to Guatemala where they 
were held in cages in a local laboratory.870 In the experiment, the doctors obtained the bacterial 
agent of syphilis from rabbit penises and then used it to inoculate the prisoners intracutaneously. 
Physicians took blood tests before and after the injection to see if the rabbit stains had infected 
the men. The doctors found evidence that the intracutaneous injection was successful in infecting 
the prisoners.871 Despite all their efforts to fly the rabbits to Guatemala, the doctors decided to 
abandon this experiment because they could not determine definitively whether the prisoners had 
different responses to the human or rabbit strains of syphilis.872   
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The hospital patients were wary of the researchers and occasionally resisted them. In 
response to highly painful abrasion methods, one patient fled the room and went missing for two 
hours.873 Although the doctors tried to keep the patients sexually isolated from each other, the 
doctors reported that many Guatemalans in the institution were homosexuals and they could not 
control them.874 By this point, the U.S. medical community knew that venereal disease could be 
transmitted through homosexual contact, but Cutler did not acknowledge this fact in his medical 
notes.875 Cutler and his team also encountered problems in their examination of the women. 
Cutler said that the women did not want their bodies to be inspected by male doctors “as a result 
of local prejudices against male viewing of the body, even by physicians.”876 He added that there 
was “no good reason which could be offered [to the women] to explain the necessity of complete 
examinations.”877 The women felt uncomfortable being examined by male doctors. Many 
Guatemalans viewed gynecological examinations as punishment for sexual transgressions or as 
violation. In Mayan and many poor communities, only midwives attended to the health needs of 
women and had medical access to their sexual organs.878 
Yet, Cutler showed little concern for Guatemalans’ emotional responses. One case in 
particular demonstrates Cutler’s disturbing disregard towards the hospital patients. In February 
1948, Cutler infected a patient named Berta with syphilis in her left arm.879 One month later, 
Cutler reported that she had scabies, a skin disease caused by a mite. She had also developed red 
bumps in the same area where he had injected her with syphilis and her skin had begun to 
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deteriorate. Cutler did not treat Berta until several months after he infected her with syphilis. 
Then in August 1948, Cutler said Berta appeared about to die, but he did not say why. Rather 
than leaving Berta in peace to die, Cutler decided to use her for further experiments. On that 
same day, he put gonorrheal pus into both of her eyes, her urethra, and rectum. He then re-
infected her with syphilis. Just a few days later, Berta did die.880 Based upon Cutler’s notes, it is 
unclear whether the syphilis inoculation injection caused her death. It appears that Cutler at the 
very least hastened her death. The record does not indicate exactly what Cutler gained from this 
so-called experiment with Berta, or why he did it. He never appeared to think that he had to 
justify himself. In his determination to infect Guatemalans, Cutler adopted increasingly brutal 
methods. Exalting “pure science,” Cutler showed no empathy for the Guatemalans upon whom 
he experimented. 
Although mental hospital patients had few means to escape, the doctors still had to try to 
find strategies to appease them and gain their cooperation. Cutler’s wife Eliese assisted the 
doctors in recruiting patients for the research. She “got to know the patients and helped keep 
things straight,” while also photographing them.881 Eliese and the scientists understood that they 
could convince the hospital patients to comply with the experiments just because they were 
“starved for attention and recognition as individuals,” as Cutler wrote.882 Eliese came to be an 
essential member of the research team through performing gendered affective work. By 
photographing the hospital patients and talking to them, she made them feel more important and 
appeared less threatening than the male researchers. Other scientists’ wives served as secretaries. 
As in other colonial contexts, white women participated in sustaining researchers’ power by 
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helping to soften their presence and gain rapport with the subjects of their programs. The doctors 
also gave the patients cigarettes, which Cutler said were “indispensable” to the entire program.883 
They used addiction to get access to experimental subjects. The doctors capitalized upon the 
desperation of the patients and the poor conditions under which they lived in order to carry out 
the experiments.    
U.S. doctors also had to generate goodwill with hospital staff to ensure they could 
proceed with minimal interference. They sought consent from the institution and not from 
individual patients, as was the custom during the mid-twentieth century in scientific research. 
Since the psychiatric hospital was very poor, U.S. doctors were able to gain the favor of the staff 
with small investments. In return for access to the facilities and to patients, U.S. doctors 
purchased the hospital a large refrigerator to maintain perishable drugs and laboratory materials, 
a motion picture projector to offer recreation for the inmates and metal cups, plates, and forks.884 
The physicians also provided drugs for the epileptic patients, since the hospital could not afford 
to purchase them. Researchers provided this last “gift” mainly to protect themselves in the event 
of seizure by one of the patients.885  
 The doctors in charge of the asylum were certainly aware that the U.S. researchers were 
working in the hospital, although it is not clear the extent to which they understood the details of 
the experiments. Dr. Carlos Salvado, a medical chief in the asylum, endorsed and participated in 
the research. Like other Guatemalan researchers, he selected the patients for the medical doctors 
to use. As mentioned in the Chapter Two, the psychiatric staff often chose the most vulnerable 
patients who were indigenous and could not speak Spanish, or who had less ability to protest the 
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experiments. Dr. Miguel Molina, the director of the psychiatric institution, further appeared to 
have knowledge that the doctors were working in the hospital. There is no evidence that he 
directly collaborated in the experiments or knew the details of them. Yet, he signed a letter 
acknowledging that he had received the refrigerator, metal plates and glasses, and a projector 
from the PASB.886 Molina then wrote to the head of the PASB office in Guatemala City to thank 
him for the gift. In the letter, he said that Cutler, Levitan, and Mahoney had been “unforgettable 
friends” to the psychiatric institution.887 If he had known that the USPHS researchers were 
burdening the hospital with more disease, perhaps Molina would not have been as effusive in his 
praise. Molina also could have expected that the USPHS doctors would provide treatment to the 
hospital patients. 
 Staff members at the psychiatric hospital also knew about the research. Some of the 
nurses and medical students at the psychiatric hospital assisted the doctors, told the doctors about 
deaths, and helped with experiments on large numbers of people.888 The psychiatric hospital was 
a hierarchical system and staffers followed the orders of the institution’s leaders, even though 
privately medical students criticized the experiments.889 Nevertheless, there is evidence that not 
all staff members at the hospital were aware of all the details of the experiments because the 
researchers hid their activities. Cutler complained that the “constant” observation of their 
activities by hospital staff members impeded their abilities to fully inspect the patients. To avoid 
interference by staff, the physicians conducted their research on national holidays or on 
weekends when they were better able to avoid prying hospital attendants.890 Despite the limited 
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number of staff at the hospital, Cutler acknowledged that they were committed to their jobs and 
concerned about the needs of their patients. The researchers could not enter the hospital and do 
whatever they pleased with the patients. Rather they often worked in secret and had to alter their 
schedules so that they could carry out the experiments.  
  After several months of the experiments in the psychiatric institution, Mahoney grew 
increasingly wary and wrote to Cutler, “the use of volunteer groups rather than the type which is 
being employed would be more than satisfactory. Our budget will stand for almost any fee for 
volunteers which could consider to be advisable.”891 Immersed in his research, Cutler 
disregarded his superior’s concerns and continued infecting hospital patients with the abrasion 
and scarification methods. Several months later, Mahoney had begun to sharply criticize the 
abrasion experiments. He wrote, “unless we can transmit the infection readily and without 
recourse to scarification or direct implantation, the possibilities of studying the subject are not 
bright.”892 Although Cutler continued to argue that it was vital that the research move forward 
with their work in Guatemala, Mahoney remained adamant that the intentional-exposure 
experiments stop. Cutler wrote that he took the news hard. The night he heard from Mahoney 
that he would have to end the experiments, he wrote, “I feel tonight just as I felt when the news 
came of the decision to discontinue the Terre Haute project, although the blow is harder now 
than then, for we have so much more at stake and we have highly suggestive evidence to make 
us believe that we are on the right track with respect to prophylaxis.”893  
Still, the experiments continued in the hospital and in the Army for more than a year. 
Mahoney was not apparently so concerned about the experiments that he demanded their 
                                                      
891 John Mahoney to John C. Cutler, June 30, 1947, Correspondence, Records of John C. Cutler. 
892 John Mahoney to John C. Cutler, September 8, 1947, Correspondence, Records of John C. Cutler. 
893 John C. Cutler to John Mahoney, September 20, 1947, Correspondence, Records of John C. Cutler. 
 250 
immediate termination. In fact, not until February 1948 did Mahoney finally tell Cutler it was 
necessary to “get our ducks in line” as they had “lost a very good friend” in the Surgeon 
General’s Office. His comment reflects that senior scientists concerns about the psychiatric 
hospital were again largely due to their fears about their own reputations and professions. 
Around this time, President Truman chose not to reappoint Surgeon General Thomas Parran, 
who was a key supporter of the experiments and could protect USPHS scientists from 
criticism.894 Moreover, the effective use of penicillin as a treatment led to waning political 
support for prophylaxis studies. Mahoney added that he felt the “Guatemala project should be 
brought to the innocuous stage as rapidly as possible.”895 The researchers completed their last 
exposure experiments months later, in October 1948. Finally, in December 1948, the intentional-
exposure experiments came to an end. Cutler flew back to the United States, leaving the majority 
of Guatemalans who he infected without treatment. 
 
Blood Studies on Children 
 Following the end of the intentional-exposure experiments, U.S. researchers continued 
with their blood studies for several more years. When Cutler departed Guatemala, Dr. Sacha 
Levitan, Assistant Director of the USPHS/PASB Guatemala project, stayed on to oversee efforts 
to study diagnostic tests. Levitan had arrived in Guatemala not long after finishing his tour on a 
U.S. Navy destroyer during World War II. He, like Cutler, had further been part of the research 
team that had found penicillin cured syphilis. Energized by this discovery, Levitan brought his 
zeal for research to Guatemala.   
                                                      
894 Leonard Scheele took the place of Surgeon General. John Mahoney to John C. Cutler, February 19, 1948, Correspondence, 
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 During his time in Guatemala, Levitan traveled around the country to collect blood 
samples for blood studies. Levitan carried with him his dark field microscope which he used to 
examine spirochetes, the corkscrew-shaped bacteria that cause syphilis. Levitan and his team of 
researchers did blood studies in the psychiatric hospital, the leprosy sanitarium located just 
outside of Guatemala City and with schoolchildren and orphans. U.S. and Guatemalan 
researchers first did blood studies with children in Port San José, a town near a military base on 
the Pacific Coast. Levitan also went to Antigua and Chichicastenango, towns located in 
Guatemala’s western highland region where the majority of the Mayan populations lived. 
Although the construction of the Pan American Highway in the 1930s had provided greater 
access to these communities, it took several hours for Levitan to drive to these regions.896   
 The researchers wanted to use children as experimental subjects because they thought 
they would not be sexually active and acquire syphilis during the course of the study. They also 
claimed it was much easier to diagnose hereditary syphilis than it was to detect syphilis acquired 
through sexual contact.897 With the children, researchers believed that they could be more certain 
of their results and resolve questions about false positives in the Guatemalan population. In sum, 
they thought they had finally found the most docile subjects: poor and indigenous children.  
 Dr. Juan Funes and a U.S. serologist named Joseph Portnoy took the lead in the study in 
Port San José. They chose this region because of its tropical climate which they believed affected 
the accuracy of the diagnostic tests.898 While U.S. doctors wanted to find a reliable test to use for 
the military in tropical locations, Guatemalan doctors needed to obtain accurate statistics in order 
to implement effective venereal disease control measures and fulfill their goals for national 
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eugenic improvement they set out at the beginning of the Guatemalan Revolution. They 
examined four diagnostic tests and found one to be more reliable than the others, although they 
still had concerns about false positive results. As with the exposure experiments and as was 
typical of the time, the doctors received permission for these studies from the Guatemalan 
sanitation department as opposed to from the children or their parents.899 
The children in these studies were poor, and the doctors observed that many showed 
evidence of chronic malnutrition and had problems with their teeth and skin.900 Altogether the 
physicians used 151 girls and boys who were 14 years old or younger as test subjects. In order to 
foster goodwill, the researchers provided medicine to treat malaria in the students after they had 
drawn their blood.901 They also believed that the presence of malaria could be one of the main 
causes of inaccurate diagnoses of syphilis in tropical areas of the world.902 The doctors drew 
blood from the children one time per month and inspected their bodies to determine the effects of 
malaria on the test results. The doctors could not make any definitive conclusions about the 
reasons for false positives. It appeared that factors other than malaria were responsible for the 
inaccurate results.903  
Along with the blood draws, the researchers inspected the children’s bodies for signs of 
syphilis. Scientists appeared sensitive to the Guatemalans’ wariness of vaginal examinations and 
views that these inspections were a form of punishment or a sexual violation. In Port San José, 
they only examined the boys. As mentioned in previous chapters, in Guatemala there was a 
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societal belief that only women who had transgressed norms of gender and sexuality should be 
subjected to gynecological examinations.904 This social belief may have been the reason that 
researchers only examined the genitals of male students to determine whether or not they could 
find signs of syphilis.905 They may have worried that the inspections of girls would cause outrage 
within the school and community and hurt their studies. Or the school could have requested that 
they not conduct medical examinations of the female students. It is also possible that the 
researchers did in fact examine the girls but did not publish this fact to avoid potential 
controversy. 
Researchers also used children in the national orphanage in Guatemala City in their 
studies. They collected blood samples and performed medical inspections. Here, physicians did 
perform vaginal exams upon the girls. They did not have to worry about protests from parents, 
and the staff at the orphanage cooperated. Researchers in fact commented that the orphanage was 
an ideal place for their research likely because of lack of oversight. They claimed that the 700 
children at the orphanage were under strict supervision and had regular encounters with 
physicians.906 Levitan wrote that “it was possible to do complete physical examinations of 55 of 
this group.”907 It is not clear why the doctors chose these particular children for “complete 
examinations.” Ultimately the medical doctors looked at 438 children for signs of syphilis and 
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compared the results with four different diagnostic tests.908 Some of the children also had to 
endure spinal taps, which were both painful and frightening.909  
The researchers continued collecting blood samples in the western highland region and 
throughout parts of Central America until the early 1950s. Directly before the exposure 
experiments ended, Genevieve Stout, a serologist who worked at the USPHS, arrived to head the 
Venereal Disease Laboratory and Training Center in Guatemala City, which had been 
established under the PASB umbrella as part of the deal that U.S. doctors made with Guatemalan 
officials. Senior USPHS researchers ordered her to continue with efforts to develop diagnostic 
tests that would be reliable with Central American populations and to train public health 
officials. Cutler and Levitan viewed her role as essential for controlling the venereal disease 
problem on the isthmus.910    
Stout’s demeanor indicates her efforts to gain respect from her colleagues in a 
predominantly male research environment. She had a Master’s degree and was trained as a 
serologist, but her lack of a medical doctorate also placed her at a disadvantage with many of her 
colleagues. Still, oral histories indicate that Stout managed to overcome opposition she faced as a 
woman and as a researcher. Her commanding presence made other doctors and her staff careful 
to pay her proper respect. PASB staffers recall that she cast an impressive and imposing 
character. Betty Adams, a field worker for the organization, described a “flurry of activity” 
before Stout arrived at the research sites. The staff knew that she needed to be taken seriously.911 
Yet, although Stout managed to maintain her authority in a predominantly male research 
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environment, serology work was a feminized profession. The majority of field workers who 
worked under Stout were Ladinas who were pursuing their undergraduate degrees at the national 
university concurrently.  
Despite serology being a women’s profession, it still required commanding control over 
indigenous bodies. Female serologists were not so different from the male doctors who presumed 
access to Guatemalans in the experiments. Under Stout’s direction, PASB field workers collected 
blood samples in primarily indigenous, Kaqchikel-speaking communities. The towns had names 
such as Santa Maria Cauqué, Magdalena Milpas Altas, and Santo Domingo Xenocoj. All of these 
communities were small with approximately 2000 people. Before PASB researchers arrived in 
these towns, their residents had limited contact with Ladinos and North Americans. Many of the 
members of these communities treated outsiders from the Ladino-run government and from the 
United States with suspicion. They referred to the field workers as “imperialistas” (imperialists). 
The presence of the researchers also exacerbated tensions in the communities over policies 
during the Revolution. Many townspeople opposed to the Revolution derided the researchers as 
“comunistas” (communists) and believed they wanted to undercut local structures of 
authority.912 The distrust of the researchers was partially traceable to their association with the 
Guatemalan Ministry of Health. Other townspeople more supportive of the government accused 
local community members of being superstitious and opposed to scientific advancements.  
By calling the researchers imperialists and communists, the townspeople showed that 
they viewed U.S. and Guatemalan researchers similarly. Fear of the new government had been 
exacerbated by the massacre of hundreds of indigenous Guatemalans in nearby Patzicía, 
Chimaltenango at the beginning of the Revolution. The new government had killed men, women, 
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and children indiscriminately in response to fighting that had broken out in the community 
between Ladinos and Kaqchikels over rights to land. In the Mayan communities where PASB 
researchers did their work, community members associated this massacre with the comunistas 
who ran the government.913 Many indigenous Guatemalans who lived near Chimaltenango 
viewed the new government as largely a continuation from past repressive regimes. They saw the 
state as working for the benefit of Ladinos and as violent and capricious.914 Indigenous 
communities perceived both foreigners and state workers as threats. Moreover, some of the 
researchers and doctors who visited these towns had racial prejudices and treated community 
members in a disdainful manner. This attitude only intensified distrust of the field workers. 
In the central highland region near Antigua where field workers collected most of the 
blood samples, many suspected that the researchers planned to steal and kill their children. As a 
field worker, Adams was responsible for collecting blood samples for Stout and giving the 
schoolchildren feeding supplements to mitigate the effects of malnutrition on test results.915 
Community members believed that the researchers wanted to take their children’s blood and eat 
them. Adams explained:  
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  The blood samples were just a pinprick of the fingers. The kids really  
  didn’t mind. It wasn’t like an injection or invasive at all. But some of the parents  
  when they heard that we were taking blood from the children got very concerned.  
  They thought we were fattening up the kids to export them for food to the United  
  States. I remember one gentleman told me that blood would not regenerate and he 
  had a hole in his hand that indicated that. He pointed to the hole and said that he  
  had given blood once and that it never came back.916  
 
 Adams dismissed the parents’ concerns, just as Cutler had done with the indigenous 
prisoners. Yet, the parents and indigenous prisoners who had caused Cutler so much trouble 
shared the same ideas about the body and blood. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Mayan 
healthcare understandings have held that the appropriate level of blood has to remain in place so 
that a person does not become ill nor cause illness in another person.917 
 Children, Mayans believed, were particularly prone to illness because they had weak 
blood.918 Indigenous healthcare practices included a concept of sangre débil (weak blood) or 
sangre fuerte (strong blood). They held that a person with strong blood could ward off disease as 
opposed to a person with weak blood.919 For instance, Mayans thought that children would 
become unwell if another person with strong blood gave them mala de ojo (the evil eye). Women 
wanting a child or menstruating had strong blood and threatened children’s wellbeing.920 
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Children were also susceptible to a disease called susto, which means loss of the soul.921 Since 
children were thought to have weak blood, parents viewed the blood draws as particularly 
alarming. 
 Emma Chirix, a Kaqchikel midwife and an anthropologist, explained further in an oral 
history interview that Mayan cosmologies perceive the body holistically and as interconnected 
on physical, mental, and spiritual levels.922 Although Chirix says that the Spanish conquest and 
influences of the Catholic church led some to understand the physical body and the mind as 
separate, nonetheless the holistic vision of the human has persisted. She added that Mayan 
midwives and women especially have resisted colonization by maintaining their healthcare 
beliefs and bodily practices. In response to discrimination and poor treatment by foreign actors 
and the military, Chirix explains that indigenous women have used self-care practices as a way to 
build self-esteem and maintain their self-determination. These practices have often occurred in 
the temascal, a collective hot bath taken among women in families that has long existed in 
Mayan tradition.923 Mayan women have refused to ascribe to biomedical practices and racist 
beliefs that devalue their healthcare systems, their communities, and their individual selves.924       
In Santo Domingo Xenocoj, parents claimed sovereignty over their community and 
children by wielding machetes and driving the researchers out of town. The people of Santo 
Domingo Xenocoj feared that the researchers were cannibals who were feeding upon their 
children’s blood. Parents had begun withdrawing their children from the school where the 
researchers were carrying out studies. Just a few days after the field workers took blood samples 
from the children at the school, a group of men carrying machetes threatened the school nurse. 
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They also evicted the Ladino teachers from their housing. In 1951, the mayor of the town told 
the researchers that they could no longer perform studies in the school.925  
After the community members forced the researchers to leave, the PASB hired an 
anthropologist named Raymond Scheele to investigate reasons for the townspeople’s fears. 
When Scheele arrived in the town, he said that the people called him a “tronchador,” a word for 
cannibal. As he walked through the town, women seized their children and fled from him. They 
said he was the first gringo to ever take up residence in their community. The belief dating to the 
time of the Spanish conquest that all white foreigners were cannibals had never been 
disproven.926 In these communities, people told stories about the time of the Spanish conquest 
when “giant white people” took the smallest Indians and broke their backs over their knees. The 
Spanish then “devoured” the dead.927 This story indicates that the townspeople largely viewed 
conquistadores, U.S. researchers, and Guatemalan government workers as similarly menacing. 
They came to their towns in order to withdraw not just blood but bodies and livelihood as well.     
The association between foreigners who fed upon human bodies and colonialism is not 
unique to Guatemala. Scholars have highlighted similar rumors throughout Africa and Latin 
America. Historian Luise White has written about rumors throughout different parts of Africa 
that colonial officers were vampires. These rumors were especially prevalent when researchers 
performed medical research in the communities. Many Africans believed that members of the 
colonial government and researchers took the blood of Africans in order to provide treatments to 
Europeans who had insufficient blood.928 Rather than dismiss these stories, White argues that 
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they illuminate Africans’ experiences under European colonial rule.929 In both Africa and 
Guatemala, these rumors reflect an understanding of the extractive nature of medical research. 
They show that people who were the subjects of this research knew that the researchers did not 
want to provide treatment to them. Rather they wanted to use their bodies for their own purposes.  
As the rumors suggest, indigenous Guatemalans’ resistance to the blood draws also 
reflects an ethics by which community members governed their lives. Indigenous groups were 
concerned about not only maintaining balance within humans but also among animals and plants. 
In Anthropologist Richard Adams’ notes, he observed that Kaqchikel Mayans would only 
castrate bulls when the moon was growing. They thought that the animal would lose the least 
amount of blood during this period.930 The practice of using animals or humans in medical 
experiments would have been thought to create an imbalance and threaten the health of the 
collective which was privileged in Kaqchikel cosmology.931 Mayan cosmologies upheld every 
living creature as important to sustain human life and the environment. These views stood in 
sharp contrast to those of the researchers who wanted to find human bodies to exploit. U.S. and 
Guatemalan doctors saw indigenous bodies as research objects to benefit science and other 
people who they deemed to be more valuable, although they worried about keeping their 
experiments secret from human rights advocates in the United States and Guatemala who might 




                                                      
929 Ibid., 44.  
930 Richard Adams Notebook, Informant, Ray Amir, Magdalena Milpas Altas, April 10, 1951. 
931 Emma Chirix, Ru rayb’al ri qach’akul Los deseos de nuestro cuerpo, 168. 
 261 
The Doctors’ Deception  
 As doctors were conducting their experiments and blood studies, they were also working 
hard to cover up their research. Even though USPHS doctors conducted many experiments and 
studies, they were denied some of the liberties that they thought they would have in Guatemala. 
In neither the United States nor in Guatemala could the doctors do whatever they wanted without 
risking potential controversy and legal troubles. Rather they had to ensure that the experiments 
remained a secret. This included guarding their words in the relationships with Guatemalans and 
in their own social circles.  
 When John Cutler was not working on his research, he and his wife, Eliese, socialized 
with other PASB researchers. Cutler was only 31 years old at the time that he served as the 
director of the experiments; most of the other researchers were also typically in their twenties or 
thirties. Cutler eventually grew wary of all the socializing between American researchers. He 
told Mahoney there had been “more talk than we like” about the experiments and that 
information about the research had turned up in “queer places.” Although the staff on the 
Guatemala project understood that the experiments should remain confidential, many still 
discussed them with their spouses. Cutler said that it was “quite a temptation to talk more than is 
wise” at the “frequent social gatherings.”932 Several years after Cutler’s departure, the 
experiments continued to generate discussion among PASB staff members. Some of this talk was 
negative. American anthropologist Richard Adams recalled that he found the experiments 
disturbing when he heard about them in the 1950s. He added, “it was just taking from other 
people. This is what the United States does to other countries.”933 
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  The experiments also became known among Guatemalan medical students who kept the 
silence. Dr. Juan José Hurtado, a medical student at the national university at the time, heard 
about the experiments from other medical students working in the psychiatric hospital.934 Even 
though the doctors tried to keep their research a secret from staffers there, many knew what the 
scientists were doing. Hurtado understood that the experiments were supposed to be a secret, and 
there was not much talk about them in general in the country. He too found the research 
deplorable. He called them a “barbaridad” (atrocity), adding that they happened because 
Guatemala is the “backyard” of the United States. The other students with whom he spoke about 
the experiments were also bothered by what they had heard.935 Yet, they still did not go public 
with their protests.  
Cutler in part wanted to keep the experiments secret because of the political climate. 
During the Revolution, Guatemala was a site of heightened political activism. Trade unions were 
staging protests in the capital and there was fierce competition between political groups. The 
government was often under critique by opposing factions.936 Newspaper columns also directed 
greater attention towards the plight of the poor and Mayans. The prison did not escape their 
attention. Cutler mentioned that concerns about the poor conditions of the prison had been raised 
in local newspapers.937 He had in fact mentioned in his notes that the prison was in fairly good 
condition, describing it as “poor but clean.” His description may have been part of his efforts to 
justify doing experiments there. In this contentious political climate, the doctors worried that the 
experiments would be strongly critiqued if people in certain circles learned about them.  
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 Physicians apparently also shared incorrect information with local newspapers. One of 
the most widely-read newspapers in Guatemala mentioned the experiments by U.S. doctors in 
the venereal disease hospital. An article stated that a group of gravely ill patients who could not 
tolerate arsenic therapy had been given penicillin in order to test their reactions to this 
treatment.938 The article made no mention that the doctors were in fact infecting sex workers 
with venereal disease. The newspaper reported that Cutler had come to Guatemala to train 
personnel from throughout Central America at the Venereal Disease Research and Training 
Laboratory in Guatemala City.939 The doctors wanted to have an article describing the 
experiments as therapeutic in order to allay the suspicions of local populations. In a small 
country, the presence of the USPHS doctors would likely have been noted by many in the 
general public and they might have thought they needed to clarify the purposes of their work and 
counter the rumors. 
 The contentious political climate in the United States made it increasingly important that 
word of the experiments did not reach beyond USPHS circles. U.S. doctors’ concerns stemmed 
partly from controversy associated with the Red Scare. The late 1940s were a particularly 
sensitive time for Surgeon General Thomas Parran and his colleagues at the USPHS. Parran had 
come under fire by the American Medical Association (AMA) for his support of President Harry 
Truman’s proposal for the establishment of a national health insurance plan. In their spirited 
attack on the program, the AMA had likened Truman’s program to “socialized medicine,” 
capitalizing on early Cold War concerns that communism had infiltrated the federal government. 
Truman’s decision not to appoint Parran as Surgeon General may have indeed resulted from this 
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controversy.940 Parran attempted to protect the USPHS from potential conflict by focusing on the 
creation of regionally organized health service infrastructure. The revelation of the experiments 
in Guatemala in which U.S. government doctors had illegally employed sex workers to transmit 
venereal disease would likely have brought more controversy onto Parran and the USPHS, 
especially since the Red Scare was also accompanied by conservative attitudes towards gender 
and sexuality.941 Moreover, as concerns about communism in Guatemala increased in the United 
States during the Arévalo administration, the doctors may have worried that they would have 
encountered critiques for working with members of the Guatemalan government.942    
 USPHS doctors well understood just how damaging the experiments could be to their 
reputations. In 1947, at the very moment that U.S. researchers were running experiments in 
Guatemala, the New York Times published a “note on science” that asserted that an experiment in 
which humans were intentionally exposed to syphilis would be “ethically impossible.” The 
article described the work of Dr. Harry Eagle, a former Johns Hopkins University professor who 
later worked at the NIH. Notably, Eagle had been on the committee that approved the Guatemala 
experiments. In his research, he had found that giving rabbits small doses of penicillin a few days 
after their exposure to syphilis stopped the disease from developing. The New York Times stated, 
“to settle the human issue quickly it would be necessary to shoot living syphilis germs into the 
human bodies, just as Dr. Eagle shot them into rabbits. Since this is ethically impossible, it may 
take years to gather the information needed.”943 Cutler included this “note on science” in a letter 
to Mahoney. He confided to Mahoney: 
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 It is becoming just as clear to us as it appears to you that it would not be advisable 
to have too many people concerned with this work in order to keep down talk and 
premature writing. I hope that it would be possible to keep the work strictly in your hands 
without necessity for outside advisers or workers other than those who fit into your 
program and who can be trusted not to talk. We are just a little bit concerned about the 
possibility of having anything said about our program that would adversely affect its 
continuation.944  
 
 The research in Guatemala generated a great deal of interest from high ranking U.S. 
medical officials who had spent their careers researching venereal disease. A few months after 
Cutler and his team began their research, Surgeon General Thomas Parran asked another 
colleague who had been in Guatemala studying malaria to update him on the STI experiments. 
Later that researcher relayed to Cutler that Parran was “very much interested in the project” and 
“familiar with all the arrangements.” He added that Parran spoke with a “merry twinkle in his 
eye” that “we couldn’t do such an experiment in this country.”945 With backing from the highest 
ranking medical officer in the United States, Cutler and his colleagues surely felt secure in their 
support from senior researchers.  
 Nevertheless, Parran’s endorsement for this project also came with strings attached. 
USPHS doctors remained concerned about appeasing senior venereal disease researchers who 
knew about the experiments and wanted to take advantage of the opportunities in Guatemala for 
their own research. Mahoney said that Surgeon General Parran had specifically requested that 
Cutler and his team assist “interested persons” in following-up on their questions about syphilis 
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945 G. Robert Coatney to John C. Cutler, May 17, 1947, Correspondence, Records of Dr. John C. Cutler. 
 266 
and gonorrhea. He explained that the researchers had access to “facilities” not available to 
researchers in the United States.946 Despite the pressure from Parran, Mahoney advised Cutler 
against trying too hard to please these senior researchers. “I am afraid that we will have to reject 
certain studies and risk the loss of some friends thereby,” he wrote.947  
 Still, saying no to these senior researchers proved difficult. Soon after Cutler sent his 
“note on science” to Mahoney, Van Slyke made a “hurried trip from Washington” to the 
Venereal Disease Research Laboratory on Staten Island, New York. He informed Mahoney that 
Dr. Eagle, the same doctor mentioned in the New York Times article, had threatened that he 
would complain to Surgeon General Parran that the Guatemala group had not allowed him to 
take advantage of the research opportunities there. As a member of the Syphilis Study Section, 
Eagle apparently believed that he would have the benefit of following-up on his own research in 
Guatemala. Mahoney wrote, “as you may know, he [Eagle] has done considerable animal work 
in prophylaxis in syphilis by use of penicillin and can only prove the thesis by a human 
experiment.” Eagle went to complain that the doctor in Guatemala would not allow him to 
perform the same experiment that the New York Times had just described as “ethically 
impossible.”948 By not appeasing senior researchers, the Guatemala team risked losing support 
for the experiments. Mahoney also expressed concern that there was significant “gossip” about 
the experiments in high places.949  
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 USPHS researchers further worried about how much information they should share with 
Fred Soper, who became PASB director in the middle of the experiments and was known within 
the U.S. medical community for his strong opinions. Soper was formidable both in personality 
and in physical size. His colleagues remember him as “very cold” and “very formal.” He was 
best known for his work in malaria control for the Rockefeller Foundation. In that role, Soper 
developed his reputation for his authoritarian approach to mosquito eradication. Given Soper’s 
character, the USPHS doctors tried to limit the amount of information that he knew about their 
research.950 Cutler asked Mahoney if he could send his reports directly to the VDRL rather than 
through any person in Guatemala. He planned to send the PASB the “barest summaries of our 
progress.”951 In response, Mahoney reminded Cutler that Soper was “entitled to complete 
confidence.” He advised Cutler to “be guided by your own impressions” as to how much he 
should share with Soper about the work.952 In spite of these concerns, Soper did not cause any 
problems for the researchers. His utilitarian approach to medial research appears to have been 
shared by the USPHS doctors.953    
 
Remembering the Experiments 
In December 2015, I met Marta Lidia Orellana in a café located near Guatemala City’s 
central plaza. Reaching no higher than my shoulders, Ms. Orellana held both of my hands and 
commented upon the name we share. This small gesture established a degree of familiarity 
through national, linguistic, and generational barriers.954 Now in her eighties, Ms. Orellana was 
just nine years old when she first encountered physicians in the national orphanage in Guatemala 
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City. She has described this experience to journalists and in my interview with her as sexual 
assault. The experience has stayed with Ms. Orellana for her entire life. Her testimony highlights 
the imprint that these experiments continue to have on Guatemalans’ everyday lives more than 
seventy years after they occurred.  
Throughout the interview, Ms. Orellana crouched over my audio recorder and cried. 
Although she had told this story numerous times, it never became easier to describe her 
experience. In excruciating detail and through tears, Orellana recalled that a group of physicians 
and nurses called her into the examination room. They then forced her to remove her clothing so 
that they could inspect her entire body. The doctors touched and examined her genitals. When 
Orellana asked the doctors questions, they refused to answer her. She said that they hit her. As 
with the other orphans, the doctors likely looked for signs of syphilis. These vaginal inspections 
continued regularly until Orellana left the orphanage at age 16. Years later, Orellana still cries 
each time she talks about her experiences in the orphanage. The fact that she only recently found 
out what the doctors had been doing in the country adds to the feeling of violation.955 
Orellana believes that the researchers infected her with syphilis. She remembers the 
doctors injecting her with yellow and white substances.956 Although the doctors’ notes do not 
contain evidence that the researchers infected the children, the flagrant disregard they 
demonstrated for Guatemalans’ wellbeing is consistent with the idea that they may have exposed 
children to syphilis. The doctors were also performing spinal taps to test for signs of syphilis, 
which may have given the impression (or provided an opportunity) that the doctors were 
infecting the orphans.957 When she left the orphanage at age 16 to work in a factory and as a 
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domestic worker, Ms. Orellana’s employers required that she undergo a health inspection. They 
told her that she had “bad blood.” She then married and had five children. Since the revelation of 
the experiments in 2010, three of her children have tested positive for syphilis.958 Given the 
secrecy and deception with which the researchers conducted these studies, it remains possible 
that they hid their infection of the children.959     
Ms. Orellana has been the most vocal survivor of the experiments. The spotlight that she 
has received in local and international media has made her vulnerable to people who have tried 
to capitalize upon her traumatic history. Following Ms. Orellana’s appearance in a local 
newspaper where she spoke out against the experiments, she was extorted by her neighbors who 
believed that she had been compensated by foreign aid organizations. Ms. Orellana had to move 
several hours from the capital after these threats. She and her family also told me that they had 
been approached by lawyers who had sought to use her experiences for their own financial gain.     
As Ms. Orellana and her family have persisted in their advocacy despite hardships, 
thousands more survivors and their family members have remained silent. Only a handful of 
people have come forward publicly claiming to have been subjected to experimentation in the 
forties and fifties. In comparison to other survivors, Ms. Orellana has children who are educated 
and may have had more capability to protest what happened to her in the orphanage. Since a 
number of survivors were indigenous and did not speak Spanish, they and their family members 
may still not know that they were infected with disease. Many survivors may have also passed 
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away. The Orellana family is Ladino and also lived in Guatemala City. They had greater access 
to institutions, the media, and foreign researchers than survivors who lived in rural areas.  
The silence of the majority of people who were affected by the experiments speaks to 
their powerlessness. Given the long history of state-sanctioned violence against the indigenous 
and the poor in Guatemala which includes a genocide of Mayans in the early 1980s, it is not 
surprising that survivors would not want to make themselves known to the government. 
Moreover, given the high rates of violent crime in the country and the fact that Guatemala 
struggles to recover from a 36-year civil war that comprised of the disappearance and murder of 
citizens by the state, many people have other problems to focus on aside from these experiments. 
They also may fear making themselves known to the public.  
In addition to Orellana, I interviewed Federico Ramos, a former soldier in the 
Guatemalan military during the 1940s, and his family members. Ramos did not know that he had 
syphilis until the story about the experiments broke several years ago. In El Progresso, the tiny 
mountain village where he lives that consists of only a few houses, Ramos’ son explained to me 
that the researchers had “experimented in his [father’s] blood.”960 To the Ramos family, part of 
the harm of the experiments was that they were internal and unseen. The idea that the 
experiments were “in the blood” speaks to the deceit that Guatemalans have undergone for 
decades. Ramos believed that the doctors had been carrying out a routine health examination. 
When he returned to his village, he began suffering from “bad urine.” His health problems then 
spread to his appendix and other organs.  
It was not until more than sixty years later that Ramos encountered a lawyer who visited 
his village and told Ramos what the doctors had really done to his body. He immediately went to 
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a private clinic where he paid for penicillin treatment. The clinic was located more than an hour 
from his house. After he took the penicillin, the pains went away. In a poor country that has been 
undergoing a healthcare crisis for decades, survivors like Ramos had little access to healthcare. 
He and others have been suffering from syphilis for years but never have been diagnosed and 
treated by a doctor. Since they learned about the experiments, they have found it too onerous to 
travel to the capital to advocate for reparations. Many survivors may be in similar situations 
where they do not have access to healthcare or the resources to protest what happened to them. 
Although many survivors have remained publicly silent, in private conversations 
Guatemalans spoke more candidly with me about the experiments. During conversations with 
acquaintances who I met during the course of my research, they shared with me their convictions 
that their relatives or friends were part of the experiments. One woman from Port San José, 
where the researchers took blood samples from schoolchildren in order to improve diagnostic 
tests for syphilis, said that approximately seventy families from the area claim to have been 
infected. In this port town on the Atlantic shoreline that is located near a military base, stories 
circulate about North American researchers arriving on boats looking for people upon whom to 
experiment. She offered very little other information about these boats. They may have brought 
Red Cross workers offering medical care, or they may have been related to the military base. The 
story about the boats resonates with many others that circulate in Guatemala about foreigners 
who steal body parts and children. In the early 1990s, the rumor that foreigners kidnapped 
Guatemalan children in order to cut out their organs and ship them to the United States for 
transplant led a group of Guatemalans to attack and kill a U.S. tourist.961   
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Other conversations I have had with Guatemalans reflect a view of the experiments as 
untethered to a specific moment or place. One man said that he had been infected with syphilis as 
a soldier in the military during the 1960s, years after Cutler’s records said that they occurred. I 
spoke about this topic with a young man who is of Quiché Maya descent named Eliseo Rivera 
Romero.962 He lives with his family in Guatemala’s Zone 18, one of the poorest and most 
dangerous neighborhoods in the capital. Human rights investigators have discovered that police 
officers have carried out “social cleansing” campaigns in this neighborhood in an attempt to root 
out activities by las maras, or local street gangs that first originated in Los Angeles before 
making their way back to Central America.963 In the absence of a strong state, some citizens have 
taken measures into their own hands and carried out public lynching or hired killers (sicarios) to 
go after suspected gang members. A view often shared in private within the Guatemalan middle 
class and among elites is that all residents of this neighborhood are part of the maras. It is true 
that most families within Zone 18 have to pay a tax to local gang members as a matter of life or 
death.  
Rivera suspected that his uncle was infected with syphilis when he was in the military 
during the early 1980s in El Quiché, a region located in the western highlands that endured some 
of the worst violence during the war. His uncle was forced to take part in Civil Defense Patrols 
(PAC), local militias created by the government in an effort to sow discord and weaken 
indigenous communities. PACs participated in massacres against their own communities. During 
the war, Rivera’s family fled to the capital like many other survivors of the genocide that took 
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place in the western highlands in the early eighties. Rivera’s perception that his uncle was 
infected with syphilis suggests his fears of a murderous and capricious state. I could not help but 
think that Rivera would be someone who could easily end up in experiments. Just by virtue of 
living in Zone 18, Rivera understood that many within the state and Guatemalan society view his 
life as expendable. Given that many of the survivors or their relatives likely had similar 
experiences as Rivera, it was not surprising that they have remained silent to avoid raising their 
profile with the state.   
 We will likely always know very little about Guatemalans’ experiences and perceptions 
of these experiments. Ms. Orellana’s presentation of herself as a rape survivor is a powerful lens 
into the physical and psychological harm caused by the experiments. Ramos’ view that the 
experiments occurred “in the blood” speaks to their insidious nature. Both the silence and the 
rumors communicate Guatemalans’ memories of state violence and foreign intervention that date 
back to years before these doctors arrived in the country. The stories shared in private 
conversations tell that the experiments have not been forgotten despite little public discussion of 
them.  
 
The Aftermath  
 In sharp contrast to the Guatemalans like Marta Lidia Orellana whose unwilling 
participation in experimentation caused physical and psychological harm, U.S. and Guatemalan 
researchers who performed these experiments gained access to promotions and career 
advancement. The effects of the experiments on thousands of Guatemalans provoked little 
concern for public health and military institutions in the United States and in Guatemala. 
Following the end of the research, Mahoney said that he wanted to “do everything possible” to 
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“push Funes to the fore as the leading Central American syphilologist.”964 Cutler also arranged 
for Dr. Abel Paredes Luna, a Guatemalan physician who collaborated in the experiments, to 
receive a fellowship to study with Mahoney.965   
 Despite having criticized Cutler’s methods during the experiments, senior USPHS 
scientists also promoted his career. He went on to direct a program of venereal disease control in 
India for the World Health Organization (WHO). Following his work in Southeast Asia, Cutler 
further performed an inoculation study in 1953 in New York’s Sing-Sing prison. The study was 
to test the efficacy of a newly developed vaccine for syphilis. USPHS researchers carried out this 
research in coordination with the New York State Health Department and the New York 
Department of Correction.966  
 The Sing-Sing study highlights what the doctors understood to be ethical research and 
how they broke these standards in Guatemala. In their published work on this experiment, the 
researchers wrote that they would not have performed this study unless they had verified that 
penicillin was a safe and effective treatment, which they had not yet done when conducting 
experiments in Guatemala.967 They used 54 “human volunteers” with treated or untreated 
syphilis. Researchers infected the prisoners with a bacterial strain that they obtained from 
rabbits, despite their reservations about this mode of inoculation in Guatemala. They also used a 
control group that did not receive the vaccine. To verify whether the prisoners had syphilis, the 
researchers performed blood tests on the men and spinal taps. None of the men had their penises 
abraded, and they all received penicillin treatment at the end of the study. The researchers also 
did not seek to hide the experiment from the public, unlike Guatemala which was not mentioned 
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in the reports.968 Sacha Levitan also continued to have a career in global health after he left 
Guatemala. He went to work for the WHO in Haiti on a yaws treatment program. Yaws is an 
infectious disease affecting the skin, bone, and cartilage that can lead to permanent disability and 
disfigurement. It is caused by the same spirochete that leads to syphilis. As opposed to the 
experiments in Guatemala, Levitan and his team implemented an extensive treatment program.969   
 Knowing what the doctors saw as the long-term benefits of their research is difficult 
because neither Cutler nor Levitan ever published papers on the exposure experiments. Yet, 
Cutler thought the experiments were important enough to archive them in his personal records at 
the University of Pittsburgh. From Cutler’s notes, he indicates that the doctors found that most of 
the measures that they used to prevent the spread of venereal disease were effective. He said, 
“thus choice of any agent must be based upon considerations such as acceptance of patient, ease 
of use, freedom from undesirable side effects, etc.” They also found that penicillin could be used 
as a preventative method for venereal disease if it is given to patients directly after they are 
infected.970 The doctors did not find any definitive reason for the inaccurate blood tests in 
Central America. Yet, the experiments were conducted in such a haphazard manner that these 
results remain questionable.   
The researchers appeared to view their participation in these experiments as government 
service and believed that they were building a better world. Although Government work was not 
a lucrative path for most doctors, it did bring a level of prestige. Following his career in the 
USPHS, Cutler became a professor at the School of Public Health at the University of Pittsburgh, 
where he became a “much beloved professor both at the graduate school of Public Health and the 
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Graduate School of International Affairs.”971 He also became an Assistant Surgeon General in 
the USPHS and the deputy director of the PASB.  
Guatemalan physicians also viewed their participation in the experiments as service. 
They hoped that their relationship with the U.S. doctors would benefit their country and help 
them to fulfill the Revolution’s goals. They also stood to gain personally and professionally from 
these relationships. In their quest to build Guatemala as an independent nation and a leader in the 
Central American region, they aimed to become vanguards of the Guatemalan medical 
community and participants in the international medical community. Without many resources to 
realize their vision, they made poor and indigenous Guatemalans their currency. 
That the doctors who participated in this research all advanced in their careers shows that 
leading USPHS scientists and Guatemalan military and medical officials viewed the methods 
they used in Guatemala as acceptable. Oral histories reveal that the experiments became “lore” in 
the USPHS.972  They recalled a romantic vision of “pure science” in Central America away from 
the “red tape” that hampered their research and scientific innovation in the United States. The 
secret story of Guatemala also reflects a masculine tale of conquest. In their work on these 
experiments and in the stories they shared with each other, USPSH researchers forged their 
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EPILOGUE: “THIRD WORLD” LABORATORY 
 
In the late 1940s, at the very moment that STI experimentation was underway in 
Guatemala, Surgeon General Parran was leading efforts to form the new World Health 
Organization (WHO). In 1946, Parran chaired the International Health Conference where the 
WHO draft constitution was adopted; delegates defined health as the “state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”973 Soon after 
he approved experiments that would intentionally expose Guatemalans to STIs, and while 
inquiring into their progress from his perch as Surgeon General, Parran gave speeches declaring 
that health constituted a human right for all people, regardless of their economic status or 
national origin.974   
Other doctors who oversaw and participated in the experiments also became key players 
in the post-World War II development of international health infrastructure and shared Parran’s 
duplicity. Dr. John F. Mahoney, the principal investigator for the venereal disease experiments, 
who had won fame due to his discovery that penicillin cured syphilis, chaired the WHO Expert 
Committee on Venereal Diseases at its first meeting in Geneva. As mentioned in Chapter Five, 
Drs. John C. Cutler and Sacha Levitan, the Director and Assistant Director of the experiments in 
Guatemala, went on to work for the WHO in South Asia and Haiti. Dr. Thomas B. Turner, 
professor at Johns Hopkins University who approved these experiments, further served as an 
adviser to the WHO. The same researchers who conducted “secret” experiments in Guatemala 
were integral in shaping international health in the post-World War II era.  
These doctors’ leading roles in the creation of the WHO bring to stark light 
contradictions embedded in international health during the wake of the Cold War. The 
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militarism, paternalism, and racism that informed STI experimentation in the immediate post-
World War II era also shaped international health policies and programs moving forward. U.S. 
policymakers approached health not as a human right, but rather as a matter of biological 
security that threatened the liberal world order. The bodies of certain people, mainly indigenous, 
poor, and non-white populations, both within the United States and in Latin America, Africa, and 
Asia, became key concerns of foreign and domestic policies.    
Although U.S. foreign policy had long connected biological and national security, the 
United States government pursued international health with increased vigor during the Cold War. 
The rising commitment to international health during the Cold War adhered to President 
Truman’s four-point plan to “make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of 
technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life.”975 Through 
technical expertise, the United States sought to promote capitalist development around the world. 
U.S. policymakers and medical professionals believed that disease, poverty, malnutrition, and 
overpopulation all threatened to spread communism in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Treating 
humans as machines, U.S. policies aimed to reduce the threat of communism through know-how 
about the biological functioning of bodies. This view of human security justified a continuation 
of medical violence towards women, poor, and indigenous people in Guatemala and around the 
world. These individuals also served as a resource for medical experimentation by scientists who 
sought to tap these populations in order to conduct research on diseases and other health issues 
threatening U.S. foreign policy. Often interpreted as a matter of “soft power,” the STI 
experiments show that international health could be just as violent in its application as military 
policies.  
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Throughout the Cold War, Guatemala remained a key site for medical experimentation 
by U.S. and Latin American scientists. Medical policies that Guatemalan doctors had touted 
during the 1940s also were upheld following the Revolution. As the medical arena reveals 
continuations between earlier period of dictatorship under Jorge Ubico and the Revolution, many 
similar medical policies persisted during governments that promoted counterinsurgency against 
leftist and guerilla forces in the country. Revolutionary leaders’ policies focused more on 
assimilation as opposed to the counterinsurgency during the civil war that aimed to segregate and 
control these groups.976 Yet, both revolutionary leaders and the Guatemalan right believed that 
indigenous, poor, and Afro-Caribbean Guatemalans were key impediments to national 
development and security. As Taracena Arriola has stated, they held paternalistic views towards 
these groups; racist and segregationist policies persisted throughout the twentieth century.977  
In both the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods, Guatemalan doctors and 
scientists continued to form alliances with U.S. policymakers and scientists in order to realize 
their visions of the nation and to maintain biological security. In fact, the revolutionary period 
developed the infrastructure that enabled the continuation of medical research by foreign and 
local actors on women, indigenous and marginalized Guatemalans. Although in the 1960s and 
1970s, a populist movement in Guatemala sought to change this approach to medicine and 
promoted a more holistic view of healthcare, counterinsurgent and neoliberal policies have 
destroyed efforts at reform and the realization of an approach to healthcare based upon treating 
the whole human being.   
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A “Third World” Research Model 
After the CIA-backed 1954 coup that unceremoniously ended “Ten Years of Spring” and 
ushered in 36-years of civil war (1960-1996), Doctors Juan Funes and Luis Galich continued to 
hold integral roles in the Guatemalan medical system. Beginning their careers as doctors 
heralding revolution, they promoted family planning programs during the civil war.978  Although 
doctors of leftist orientation, they found important roles within right-wing administrations. 
Ladino/a political and medical elites on both the right and the left viewed women’s sexuality and 
the reproduction of the indigenous, poor, and Afro-Caribbean as key concerns of national policy. 
Their preoccupations aligned with the U.S. government and right-wing Latin American 
governments which also held that overpopulation bred subversion and harmed national 
development within their countries.  
In the 1970s, Galich became the director of APROFAM (Asociación Pro-Bienestar de la 
Familia de Guatemala), a private Guatemalan institution devoted to reproductive health that 
became a source of controversy in the country.979 APROFAM received funding from the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) which promoted the U.S. government 
policy to quell overpopulation in poor countries around the world as part of efforts to limit the 
spread of communism. Galich heralded APROFAM for its work addressing overpopulation, for 
its efforts to preserve natural resources, and to combat malnutrition in the country through 
limiting the size of families. He said that the organization was vital for poor and indigenous 
women who needed to take control of their bodies and secure their financial futures.980 Scholars 
have found that women in Central America, the Caribbean region, and the United States did 
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indeed seek out opportunities to control their reproduction.981  Yet, like the STI experiments, 
population control programs were also informed by paternalism and eugenic understandings in 
medicine which held that primarily male doctors knew what was best for women and their 
bodies.    
Guatemalans have charged that APROFAM personnel and other U.S. and European 
international organizations performed forced sterilizations of poor and indigenous women during 
the Cold War.982 Dr. Carlos Gehlert Mata, former Minister of Health under President Vinicio 
Cerezo (1986-1991), members of the University of San Carlos Medical School, and the 
Guatemalan Catholic Bishop, Gerardo Flores, all accused APROFAM, U.S. and British agencies 
of performing a massive sterilization campaign of indigenous women without their consent 
during the 1970s and 1980s.983 In 1985, the Archbishop of Guatemala wrote a letter to U.S. 
President Ronald Reagan demanding an end to the sterilization of indigenous women by 
APROFAM and International Planned Parenthood.984 Flores called the sterilizations acts of 
genocide and “biological” and “cultural” genocide.985 He understood that the control of women’s 
reproduction was closely tied with U.S. international policy during this time period. Although 
these charges have never been definitively proven, Galich’s role in the experiments make them 
appear plausible. Moreover, the fact that forced sterilization was practiced in locations around 
the world before and during the Cold War also makes these charges seem possible. Sterilization 
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abuse has been reported among poor and women of color in the United States, Puerto Rico, 
Mexico, India, Bangladesh, Brazil, and in Peru, among other countries.986 Doctors, often 
believing their intentions to be humanitarian, routinely performed these procedures without 
obtaining women’s consent.    
The 2010 revelation of the STI experiments brought renewed attention to the history of 
sterilization abuse in Guatemala. Reports of medical violence in STI research appeared 
reminiscent of sterilization reports in the country. In December 2011, the Guatemalan 
newspaper, El Periódico, published a report proclaiming that in 1974 the major general hospital 
in Guatemala City, San Juan de Dios, conducted experiments on the sterilization of indigenous 
women without their consent. The report said that the sterilization experiments received support 
from the Population Council, which was founded in 1952 by John D. Rockefeller.987 Once again, 
Rockefeller’s name was tied to medical imperialism in the country. These charges were not new; 
reports of sterilization abuse in San Juan de Dios Hospital had been present in the country since 
the 1970s.988 During that time, the medical school at the University of San Carlos called for an 
investigation into the sterilization of indigenous women at San Juan de Dios, although the 
hospital denied that this had occurred.989 The recent article in El Periódico drew from the 
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research of a Spanish doctor who wrote a report claiming that the hospital used 
paraformaldehyde, which has historically been used to clean surgical instruments, to sterilize 
Guatemalan women. The chemical substance caused an inflammatory response in uteruses that 
apparently made women infertile.  
Although the exact details of experiments with sterilization remain unknown in 
Guatemala, written and oral evidence shows that the country did indeed continue to serve as a 
key site of research on malnutrition conducted by U.S. and Latin American scientists during the 
Cold War. Indeed, the country became a “Third World Model” in which U.S. and Latin 
American researchers investigated malnutrition in poor and indigenous communities as part of 
their efforts to solve problems of underdevelopment and poverty around the globe. Like efforts 
to stem population, malnutrition research was also tied to the U.S. concerns with biological 
security as it related to foreign policy; through addressing problems with malnutrition, U.S. 
scientists and policymakers aimed to contain the spread of communism through addressing root 
causes and effects of poverty. Latin American officials also had a vested interest in quelling 
malnutrition in order to spur national development. In 1946 during the revolutionary period, U.S. 
and Central American public health officials together created the Nutrition Institute of Central 
America and Panama (INCAP) under the PASB umbrella and with financial support from the 
Kellogg Foundation.990 Key U.S. scientists participated in the creation of INCAP.991 Yet, 
important leaders of the Guatemalan Revolution also had a role in INCAP’s creation and 
advocated that PASB locate the organization’s office in Guatemala City.  
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As during the STI experiments, revolutionary officials’ focus on regenerating the 
population helped to build the networks and infrastructure that rendered the country a site of 
research continuing into the Cold War. Dr. Julio Bianchi, the Guatemala Minister of Health 
during the Guatemalan Spring who also was privy to the STI research, pushed for the INCAP 
office to be located in Guatemala City. The organization established its first office in Guatemala 
City’s botanical garden near the Avenida Reforma, the main boulevard running through 
Guatemala City built to commemorate the liberal revolution of the late nineteenth century that 
had brought the coffee planting elite to power. Latin American medical professionals and 
scientists who supported the creation of INCAP wanted to build food and national sovereignty 
among Central American countries.992 A prominent revolutionary leader, Dr. Epaminondas 
Quintana, said that malnutrition was evident in the recruitment of indigenous soldiers to the 
military.993 As doctors pushed for solutions to eradicate venereal disease, they also sought 
external expertise about malnutrition in order to fulfill their vision for the nation and strengthen 
the country’s defense.  
Yet, following the end of the revolution, INCAP’s mission also aligned with the interests 
of right-wing authoritarian governments who also sought to combat underdevelopment and 
poverty in order to spur nation-building and quell subversive leftist groups in the country. 
Guatemalan right-wing military dictatorships upheld U.S. policies that sought to transform the 
bodies of the poor as part of efforts to suppress leftist influences and build the capitalist economy 
through increasing the vitality of workers. Despite INCAP’s alignment with right-wing policy 
goals, many of the U.S. and Central American scientists who worked on malnutrition held left-
                                                      
992 Corinne A. Pernet, “Between Entanglements and Dependencies: Food, Nutrition, and National Development at the Central 
American Institute of Nutrition (INCAP), in International Organizations and Development, 1945-1990, eds. Marc Frey, Sonke 
Kunkel and Corinna R. Unger (Palgrave, 2014). 
993 Epaminondas Quintana, “Trabajos de Guatemala, México, Honduras, Nicaragua y Paraguay,” El Imparcial, 26 de septiembre 
de 1957. 
 285 
leaning political views. They continued to believe in the relevance of their work for helping the 
poor and spurring national self-determination. Doctors also thought that their research provided 
the necessary evidence to advocate for governments to increase health and social services for 
poor communities.  
Other INCAP researchers appeared more intent on promoting their own work and 
scientific discovery than addressing the welfare of the people they studied. In one longitudinal 
study by INCAP that occurred between 1964 and 1972, U.S. and Central American scientists 
observed children in a Mayan highland community called Santa Maria Cauqué, located about 
twenty-two miles from Guatemala City near the Inter-American Highway and in the foothills of 
the Sierra Madre mountains. The Pan American Sanitary Bureau, the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the WHO, U.S. Army Research 
and Development Command, the Guatemalan Ministry of Health, among other groups, provided 
the majority of funding for the study.  
The researchers selected Santa Maria Cauqué because its location near the highway made 
it both accessible to researchers while it still remained a relatively isolated community. Mata 
wrote that the INCAP team viewed the village as representative of indigenous communities in 
Central America and in the “Third World.”994 The researchers saw the Mayan community as 
closed and timeless, reflective of dominant views of indigenous peoples by white North 
American researchers. Mata presumed, “the community must be three hundred years old 
probably dating from pre-Columbian times, is a reasonable assumption.”995 Moreover, after U.S. 
anthropologists and nutritionists conducted a survey of surrounding communities, he found that 
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Santa Maria Cauqué was more indigenous thans surrounding communities.996 In his field notes, 
Anthropologist Richard Adams, who conducted a study of communities in the region and was a 
consultant for INCAP, said that the people in Santa Maria Cauqué were “much opener in their 
talk, and seem much more willing to be involved in conversation.”997  
 In justifying the ethical grounds of his research, Dr. Leonardo Mata Jiménez, the Costa 
Rican microbiologist who oversaw these studies, called his study “the natural history of the 
health and growth of children.”998 The researchers observed the interactions between 
malnutrition and infectious disease in pregnant women and children from birth to until five years 
of age. They conducted regular measurements of the children and studied their intestinal 
infections, tracking how malnutrition and disease caused “growth retardation.”999 In essence, the 
researchers studied how deprivation caused permanent damage to the children of Santa Maria 
Cauqué. They found that the Cauqué infants were born preterm and at low birth weights at rates 
comparable to those of “the most stressful environmental conditions, for example, those 
prevalent during the siege of Leningrad.”1000 Despite acknowledging the harm that malnutrition 
and disease caused to children, INCAP researchers did not seek to better their circumstances, 
believing that any measures they took would intervene with the “naturalness” of the environment 
they studied and confound their results.  
 An oral history with a Guatemalan pediatrician named Dr. Carlos Beteta, who 
participated in the study said that the scientific protocol required that he keep Guatemalans in the 
study from receiving certain types of treatment that would interfere with research.1001 During 
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Beteta’s time working with the study, he felt discomfort as a medical doctor not able to make 
significant changes in the community to improve their care: 
 
  There was an important aspect of the study, which is that you weren’t able to 
 make radical changes in the living of the people because it would alter the entire project 
 which was based upon studying a closed community without us changing it, because if 
 we did that the results of the study would not have been genuine.1002   
 
 
According to Beteta, the people of Santa Maria Cauqué and of Guatemala did not receive much 
in return from their participation in the study. Instead, he sees the benefit of the research as for 
the “future” and for other people.  
 Scientists’ justification that Santa Maria Cauqué was a “natural” study is false; the 
INCAP team did indeed make interventions in the community. Like the syphilis study in 
Tuskegee, Alabama, INCAP researchers provided some medical services. They gave people in 
the village antimicrobial drugs to treat infectious disease, and some smallpox and diphtheria-
pertussis-tetanus vaccines.1003 In fact, part of the way that researchers sought to gain rapport with 
villagers was by offering them medical treatment. INCAP researchers also held a Christmas 
celebration, gave gifts to the children, and had piñatas for the villager. These efforts again were 
intended to secure cooperation from the community. Yet, the INCAP team did not provide 
nutritional education or food distribution, although the field staff did give dietetic treatment to 
patients with severe malnutrition. As Mata highlighted in his 1978 book of the study, The 
Children of Santa Maria Cauqué, the purpose of the research was to conduct a “natural study” 
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that “complied with national plans and government norms for rural regions.”1004 This 
methodological approach meant that the field staff provided the people in Santa Maria Cauqué 
with little to no healthcare since “no programs of general health education, nutrition, use of 
latrines, mass treatment for intestinal parasites, treatment of water supplies or vaccination were 
prescribed or effected by the central government during most of the study.”1005 The town had 
largely continued to rely upon curanderos, midwives, and other traditional medical providers. 
Researchers took advantage of poverty in the country and the neglect of the Guatemalan 
government.  
As Mata and other INCAP researchers claimed that the study was natural, Mata also 
proclaimed the humanitarian intentions of himself and his staff; he said that “all staff members 
had the conviction that the Indian deserves the same treatment as the non-Indian. Indian dignity, 
pride, problems and way of life were respected and understood.”1006 The study complied with the 
ethics of research in the United States; the NIH and U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) conducted an ethics review of the study to ensure that it adhered with HEW 
Policy on the Protection of Human Subjects.1007 According to Mata, the ethics committee found 
that “no damage or injury was imposed upon the individuals concerned and the project.”1008 
Again, the justification was that the malnutrition represented a “natural study” of the community. 
Yet, scientists produced knowledge about indigenous people in Santa Maria Cauqué that could 
be used for potentially harmful purposes. Guatemalan newspapers published reports quoting 
INCAP scientists who claimed that malnutrition and disease both impeded development and 
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harmed the “genetic potential” of individuals.1009 In a country with a long history of entrenched 
racism, this claim bolstered dehumanizing views of indigenous populations in the country.   
Moreover, in 2016 when I visited Santa Maria Cauqué, it was evident that the researchers 
did not clearly explain the study to the community at large or people who were part of the 
longitudinal study, even though Mata stressed that the researchers explained the study to 
community principales (chiefs) and leaders in language that they could understand, since more 
than half of the people in the village did not read or write.1010 When I asked community members 
if they knew about the INCAP research, including one woman who was part of the study, they 
seemed confused. Perhaps INCAP employees had explained the research to people in the village 
in different terms. As in the syphilis study in Alabama, people may have simply known about the 
research in reference to “the nurse,” referring to Nurse Eunice Rivers who most frequently 
interacted with the men and gave them medications, or in the health clinic. Yet, I also 
interviewed the former mayor of the town who had been responsible for selecting the women and 
children to participate in the study.1011 He praised Mata and INCAP for the medical care that he 
had brought to the community. Still, when I asked him about the longitudinal study that the 
INCAP team had conducted, the mayor seemed confused. As the mayor was in his eighties, he 
may have not remembered the study. It appears that Mata and other health workers did not 
clearly explain their research to community members, despite insisting to me that they had done 
so and claiming to have explained the study in their medical reports.  
 For years after the study ended, Mata continued to visit the community. He also seemed 
to believe that the study would provide information to promote better health for the people of 
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Santa María Cauqué. Dedicating his book “to her, who deserves all, to the Indian woman of 
Santa María Cauqué,” he argued for both indigenous and ladino representatives to engage in a 
national plan to develop education, environmental sanitation, and integrated health services.1012 
Yet, these goals never came to fruition. INCAP defined itself as a scientific research institution 
and not as an organization that formed public policy. The people of Santa María Cauqué served 
as fodder for research, and continue to suffer from high rates of malnutrition and disease. When I 
visited the hospital responsible for providing medical care to the department of Sacatepéquez, 
where Santa Maria Cauqué is located, the doctor in charge was distressed by her limited ability 
to help her patients. Mentioning the public health crisis in the country, she pointed to a largely 
empty cabinet and said that they comprised the medical supplies she had for the entire 
department. 
 
Squelched Efforts for Reform 
 Beginning in the 1960s, Guatemalan medical students and professors at the University of 
San Carlos sought to change medical practice in Guatemala so that it responded to grassroots 
concerns. They sought to approach human beings holistically in their social and economic 
environments, and pushed back against narrow technological or biological views of the human 
upheld by U.S. and Guatemalan medical institutions. Many left-leaning members of the medical 
school, Mayan health workers, and feminists began to sharply criticize organizations including 
INCAP, APROFAM and USAID. Accusations of forced sterilization and the longitudinal study 
in Santa Maria Cauqué became a focus of their concerns about unethical clinical practices in the 
country.1013 Even within INCAP there were critics of the study; some members, particularly the 
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health professionals, viewed Mata as very scientific and not as concerned with the humanistic 
side of the work.1014 In fact, Mata eventually left the organization due to controversy surrounding 
his study.1015 Within the organization, individuals and groups sought to advocate for the 
economic and social structural changes necessary to address malnutrition in the country, while 
others remained committed to scientific discovery and research.  
 In 1969, the medical school made strides towards realizing this vision. At the urging of 
students and professors, USAC’s medical school adopted the Actas de Reformas (Reform 
Acts).1016 Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, socialized medicine, and the global bioethics 
movement, students including José Garcia Noval, who was a medical student at the time, led the 
charge to push the medical school to adopt these reforms.1017 Students called for the medical 
school to send more students and doctors to rural areas and to better address the healthcare needs 
of the poor in rural and urban areas. In his oral history interview, Garcia said that the students 
were also influenced by medical professors at USAC who continued to uphold the values of the 
revolutionary period and doctors who had studied abroad and were interested in promoting social 
medicine in the country. 1018 Through a program established at the medical school, students 
began working in rural areas during this time period. Some but not all of the students joined 
guerilla organizations such as the EGP (Guerilla Army of the Poor) or were part of the 
communist party. Yet, Garcia claims the students were in general not radicals but idealistic and 
intent on bringing about social and economic change in the country. 
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 U.S. doctors conducting humanitarian work in Guatemala also promoted social medicine 
during this period. In 1962, a U.S. doctor named Carroll Behrhorst founded a health clinic in 
Chimaltenango, located in the central Guatemalan highlands; he sought to address the social and 
economic factors that harmed his patients’ health. He trained health promoters, or members of 
indigenous communities, in healthcare and facilitated campaigns in potable water, literacy, 
vaccination, and family planning. These health promoters went on to develop clinics that became 
important to people in rural areas.1019 Behrhorst promoted a different model of medicine that had 
been practiced by Guatemalan doctors connected to the government and U.S. organizations. 
 Behrhorst was not the only medical professional training indígenas to become health 
promoters. The 1960s and 1970s saw a rise in indigenous health promoters who joined efforts to 
develop healthcare resources and preventative medicine in the countryside. State licensing of 
health promoters came with the realization of medical professionals in the 1960s and 1970s that 
the government could not serve the needs of rural communities, or provide adequate services. 
Indigenous groups spoke 22 different indigenous languages in the countryside, and over a 100 
different dialects of those languages.1020 Churches and private agencies also began to open health 
clinics and train health promoters from indigenous communities. In 1976, a major earthquake in 
Guatemala exacerbated the problem of healthcare shortages in the countryside. U.S. and foreign 
medical professionals who came to alleviate problems with the earthquake further began to train 
health promoters to work in the countryside. As part of a popular movement in the 1970s that 
arose with the rise of labor unions in the capital and peasant organizing in the countryside, health 
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promoters began to organize in their communities and give classes on nutrition, prenatal care, 
hygiene, and the prevention of parasites. 
 Yet, the ongoing civil war squelched these efforts to develop healthcare resources in the 
countryside. The Guatemalan government and the agricultural elite soon began to suspect health 
promoters, doctors, and medical students working in poor and rural areas of subversive activities. 
As health promoters began to implement preventative healthcare, their work at times ran counter 
to the business practices of local plantations. Health promoters realized that in order to improve 
the wellbeing of their communities, they needed to change the power structure in the country. 
For example, health promoters began to question finqueros’ (plantation owners) spraying of 
pesticides on their plantations when agricultural workers were laboring in the fields.1021 By 
raising concerns about pesticide poisoning, plantation owners increasingly viewed health 
promoters as threats to their businesses. The Guatemalan military, supportive of the plantation 
owners, also suspected the health promoters of subversion. Moreover, as health promoters 
increasingly became concerned with issue of malnutrition, they began to question the fact that a 
small minority of people owned the vast majority of land and left indígenas and the poor without 
the resources to sustain themselves and their families. In their efforts to build healthcare 
programs in rural areas, health promoters’ work inevitably led them to confront the economic 
and social inequality in the country that placed indigenous and poor Guatemalans’ health and 
wellbeing at risk. 
 As the civil war entered La Violencia (the violence) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
period in which the state conducted “scorched-earth” campaigns in the highlands where the 
indigenous population is concentrated, counterinsurgency campaigns targeted health promoters. 
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The government presumed that health promoters who were working to improve the health of 
their communities through installing potable water systems or implementing community health 
projects were aiding guerillas hiding within indigenous villages. Between 1980 and 1985, 
conservative estimates indicate that the military killed at least 500 health promoters.1022 Still, 
since the majority of health promoter were indígenas and poor, adequate statistics do not exist 
about their deaths and the repression that they endured.  
 The government’s counterinsurgency campaign against health promoters extended to a 
general attack on healthcare in both urban and rural areas as a way to hamper guerillas’ strength. 
The policies that the military implemented violated the Geneva Convention which holds it a 
human rights violation to deny individuals access to healthcare during war. As the military 
believed that guerillas were hiding in indigenous communities in rural areas, these groups 
endured some of the harshest suffering during the war. General Ríos Montt, who was president 
during the most violent period of the war and in 2013 was accused of genocide of Mayan people 
(this charge was later overturned), described his military policies as “draining the sea the fish 
swim in.”1023 The military’s control of some regions of the countryside made people fearful of 
leaving their communities to attend health clinics and hospitals. Military personnel even went to 
the entrance of hospitals to check on who was entering to receive care. In the early 1980s, there 
were reports of the military kidnapping medical personnel and patients with “suspicious” 
wounds. One community worker relayed a story of a pregnant woman who had escaped from an 
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army raid of her village and went to a local hospital seeking care; when the military learned 
where she was from, they took her away. No one has seen or heard from her since.1024  
 In addition to the repression towards health promoters and hospitals, left-leaning doctors, 
lawyers and intellectuals fled the country, were “disappeared” and killed. Dr. Juan José Hurtado, 
whose interview was included in this dissertation, ran a health clinic in a poor neighborhood in 
Guatemala City. Hurtado had also worked for INCAP on programs and was connected to the 
international medical community. He had been a medical student when the experiments occurred 
and knew of them. In the interview, Hurtado called the experiments a “barbaridad” (barbarity), 
although he never came forward publicly to denounce them. In June 1982, Hurtado was 
“disappeared” by Dictator Rios Montt who has also been charged with carrying out a genocide of 
Mayan people in the early 1980s.1025 In one of his “Sunday sermons,” or his weekly broadcasted 
addresses to the nation, Montt admitted that he had taken the doctor as a prisoner and accused 
him of subversive activities against the government. 
 Yet, due to widespread pressure in Guatemala and in the United States with doctors and 
social scientists who had worked with Hurtado at INCAP, Montt allowed for his release after one 
month in a detention center. Many other doctors were not as fortunate. The archives of the 
national police and human rights reports have documented countless records of doctors, medical 
students, and professors at the University of San Carlos who were “disappeared,” fled the 
country, or murdered.1026 The repression was not just directed towards the medical profession but 
all intellectuals in the country and many middle class professionals suspected of or holding left-
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leaning sentiments. Following these murders, the military would display the bodies to terrorize 
the population and threaten them about the consequences of any actions against the 
government.1027 
 As state terror squelched the popular movement to promote healthcare services in poor 
rural and urban areas, the government increasingly used health services as part of its 
counterinsurgent policies. Once again, the government aimed to more closely connect biological 
security with national security strategies. In the 1980s under Montt’s regime, the state coupled 
terrorism with social reforms and incorporated health promoters into their infrastructure; this 
policy was called “guns and beans,” (fusiles y frijoles). The government built “model villages” 
where they forcibly resettled Mayans in a grid pattern to “re-educate indigenous people.”1028 In 
order to win the cooperation of indigenous people, the government promised healthcare in these 
towns and other services. Yet, the Guatemalan Truth Commission found that the increase of 
military spending during the war directed funding away from social development in education 
and healthcare.1029 In many of these “model villages,” people suffered from a lack of healthcare, 
malnutrition, and repression. The military organized PACs, which comprised of the forceful 
recruitment of indigenous young men into patrols of their own communities.1030 Health 
promoters were also forcibly recruited in these patrols. The intended goal of these groups was to 
weaken the fabric of indigenous communities. The PACs have also been held responsible for 
forced disappearances and killings of their own people.  
 Healthcare in the Central American region suffered further after the United States pushed 
through neoliberal reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, the Guatemalan government 
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increasingly came to rely upon multinational corporations and nonprofit groups to provide 
healthcare services to poor and indigenous communities.1031 In the present day, the government 
still fails to provide basic medical care to much of the country. Doctors have said that the rise of 
neoliberalism and lack of support from the government has led to a deterioration of morals in the 
post-civil war era.1032 The limited resources that medical doctors receive has fundamentally also 
harmed their medical practice. Garcia is convinced that the effects of the war and neoliberal 
policies have brought a crisis of ethics in the medical profession and in the country in the present 
day: 
 
   We are living in an era that is very critical from a psychosocial viewpoint,  
  from an ethical point of view and in general from a sociological viewpoint, when  
  you consider that I am becoming increasingly convinced that this has resulted  
  from a  larger force of  anomie. I think that the repression of the 1980s had   
  influences on distinct levels, but all  of them were serious. One is the end of a  
  thriving intellectual culture and within this a thriving medical culture. The war  
  corrupted the centers of medical formation, including the faculty of   
  medicine at the University of San Carlos, and the university in general. And when 
  I am talking about the end of intellectual life in Guatemala, I am also obviously  
  talking about also the deaths and the people who left Guatemala. This breaking  
  down of institutions is a social tsunami. It is not only the center of academic  
  formation but also has invaded the centers of medical attention.1033  
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 Doctors, medical students, health promoters, and intellectuals’ worked to change the 
practice of medicine in Guatemala, hoping to address the root causes of inequality, poverty, and 
poor health in the country. Their efforts were met with drastic force by the military. In the 
present day, the practice of medicine has been increasingly tied to the interests of the business 
and political elite and sullied by violence, poverty, and corruption. 
 
Limitations Surrounding the U.S. Federal Apology 
 Following the 2010 revelation of the experiments, Guatemalan doctors, some of whom 
had begun to press for reforms in medical education and healthcare during the 1960s and 1970s, 
hoped that change would finally come to the medical system. These doctors included Garcia, 
who after leading efforts to implement the Actas de Reformas at the University of San Carlos 
during the 1960s, had later become a professor focusing on bioethics in the same medical 
school.1034 Many Guatemalan doctors, especially those who had studied and worked abroad, 
knew about the important role that the syphilis study in Tuskegee, Alabama had in pushing for 
ethics reforms in medical research in the United States. Doctors believed that the STI 
experiments in Guatemala might energize a similar discussion within Guatemala concerning 
ethics and the practice of medicine in the country. They thought it was a chance to reform what 
they saw as widespread problems in the medical system that included corruption and a lack of 
government investment in resources. Doctors such as Garcia thought they might finally establish 
effective regulations and boards to oversee the medical research happening in the country.  
 The medical community’s aspirations for change were coupled with general outrage in 
the country immediately following the revelation of these experiments. In 2010, newspapers 
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published numerous articles about the experiments in the first month after the U.S. apology to 
the Guatemalan government. Many articles highlighted the experiments in relationship to the 
long history of U.S. imperialism in the country. “The backyard of beyond: this is Guatemala,” 
wrote one journalist in a national newspaper.1035 They described Guatemala an “immense 
laboratory” for medical experimentation and said that U.S. doctors treated Guatemalans as lab 
rats.1036 Journalists charged that the experiments represented another moment when the U.S. 
government had facilitated “limpieza social” (social cleansing) of Guatemalans; the other 
example mentioned was sterilization campaigns against indigenous women.1037 They compared 
the experiments to the CIA’s orchestration of the 1954 coup of Jacobo ´Arbenz Guzman, the 
creation of the School of Americas, the U.S. Army’s training facility which was attended by 
Latin American military personnel who later committed torture and massacres during the war, 
and President Ronald Reagan’s funding Rios Montt’s genocidal policies. Other articles focused 
the blame more specifically on individual doctors; one journalist referred to USPHS director, 
John Cutler, as a “medical assassin.”1038 Newspapers held that Guatemalans should be fairly 
compensated for what happened to them, and that Guatemalan immigrants in the United States 
should be granted refuge and a path to citizenship.1039 Journalists held that the U.S. apology was 
insufficient to address the wrongs that had occurred not just during these experiments but 
throughout the long history of U.S. imperialist policies towards the country and Central 
American region at large.1040 
                                                      
1035 Juan Luis Font, “Gloriosa desverguenza,” El Periódico, 4 de octubre de 2010. 
1036 Edgar Gutiérrez, “Un inmenso laboratorio,” El Periódico, 7 de octubre de 2010. Dina Fernández, ¿Víctimas o culpables?” El 
Periódico,” 6 de octubre de 2010. 
1037 “Crímenes ocultos,” Prensa Libre, 4 de octubre de 2010. 
1038 Edgar Gutiérrez, “Un inmenso laboratorio,” El Periódico, 7 de octubre de 2010. 
1039 Karen Marie Fischer Pivaral, “Demanda por Delitos de Lesa Humanidad Contra los Estados Unidos de América,” Prensa 
Libre, 8 de octubre de 2010. 
1040 Edgar Gutiérrez, “Un inmenso laboratorio,” El Periódico, 7 de octubre de 2010. 
 300 
 The fact that the experiments occurred during the revolutionary period was also a source 
of controversy in the country. To complement the U.S. Bioethics Commission’s investigation of 
these experiments, President Alvaro Colom, a leftist and former guerilla during the civil war, 
created a commission to research the experiments and the participation of Guatemalan officials 
and institutions. The commission included the country’s Vice President and a medical doctor, 
Rafael Espada, medical doctors, anthropologists, and archivists. Colom claimed that President 
Arévalo had not known about what had occurred.1041 The family of Arévalo also defended him 
and said that he had been unaware of the experiments.1042 As mentioned in Chapter Four, 
Arévalo noted in his presidential yearly report that U.S. researchers were in the country 
conducting research on STIs, although the extent of his knowledge about what they were doing 
remains unclear. Other newspapers called for a thorough investigation into the roles of 
Guatemalan officials in these experiments. Nevertheless, conducting an investigation into what 
occurred in Guatemala was difficult given the fact that many had been destroyed previously, 
including some of the archives of the Asilo de Alienados that had burned during a fire in the 
1960s.  
 Since this initial attention to the experiments, there has been little public focus on them. 
Problems in the country that include the profound insecurity that has resulted following the war 
from drug trafficking, gang violence, and poverty, continue to take center stage in national policy 
and discourse. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously in this dissertation, openly there is little 
discussion about experimentation. As Linda Green found in her study of Mayan widows 
following the civil war, silence can be a strategy of survival.1043 Yet, in private conversations 
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people tell tales of experimentation, body snatching, and organ harvesting by gringo/as and 
foreigners.1044 Some researchers have attributed these stories to the war. During the height of the 
scare about international adoption during the 1990s, when a criminal network emerged in the 
country to steal and traffic children, a community lynched one American woman taking 
photographs of children because they suspected her of kidnapping.1045 My research shows that 
these stories have a much longer legacy in the country. Even in the 1940s, communities told 
stories about cannibals who ate children and tried to steal their blood. Dating at least to the time 
that the Rockefeller Foundation and United Fruit operated in the country in the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Guatemalans have been routinely subjected to experimentation. The stories 
speak of the frequency by which Guatemalans have been subjects of medical violence, and their 
keen understanding about the extractive nature of the international medical research community. 
 Still, another reason why there has not been as much mobilization around the experiments 
likely also stemmed from the way that the United States orchestrated the 2010 federal apology to 
Guatemala. In other apologies that have occurred in the United States for sterilization abuse and 
Tuskegee, Alabama, advocates pressed the government for years to apologize.1046 This pressure 
on the U.S. government facilitated mobilization and organizing of advocacy groups. Since the 
U.S. government knew about the experiments in Guatemala well before their revelation to the 
public, they were able to better manage the dissemination of information.  
 Professor Susan M. Reverby, who made the discovery of the experiments in Guatemala 
during her research on the USPHS “Tuskegee” syphilis study at the University of Pittsburgh, 
first went to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) with her findings. Following years of 
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research on Tuskegee, Alabama, Reverby had developed a friendship with Dr. David Sencer, 
who was at the time the CDC director. Reverby believes that President Barack Obama’s 
administration readily agreed to apologize for these experiments as a gift to Sencer who had 
endured controversies during his time as administrative head due to the backlash surrounding 
Tuskegee, Alabama and later the immunization program for the swine flu.1047 To curb another 
controversy at the end of his tenure, Reverby believes that the U.S. government immediately 
moved forward with the apology. By issuing an apology that coincided with the revelation of the 
experiments, the U.S. government was also better able to control the message of what occurred 
during this research, as opposed to what happened with the USPHS “Tuskegee” study which was 
revealed through a newspaper article published by the Associated Press.  
 The Guatemalan government also sought to stem controversy about the experiments. 
Attention to the experiments focused more on domestic political and foreign policy concerns of 
the government rather than the needs of people who had been subjected to experimentation. In 
October 2011, the Guatemalan government published “Consentir al Daño,” (Consent to Harm) 
based upon a search of archival documents in the country.1048 In his 2014 article, (Pending Issue: 
Medical Experiments, Guatemala, 1946-1948,” (Tema Pendiente: Experimentos Médicos, 
Guatemala 1946-1948) Garcia discussed the limitations of the Guatemalan and U.S. reports. For 
starters, he questioned the reason that the front of the Guatemalan report does not depict the 
venereal disease experiments in Guatemala but rather has a photograph of African Americans in 
the Terre Haute, Indiana experiments during World War II (in actuality, the photograph is of 
African Americans subjected to experimentation in Holmesburg Prison in Philadelphia). 1049 
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During an oral history interview, an anthropologist named Jorge Solares who worked on the 
Guatemalan medical commission that investigated the experiments and was also unsatisfied with 
the final report, claimed that the Guatemalan government used this photograph to appeal to 
Obama.1050 He believed that through this picture, Guatemalan politicians sought to build 
diplomatic channels with the U.S. government rather than to engage with the Guatemalan 
survivors of the experiments. The photograph may also have been an effort to connect the 
Guatemalan experiments to the syphilis study in Tuskegee, Alabama. Moreover, the Guatemala 
report argued that the experiments represented a violation of national sovereignty; the 
government likely wanted to call attention to the U.S. role in these experiments and downplay 
Guatemalan government institutions and officials’ complicity.  
 Noval highlighted other issues with both the U.S. and the Guatemala report. In order to 
grasp what occurred in Guatemala, Noval said it was necessary to also understand what occurred 
in the USPHS research in Tuskegee, Alabama and in Terre Haute, Indiana, when researchers also 
infected prisoners with gonorrhea during World War II.1051 Noval also took issue with the title of 
the Guatemala report, “Consentir al Daño” (Consent to Harm); he said that the title placed 
culpability on Guatemalans who allegedly consented to be experimented upon, rather than the 
government officials who used manipulation and power to coerce people into 
experimentation.1052 He also further hoped that the Guatemalan government and intellectual 
community would host interdisciplinary workshops in which experts would discuss the 
experiments and their implications. Yet, none of this has yet to come to fruition.   
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 As opposed to this absence of national discussion surrounding the experiments, several 
lawsuits have cropped up demanding reparations for the wrongs committed more than seventy 
years ago. Some Guatemalans have dismissed the lawsuits. For one, Solares called the lawsuits 
“negocios” (business), suggesting they were more about money than addressing the ethical 
concerns associated with these experiments.1053 The lawsuits have highlighted issues with 
seeking justice for wrongs committed in countries against foreign and imperialist powers. They 
show Guatemalans’ limited power to hold foreign and national organizations accountable for 
wrongs committed in the past. In 2012, the first case filed against sitting U.S. government 
employees by U.S. and Guatemalan lawyers on the part of plaintiffs who claim to have been 
subjected to experimentation was dismissed by the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia on the grounds of “sovereign immunity,” meaning that the United States government 
cannot be prosecuted for acts that it conducted in foreign countries.1054 This law denies the 
United States’ deeply intimate involvement with Guatemalan affairs over the course of the 
twentieth century. Although the lawsuit was also dismissed on the grounds that it sought to hold 
current U.S. government administrators accountable for wrongs committed years ago, it further 
highlighted the limitations of international law. The federal judge who dismissed the lawsuit 
encouraged victims of the experiments to appeal to politicians for compensation, noting the 
problems they would have gaining reparations through the courts. 
 Since the dismissal of this lawsuit, two other lawsuits are underway. In one, lawyers 
representing 774 Guatemalans who comprise of survivors, spouses, children, and grandchildren 
of people subjected to experimentation, have a $1 billion dollar lawsuit against Johns Hopkins 
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University, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the pharmaceutical company Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company, and demanded reparations.1055 In the complaint, the lawyers charge that Johns 
Hopkins and Rockefeller as institutions and through their employees, “created and designed the 
Guatemala Experiments; approved and recommended them for funding; oversaw, monitored, 
encouraged, directed, and aided and abetted them while they were ongoing; and helped conceal 
their unethical, immoral, and tortious nature.”1056 In regards to the pharmaceutical company, the 
complaint says that the organization used the experiments to further their research on penicillin 
and also “helped to conceal the unethical, immoral, and tortious nature of the Experiments.”1057 
As Mining Bodies has shown, although U.S. government organizations ultimately were 
responsible for these experiments, the medical network that enabled these experiments to occur 
involved both the private and the public sector. Johns Hopkins and the Rockefeller Foundation 
were certainly integral parts of the culture of medical research community that emerged during 
the mid-twentieth century and that enabled these experiments to occur. The question remains, 
however, of whether a legal path to justice can account for the systemic nature of the medical 
system in these lawsuits, or just focus on the specific organizations that conducted this research. 
 The other lawsuit, filed by the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala 
(ODHAG), has charged the U.S. and Guatemalan government for human rights abuses 
conducted during the experiments.1058 OHDHAG, which provides legal assistance and 
community support to victims of human rights violations, filed the lawsuit in the Inter-American 
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Commission of Human Rights. The organization has focused the majority of its efforts on 
seeking justice for human rights violations committed during the war. Most significantly, in 1998 
the ODHAG published the Recovery of Historical Memory (REMHI) Project which documented 
human rights abuses during the civil war and found the military responsible for the majority of 
violations. Immediately following the publishing of the report, Bishop Juan Gerardi, head of the 
REMHI project, was murdered by members of the military outside of his home. His efforts to 
highlight the abuses of what occurred during the war resulted in losing his life. Medicine and 
healthcare represents a new focus for the OHDAG and has been promising to many Guatemalans 
seeking to change the healthcare system in the country and address the wrongs committed in the 
past through medical violence.  
 
Continued Public Health Crisis and Medical Experimentation in Guatemala 
 Yet, unfortunately, recent events in the country have exacerbated the healthcare crisis in 
the country. President Jimmy Morales, with the support of politicians and businessman who 
support the entrenched power inequality in the country, are forcing out the International 
Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), an anti-corruption agency overseen by the 
United Nations and supported by the United States. Formed in 2006, CICIG has sought to 
overturn the repressive state-security agencies formed during the war and to address deeply 
seeded corruption in the country. Lucrecia Hernández Mack, daughter of indigenous-rights 
activist and anthropologist Myrna Mack, who was killed by the Guatemalan military in 1990, 
headed Guatemala’s Ministry of Health during the Morales administration. Through CICIG and 
the Attorney General’s Office, Mack sought to remake the healthcare system and to combat the 
public health crisis in the country. “Corruption is what prevents the state from forming and 
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implementing public, social, and economic policies that can improve the conditions of the 
population,” she said.1059 Yet, Mack’s efforts made her the target of a smear campaign; she 
eventually resigned. Hospitals and health clinics in Guatemala continue to be short on 
medications and supplies. Moreover, preventable diseases are spreading throughout the country. 
    The continued public health crisis in Guatemala has rendered the country a useful site 
for medical experimentation by pharmaceutical companies in the present day.1060 Some 
Guatemalan medical doctors have formed Contract Research Organizations (CROs) to help set 
up and profit from clinical trials conducted by multinational corporations. These pharmaceutical 
companies protect themselves by saying that their clinical trials undergo institutional review 
boards organized by CROs in conjunction with local governments in these countries. Yet, in 
Guatemala, the same doctors who have written ethical guidelines for medical research in their 
countries run the CROs. Having a bioethics board and ethical guidelines is strategic to 
pharmaceutical companies’ business model. CROs also market the “treatment naïve” populations 
in poor countries in Guatemala and other Latin American and African countries as beneficial to 
pharmaceutical companies who do not want the results of their studies to be confounded by other 
drugs. In Guatemala, people are “treatment naïve” because they do not have access to healthcare.       
  Guatemala is certainly not the only poor country used by multinational corporations for 
clinical trials and experimentation. During the 1990s, the NIH and CRC encountered criticism 
from the medical community and activists for research it funded in Africa, Thailand, and the 
Dominican Republic on AZT drugs which were known at the time to reduce pregnant women’s 
transmission of the AIDS virus to their children.1061 In these studies, researchers gave some 
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women different levels of the drug than understood to be “standard of care” in the United States, 
and provided others with a placebo. The trial was intended to help poor countries find affordable 
and effective methods of preventing the spread of HIV to babies; since AZT drugs were so 
expensive yet understood to be “standard of care” in the United States and Europe, researchers 
sought a less expensive way to treat women and their children.  In an editorial in the prestigious 
New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Marcia Angell, then editor of the journal, likened the 
AZT research to the Tuskegee, Alabama study and stated “there appears to be a general retreat 
from the clear principles enunciated in the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki as 
applied to research in the Third World.”1062 Like the syphilis study in Tuskegee, Alabama, and 
the malnutrition studies in Guatemala, researchers defended the study based upon the premise 
that these women not have been able to obtain access to this care.1063 Again, the premise that the 
research was a “natural study” was used as an ethical justification for this study. 
 While this research became controversial, other studies funded by the NIH now are 
largely conducted in private and non-academic medical centers that remain unregulated by ethics 
review boards.1064 As shown in Guatemala, CROs in poor Latin American and African countries 
arrange for clinical trials to place according to the ethical norms in their countries, which differ 
from standards in the United States and in Europe. Doctors in poor countries seek to augment 
their salaries by competing for contracts with pharmaceutical companies. As Melinda Cooper 
and Catherine Walby observe, medical practitioners in poor Latin American and African 
countries play a dual role of health provider and contractor for pharmaceutical companies.1065 
                                                      
1062 Dr. Marcia Angell, “The Ethics of Clinical Research in the Third World,” New England Journal of Medicine, September 18, 
1997.  
1063 Ibid. 
1064 Melinda Cooper and Catherine Walby, Clinical Labor: Tissue Donors and Research Subjects in the Global Bioeconomy, 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014): 149. 
1065 Ibid, 151. 
 309 
Medical subjects for clinical trials also include undocumented immigrants because they do not 
need to show residential status. Although medical research is different today than it was in the 
1940s, American and European healthcare systems take advantage of social and economic 
inequality in other countries and the world system in order to locate bodies for medical research. 
Researchers should follow the same ethical guidelines in their own countries as in impoverished 
regions and countries of the world. Moreover, the experiments in Guatemala also highlight that 
historical memory and understanding of wrongdoing in experiments continue to be defined by 
same institutions and historical actors who have been responsible for research. The grassroots 
concerns and ethical understandings of the people who have been subjects of public health 
programs and experiments continue to be silenced in discourse on international law and medical 
ethics.  
 As poor countries and people continue to be rendered sites of experimentation, the people 
who foreign researchers and multinational corporations use as resources for their clinical studies 
also continue to be construed as biological and national security threats. As the United States 
government turns a blind eye to medical research in Latin America and Africa on the poor, 
minority groups, undocumented immigrants within the United States, U.S. policymakers 
represent people from Central America as “thugs,” “animals,” and disease carriers. Policymakers 
often refer to an “invasion” on the U.S.-Mexico border, as if speaking of the United States at war 
with immigrants or in relationship to the containment of the spread of diseases. Most recently, 
President Donald Trump has sought to build a wall to keep people from Central America from 
crossing the U.S. border because he claims that they represent a key national security threat. 
Once in the United States, these people are also denied medical attention in detention facilities. 
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At least five Guatemalan children have recently died in detention centers.1066 The lack of 
provision of medical attention indicates the extent to which members of the U.S. government and 
institutions have dehumanized people from this region of the world, while the healthcare system 
capitalizes upon their labor in clinical trials. 
 Indeed, one of the most disturbing continuities between the period of the 1940s and today 
is the views that U.S. policymakers, doctors, and administrators have of people in Central 
America. The racism that enabled doctors to conduct medical experimentation in Guatemala is 
also evident in U.S. immigration policies that endangers the wellbeing Guatemalans, Honduras, 
and Salvadorans. People from this region of the world continue to be depicted in U.S. discourse 
and national policy as biological and national security threats. Yet, in contrast to the paternalism 
of the Cold War, now U.S. policymakers blatantly disregard efforts to improve the economic and 
social circumstances of Central Americans. Rather as people seeking to cross the U.S. national 
border, these men, women, and children are viewed both as resources and as existential threats to 
the U.S. nation. The United States has sought both to eliminate the danger posed by Central 
American bodies by keeping them outside of the country and by funding efforts in the Central 
American military and the police to increase surveillance of them. This view of these people as 
threats to the nation means that the U.S. and Central American governments do little to contain 
multinational organizations from capitalizing upon their bodies for medical research.     
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 The experiments on STIs resulted from systemic factors present in U.S. and Guatemalan 
histories. They arose as a result of imperial circuits of public health and medicine that the United 
States established in Central America and the Caribbean during the twentieth century. In 
America’s backyard, a region defined by its intimate connections with a decidedly more 
powerful United States, medical institutions and professionals from both countries created a 
research network. In turn, a culture of medicine arose through border-crossing individuals 
contact with each other and institutions such as Johns Hopkins University, USPHS, PASB, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, United Fruit Company, and also through connections with Central 
American and Caribbean individuals and institutions. 
 Across national borders and histories, paternalism and racism bonded U.S. and 
Guatemalan doctors. Doctors from both countries, based upon their while male identities and 
their professional accomplishments, viewed themselves as uniquely positioned to determine 
which Guatemalans should be subjected to experimentation and the research protocols they 
should follow in a laboratory setting. This attitude was also informed by norms in medical 
research in the United States during the mid-twentieth century, a period when institutional 
guidelines gave individual researchers considerable freedom over their work in the laboratory, 
except in the realm of research on sexuality and reproduction. Still, U.S. doctors believed that 
their work in Guatemala enabled them to escape from these restrictions they faced in their own 
country. U.S. doctors’ identities as white male medical professionals in a country at the height of 
its world power, and Guatemalan doctors’ views of themselves as Ladino leaders of a country 
embarking upon a revolution, formed their views of themselves as above the ethics and laws. 
 312 
Through their fraternal bonding, they justified and intensified their violence towards Guatemalan 
men, women, and children.   
 The experiments also grew out of a long history of state repression in Guatemala that 
extended to the fields of medicine and public health. Although scholars, journalists, and activists 
have heralded the Guatemalan Spring as a break from violent state policies towards women, 
indigenous, and marginalized Guatemalans, the experiments reveal an intensification of state 
efforts to mold bodies that fit a Ladino and patriarchal notion of nationhood. Although efforts to 
grow the state during this period have been viewed as humanitarian, in practice they brought 
more encroachment into the lives of sex workers, indigenous Guatemalans, prisoners, psychiatric 
patients, soldiers, gay and lesbian Guatemalans, orphans, and schoolchildren.  
Guatemalan revolutionary leaders’ stories further highlight the challenges of forging a 
revolution in a geopolitical order marked by sharp inequality. This challenge has been faced not 
only by Guatemala but also by countries throughout Latin America during the twentieth century, 
including Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Cuba. In doctors’ efforts to create 
Guatemalan bodies anew and to forge national development within the context of economic 
dependency on the United States, they established a deal with U.S. doctors that ran directly 
counter to those ambitions. As a result of the experiments, more Guatemalans became infected 
with disease and distrustful of biomedicine. Indeed, Guatemalan doctors compromised their 
stated values to protect the health of the Guatemalan populace in their efforts to secure the 
technical knowledge and resources needed to achieve this goal. Although a political revolution, it 
remained limited in the changes that it brought to social conditions in the country. Perhaps had 
the revolution been able to develop without the 1954 intervention from the United States it 
would have brought about more grassroots change and gone further to upend the entrenched 
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ethnic and class inequality in the country. Nevertheless, as these experiments reveal, the power 
structure held by Ladinos was so strong that ethnic and gender inequality likely would have 
persisted in the country.  
 In these experiments, U.S. and Guatemalan doctors also created new identities for the 
Guatemalans they experimented upon as medical subjects. These men, women, and children do 
not fit into a neatly categorized group; they were indigenous, Ladino/a, Afro-Caribbean, 
institutionalized populations, women, men, children, gays, and lesbians. They were the 
populations that Guatemalan doctors connected to the revolution sought to discipline and reform 
through public health policies, but who they were also willing to sell as medical subjects to reap 
technological resources, financial gains, and career advancement from foreign doctors and 
institutions in their quest to realize their revolutionary mission. Both through discipline and the 
harvesting of bodies, Guatemalan doctors embarked upon the elimination of their diverse 
identities so that they could realize their Ladino vision of the nation.  
 U.S. doctors had much less investment in these individuals; they were accessible 
populations who they could use for research away from laws and ethics in the United States. U.S. 
doctors selected the groups in this research on the basis of their location in the Central American 
and Caribbean region, rather than through their understandings of their racial identities. Yet, in 
their writings, U.S. doctors described these Guatemalans as indigenous, due to their views of all 
people in the country, but also perhaps because of their efforts to defend the relevance of their 
conclusions. As opposed to Tuskegee, Alabama, where USPHS officers conducted experiments 
specifically to study the manifestation of disease in African Americans, doctors viewed results 
collected from indigenous bodies as easier to justify having universal application. While USPHS 
officials viewed race as completely determinative for African Americans, U.S. doctors could 
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more easily erase the identities of the indigenous people they experimented upon in Guatemala. 
These views fit into a long history of U.S. imperial policies in which one drop of black blood 
was viewed as tainting the white race, whereas indigenous blood was seen as capable of being 
erased and incorporated into white identity.      
 Still, although we have an understanding of U.S. doctors’ views of this history, there is 
much we do not know about the experiments due to the inaccuracies of Cutler’s record and from 
the silences of many people in Guatemala. These experiments highlight the challenges of writing 
histories of medical violence towards marginalized peoples living in poor countries around the 
world. With few archival resources available, we often rely upon the records of medical 
professionals; in this case scholars and journalists have based their accounts of this history 
mainly from John C. Cutler’s medical notes. Yet, Cutler was often carelessness in keeping these 
records and on multiple occasions evaded giving a frank depiction of what he did in the country. 
He often did not record all of the names of the people he subjected to experimentation, and left 
some people out of his notes altogether. By relying upon the records of doctors such as Cutler, 
we reinforce their vision of themselves as arbiters of ethics, law, and history.  
    Researching the history of these experiments highlights that in order to avoid 
privileging the viewpoints of perpetrators of violence and colonial administrators, we need to 
take seriously the claims of Guatemalans subjected to experimentation, even when we find no 
evidence of their accounts in written records. Marta Lidia Orellana’s story and name cannot be 
verified in Cutler’s papers, but she provides a powerful testimony of the bodily harm 
experienced by Guatemalans who encountered doctors during the 1940s. Although no evidence 
indicates that doctors infected people in San José with STIs, the stories that Guatemalans tell 
each other medical brigades arriving in boats to conduct medical research indicate the horror 
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experienced by people who have encountered foreign doctors, and their enduring trauma. The 
silences also communicate peoples’ experiences of medical violence. They indicate the deceit of 
doctors who did not inform people about their experimentation, and they also suggest 
Guatemalans’ fear and hopelessness in pursuing justice against the U.S. and Guatemalan 
governments. 
 Indeed, the challenge of writing a history of medical violence that occurred more than 
seventy years in Guatemala reflects the process by which U.S. empire becomes erased from 
historical memory. By not publishing a paper and concealing his notes, Cutler helped to keep the 
experiments within a closed community of USPHS, PASB, and Guatemalan doctors and 
researchers. These researchers continued to tout their work and the United States’ involvement in 
the world as humanitarian, while concealing what they knew would be controversial aspects of 
their research and public health initiatives. Nevertheless, the fact that Cutler preserved these 
records on Guatemala points to his desire to reveal the secret of what occurred. He apparently 
believed in the importance of his research in Guatemala, or may have also maintained a perverse 
pride in the power that he exerted over people in the country. In both hiding and preserving his 
medical notes, he kept tabs on what many would view as the official record of this history, even 
as people in Guatemala told each other stories about medical abuse. 
 The U.S. social science researchers working in Guatemala likewise knew of the 
experiments but did not speak of them publicly. U.S. anthropologist Dr. Richard Adams, one of 
the giants of Guatemalan scholarship who lived many years of his life in the country with his 
wife, Betty, who descended from German coffee planters, knew not just about the STI research 
but also the studies on river blindness and on malnutrition. In all of his writings on Guatemalan 
history, Adams never thought it important to write about the history of medical experimentation 
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and research in the country. Perhaps because Adams was part of the PASB research community 
and a close friend of INCAP Director Nevin Scrimshaw, he decided that writing about the topic 
would compromise his own status in the country. The medical research network extended not 
just to medical doctors but also to anthropologists and other social scientists. During my 
interview with Adams, he dismissed the STI experiments as an uninteresting area of research. 
“This is just what the United States does to small countries like Guatemala,” he said. Similar to 
how USPHS doctors in Tuskegee, Alabama failed to see wrongdoing because they viewed their 
research as a “study in nature,” Adams appeared to also view it natural that the United States 
would treat Guatemalans in this manner and that such experiments would occur in the Central 
American and Caribbean region.   
 Likewise, among members of the Guatemalan medical establishment, the experiments 
were known but never denounced publicly. Dr. Juan José Hurtado, a champion of the poor who 
was disappeared by General Rios Montt during the early 1980s for suspected subversive activity, 
knew about what had occurred with the STI research but never denounced these experiments in 
his publications. Although he called these experiments a “barbaridad,” Hurtado explained what 
occurred as just what the United States does to people and countries in its “backyard.” Like 
Adams, he viewed the experiments as the natural order of hemispheric politics between the 
United States and the Central American and Caribbean region. Hurtado’s response, which 
focused on wrongdoing by the United States, may also reflect a hesitation to criticize the 
Guatemalan Revolution, which continues to be heralded by the Guatemalan left. Many 
Guatemalan leftists may want to hide the fact that Guatemalan government leaders during this 
time period also aligned with U.S. imperial networks and continued with repressive policies 
towards the poor and marginalized in Guatemala. This position remains understandable given the 
 317 
history of violence perpetrated by right wing governments during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Nevertheless, through Guatemalans’ refusal to recognize the imprint of U.S. 
imperialism on the revolutionary period and how it limited aspirations for change, they also 
participate in the erasure of this power dynamic from historical memory.  
 Although the experiments remain hidden just like U.S. empire appears invisible to many 
in the United States, they were known to the Guatemalans who were the subjects of this research. 
Orellana did not understand exactly what the doctors she encountered had done to her body, but 
her experience of assault has remained palpable. Ramos also did not erase from his memory his 
encounter with medical doctors, as he struggled with his health and his ability to work to support 
his family. In indigenous communities and poor urban neighborhoods, tales of organ trafficking 
and body snatching speak of the horrors of medical violence in the country. Although not 
necessarily known as experiments, because the doctors never explained their research to the 
Guatemalans they infected with disease, the memory of these experiments and others remain in 
the country. By calling these stories rumors, we mitigate people’s experiences and the real 
history they communicate with each other medical violence in Central American and Caribbean 
communities.  
 As the experiments remained hidden from white, middle and upper class Guatemalans 
and Americans not directly involved in the medical research community, U.S. empire remains 
invisible to many within U.S. society. Nevertheless, the effects that U.S. power has had on the 
Central American and Caribbean region are starkly apparent to people who have been the 
subjects of experimentation and other violent imperialist policies. Their stories are the ones that 
remain so difficult for historians to uncover, and that are readily dismissed by academic 
researchers and journalists seeking to verify their reports with written archival documents of the 
 318 
past. Yet, the harm inflicted upon Guatemalan bodies and their memories of the violence provide 
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